

Organisation internationale du Travail
Tribunal administratif

International Labour Organization
Administrative Tribunal

*Registry's translation,
the French text alone
being authoritative.*

T. (No. 9)

v.

Interpol

140th Session

Judgment No. 5023

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL,

Considering the ninth complaint filed by Ms V. T. against the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) on 26 October 2021 and corrected on 29 November 2021, Interpol's reply of 4 May 2022, the complainant's rejoinder of 23 September 2022, and Interpol's surrejoinder of 16 January 2023;

Considering the additional documents and information submitted by Interpol on 17 February 2025 in response to requests for further submissions from the President of the Tribunal;

Considering Articles II, paragraph 5, and VII of the Statute of the Tribunal;

Having examined the written submissions and decided not to hold oral proceedings, for which neither party has applied;

Considering that the facts of the case may be summed up as follows:

The complainant challenges the dismissal of her complaint of institutional harassment.

Facts relevant to the present dispute are set out in Judgments 5017, 5018, 5019, 5020, and 5022, also delivered this day, concerning the complainant's second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth complaints, relating to the redefinition of her duties as a result of a restructuring, her placement on compulsory leave, the abolition of her post, the termination of her appointment and the dismissal of her

complaints of moral harassment against two of her superiors. Suffice it to recall here that on 1 March 2007 the complainant joined the Organization at its Headquarters in Lyon, France, as Assistant Director for the Human Resources Management Sub-Directorate, on a three-year fixed-term contract. Her appointment was confirmed in February 2008 and converted into an indeterminate appointment in July 2009. She left Interpol on 7 May 2019.

On 31 October 2018 the complainant submitted a complaint to the Secretary General alleging institutional harassment which resulted in particular, according to her, from the events that had led to her previous complaints to the Tribunal. She mentioned 17 events that had occurred between 19 December 2017 and 31 October 2018, which, in her opinion, constituted harassment, and stated that she had been subjected turn by turn to “contempt, sidelining, humiliation, refusals, insinuations and unfounded accusations”^{*} from the Administration and her superiors. She requested that an inquiry be conducted into her allegations and offered to provide the investigators with the documents supporting these allegations.

On 28 December 2018 she was informed of the Secretary General’s decision to dismiss her harassment complaint as unfounded on the grounds that her allegations did not prove that the Organization had created an intimidating, hostile or abusive working environment in her regard, that she did not provide evidence that Interpol had committed any mismanagement or omissions that damaged her dignity or career objectives, and that she did not establish that her employer intended to harm or harass her.

On 26 February 2019 the complainant lodged an internal appeal against the decision of 28 December 2018, asserting that the decision – which, in her view, “[was] based on a flawed procedure due to the lack of an inquiry and on obvious bias”^{*} – was a further example of the harassment she complained of. She asked for it to be withdrawn, redress for the injury she claimed she had suffered and an award of costs.

^{*} Registry’s translation.

During its examination of the appeal, the Joint Appeals Committee – which had already received three internal appeals, lodged on 20 February 2018, 1 September 2018 and 27 September 2018 respectively, against what the complainant regarded as a deprivation of her duties amounting to dismissal, the rejection of her harassment complaints against two of her superiors, her placement on compulsory leave, and the decision to abolish her post – received a further appeal lodged by the complainant on 17 April 2019 against the Secretary General’s decision of 18 February 2019 terminating her contract of appointment, which also concerned the settlement of her pension rights.

Having noted the similarity of the issues involved, the Joint Appeals Committee decided to join the five appeals and alerted the Secretary General to the “multiplication of notices of challenge”^{*} and “protest”^{*} from claimants represented by the same counsel, which prevented it from working efficiently. The executive head reported these notices to the professional bodies to which the complainant’s counsel belonged.

In the single opinion it issued on 1 April 2021, the Committee stated that the “necessary and sufficient”^{*} conditions for the conduct complained of to be considered institutional harassment had not been met. It noted, however, that the Organization had not clearly shown what measures had been put in place to carry out its inquiry and found that “the form taken to reach [the] decision [of 28 December 2018] [was] not appropriate [given] the complexity of the case dealt with [and] the sensitivity of the relationship with the complainant”^{*}. It recommended that the appeal be rejected as unfounded.

By a letter of 28 July 2021 concerning the appeals dealt with by the Committee relating to her three harassment complaints, the complainant was informed of the Secretary General’s decision to follow this recommendation. That is the impugned decision in the present case.

The complainant asks the Tribunal to set aside the part of the impugned decision concerning her appeal of 26 February 2019 and the entirety of the decision of 28 December 2018. She also seeks compensation

^{*} Registry’s translation.

for the moral injury she considers she has suffered, which she quantifies as follows: at least 50,000 euros for the damage to her dignity, at least 30,000 euros for the lack of an inquiry and for the alleged flaws affecting the handling of her harassment complaint and the internal appeal procedure, at least 30,000 euros for the “wrongful reporting of her [counsel]”*, and 17,000 euros for the length of the internal appeal procedure. Lastly, she claims costs in the amount of 8,000 euros.

Interpol asks the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint as unfounded.

CONSIDERATIONS

1. In her ninth complaint, the complainant impugns before the Tribunal the Secretary General’s decision of 28 July 2021 by which he informed her that he had decided to follow the recommendation contained in the opinion of the Joint Appeals Committee of 1 April 2021 to reject her internal appeal of 26 February 2019 and to confirm his previous decision of 28 December 2018. In the latter decision, he had concluded that there were no grounds to open an inquiry following the complaint of institutional harassment lodged by the complainant on 31 October 2018.

However, in the impugned decision, the executive head stated that he disagreed with the Committee’s finding that Interpol had not “clearly shown what measures had been put in place to carry out [a] ‘thorough investigation’ [...] by means of a preliminary inquiry as specified by the provisions which it [had] adopted on 1 January 2019”*. According to the Secretary General, in this case, there was no reason to initiate an inquiry or to institute disciplinary proceedings following the complainant’s complaint of institutional harassment.

2. Interpol asks the Tribunal to consider the possibility of joining the ninth complaint with the seven other complaints filed by the complainant on 26 October 2021. However, as the Tribunal explained in considerations 5 to 7 of Judgment 5017, also delivered this day on

* Registry’s translation.

the complainant's second complaint, it is not appropriate to order that the present complaint be joined with any of the seven other complaints.

More specifically, the Tribunal considers it inappropriate to join the present complaint with the seventh and eighth complaints, concerning the complainant's complaints of moral harassment, which were joined in consideration 2 of Judgment 5022, also delivered this day. Those harassment complaints were different in nature, covered separate periods and were not dealt with in the same way.

3. The Tribunal observes firstly that, in the harassment complaint she had submitted on 31 October 2018, the complainant stated that she had been experiencing institutional harassment for just under a year, alleged that she had been harassed and induced to resign by inappropriate behaviour and unfair decisions in her respect, and requested that an inquiry be carried out to draw all the consequences of the situations complained of.

4. According to the Tribunal's case law, institutional harassment consists particularly of an accumulation of repeated events of mismanagement or omissions, for which there is no reasonable explanation and which deeply and adversely affect the dignity and career objectives of a staff member (see, for example, Judgments 4523, consideration 11, 4345, consideration 8, and 3250, considerations 9 and 10, and the case law cited therein).

5. However, the Tribunal notes that in the present case, although the complainant makes allegations against the Organization's departments in general, she also implicates particular staff members by name in her harassment complaint. The Tribunal notes that, according to the information provided by the Organization in response to requests for further submissions made during the proceedings, Interpol did not have an internal harassment policy as at 31 October 2018. The Organization did not adopt a formal harassment policy until January 2019.

6. In this connection, it is clear from consideration 15 of Judgment 4207, adopted by a plenary panel of judges, that in the absence of a lawful comprehensive procedure within the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules to deal with a claim of harassment, an international organisation has to respond to such a claim in accordance with the Tribunal's relevant case law. In that judgment, the Tribunal further pointed out the following in this matter:

“It is well settled in the case law that an international organization has a duty to provide a safe and adequate working environment for its staff members (see Judgment 2706, consideration 5, citing Judgment 2524). As well, ‘given the serious nature of a claim of harassment, an international organization has an obligation to initiate [an] investigation [...]’ (see Judgment 3347, consideration 14). Moreover, the investigation must be initiated promptly, conducted thoroughly and the facts must be determined objectively and in their overall context. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the complainant is entitled to a response from the Administration regarding the claim of harassment. Additionally, as the Tribunal held in Judgment 2706, consideration 5, ‘an international organisation is liable for all the injuries caused to a staff member by their supervisor acting in the course of his or her duties, when the victim is subjected to treatment that is an affront to his or her personal and professional dignity’ (see also Judgments 1609, consideration 16, 1875, consideration 32, and 3170, consideration 33). Thus, an international organization must take proper actions to protect a victim of harassment.”

7. The Tribunal next observes that, in contrast to what had been decided in the two complaints of moral harassment submitted by the complainant on 16 November 2017 and which are the subject of her seventh and eighth complaints referred to above, the Organization chose not to open an inquiry into her complaint of institutional harassment. In the letter conveying the decision he adopted on 28 December 2018, while stating that, in his view, “the objective pursued by such an inquiry [was] to ascertain all relevant facts in order to determine whether there [was] sufficient evidence to initiate a disciplinary procedure”^{*} and recalling that the decision to open an

^{*} Registry's translation.

inquiry was a matter for his discretion, the Secretary General wrote the following to the complainant:

“I do not consider that anything in your [harassment] complaint demonstrates that the Organization has created an intimidating, hostile or abusive working environment in your regard. You do not provide evidence that the Organization has committed any mismanagement or omissions that adversely affected your dignity or career objectives, nor do you establish that the Organization intended to harm or harass you.”*

8. Lastly, the Tribunal observes that, in Judgment 4961, consideration 6, it emphasized the following with regard to the principles applicable to harassment complaints:

“The Tribunal recalls that, according to its settled case law, the question whether harassment occurred must be determined in the light of a careful examination of all the objective circumstances surrounding the acts complained of (see, in particular, Judgments 4471, consideration 18, and 4241, consideration 9) and that an allegation of harassment must be borne out by specific acts, the burden of proof being on the person who pleads it, but there is no need to prove that the accused person acted with intent (see, for example, Judgments 4344, consideration 3, 3871, consideration 12, and 3692, consideration 18). When a specific procedure is laid down by the organisation concerned, it must be followed and the rules correctly applied. The Tribunal has also ruled that investigations must be objective, rigorous and thorough in that they must be conducted in a manner designed to ascertain all relevant facts without compromising the good name of the person accused and that she or he be given an opportunity to test the evidence put against him or her and to answer the charge made (see, in particular, Judgments 4663, consideration 11, 4253, consideration 3, 3314, consideration 14, and 2771, consideration 15). It is, however, understood that a staff member who alleges harassment does not need to establish, nor does the person or body evaluating the claim, that the facts establish beyond reasonable doubt that harassment occurred (see, to that effect, Judgments 4663, consideration 12, and 4289, consideration 10). The main factor in the recognition of harassment is the perception that the person concerned may reasonably and objectively have of acts or remarks liable to demean or humiliate her or him (see Judgments 4663, consideration 13, and 4541, consideration 8).”

(See also Judgment 4900, consideration 18.)

* Registry’s translation.

The Tribunal considers that this case law also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to complaints of institutional harassment.

9. Among the many pleas put forward by the complainant in support of her complaint, there are two that are decisive for the outcome of the present dispute. These pleas relate, firstly, to the error of law committed by the Organization in asserting that the decision to initiate a harassment inquiry was a matter for the discretion of its executive head and to the serious procedural defect arising from the failure to carry out a thorough investigation in the present case and, secondly, to the errors of law committed by Interpol in dealing with the harassment complaint.

10. With regard, firstly, to Interpol's assertion that the decision to open an inquiry into harassment was discretionary and the prerogative of the Secretary General, who, in the present case, had decided not to open an inquiry following the submission of the harassment complaint in question, the complainant submits that an organisation which has received serious allegations of harassment has a duty to investigate, that this is not merely an option left to its discretion and that Interpol evaded its obligations in this regard.

11. The Tribunal notes first of all that the Joint Appeals Committee observed the following in this regard:

“While a thorough preliminary inquiry was carried out to assess the complaint[s] of harassment against [...] [the complainant's] two superiors, it does not appear that the same care was taken with the appeal against ‘institutional harassment’. [...] [T]he Organization has not clearly demonstrated what measures were put in place to carry out a ‘thorough investigation’ [...] [T]he form taken to reach the decision to reject the appeal against institutional harassment is not appropriate to the complexity of the case dealt with, nor to the sensitivity of the relationship with the complainant.”*

* Registry's translation.

12. The Tribunal next notes that, in the impugned decision, the Secretary General stated that he did not agree with the Joint Appeals Committee's conclusion in that regard because some of the allegations in the complaint of institutional harassment were already contained in the complaints of moral harassment which had been investigated, that the allegations of institutional harassment served as a basis for discussing points which were being examined by the Committee in the context of the other appeals pending before it and that "[w]hat [the complainant] [had] regarded as harassment was part of the ordinary functioning of any administration"* . The Secretary General therefore concluded that, as the decisions to initiate an inquiry and to institute disciplinary proceedings were both a matter for his discretion and were governed by the provisions of Chapter 12 of the Staff Manual, the complainant had not directed her allegations against any particular staff member, with the result that, given her "vague allegations or, by contrast, allegations that were so specific that, taken individually, they could not reasonably be characterised as harassment"*, and that "[i]n his view, there were no grounds for initiating an inquiry or instituting disciplinary proceedings"* .

13. The Tribunal considers that the Organization is mistaken in asserting that the decision whether or not to initiate an inquiry when it receives a complaint of harassment is a matter for its executive head's discretion. In Judgment 4663, consideration 9 – which refers, in particular, to consideration 15 of Judgment 4207, adopted by a plenary panel of judges – the Tribunal recalled that it is settled case law that an international organization has a duty to provide a safe and adequate working environment for its staff members, that, given the serious nature of a claim of harassment, an organisation has an obligation to initiate an investigation rapidly and that the investigation must be thorough. An organisation cannot evade this obligation by hiding, wrongly as explained above, behind the fact that decisions taken in respect of harassment fall within the sole discretionary authority of its executive head.

* Registry's translation.

14. The Tribunal further considers that, in this case, the need to initiate, at least, a preliminary inquiry into the complaint of institutional harassment was particularly compelling given that, firstly, that was precisely the procedure that Interpol had deemed necessary to follow when dealing with the two complaints of moral harassment submitted by the complainant on 16 November 2017 and, secondly, in their reports the investigators appointed to deal with those complaints had identified shortcomings in terms of communication with the complainant and considered that efforts should be made to remedy these, which should have prompted the Organization to be cautious.

15. The Tribunal also observes that the new internal harassment policy that entered into force on 8 January 2019, just a few days after the adoption of the contested decision, provides that a harassment complaint must result in an inquiry.

16. The Tribunal concludes that the failure to conduct a thorough, independent inquiry in the circumstances of the case constitutes an error of law that renders the contested decisions unlawful.

17. Secondly, in respect of the alleged errors of law committed by Interpol when handling the harassment complaint as regards the approach taken and the intention to cause harm, the complainant submits that the Organization has once again misconstrued the Tribunal's settled case law.

In this regard, the file shows that it is true to say that the Secretary General assessed the complaint of institutional harassment solely in terms of possible disciplinary proceedings, without taking into account the fact that, from the complainant's perspective, the complaint sought recognition of harassment and included explicit claims regarding its impact on her. This finding is based on the content of the initial decision of 28 December 2018, in which it was explained that the purpose of an inquiry was to institute disciplinary proceedings, and of the impugned decision of 28 July 2021, which specifically referred to Staff Regulation 12.2 concerning the institution of such proceedings. Moreover, that is how the Joint Appeals Committee understood the

Organization's position in this respect when it referred to it in its opinion of 1 April 2021.

18. In view of this finding, the Tribunal considers that the Organization must have been aware that the complainant expressly complained of institutional harassment against her, that her complaint was not limited to seeking disciplinary action, which she could not in any case have sought in respect of the Organization itself in a complaint of institutional harassment, and that the impact on her personal and professional situation was the primary factor leading her to take this course of action (see, to this effect, Judgment 4663, consideration 10). It follows that, in such a situation, the Secretary General could not limit his examination to the sole question of whether there were grounds for instituting disciplinary proceedings.

19. In Judgment 4900, consideration 31, the Tribunal recalled the following:

“[T]his understanding of a harassment complaint, according to which its outcome can solely be determined from the point of view of the persons accused, who may be subject to administrative or disciplinary measures, disregards the Tribunal's case law on the matter, which recalls that a staff member who lodges such a complaint is included as a party to the procedure conducted to ascertain whether that complaint is well-founded, even though she or he will not be a party to any subsequent disciplinary proceedings taken against the perpetrator of recognised harassment.”

(See also, on this point, Judgment 4739, consideration 10.)

The Tribunal considers that this case law also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to complaints of institutional harassment.

In the present case, the Tribunal considers that the Organization misunderstood its obligations in this matter and that it clearly erred in law by examining the harassment complaint only from the standpoint of the possible institution of disciplinary proceedings. As the complainant rightly notes, although an inquiry may lead to disciplinary proceedings, it is wrong in law to state that this is its sole purpose. Similarly, on this point, the Joint Appeals Committee erred in law in asserting that the Organization had scrupulously complied with the

applicable provisions of Staff Regulation 12.2, which were limited solely to considerations relating to potential disciplinary measures, whereas it is clear from the Tribunal's well-established case law that this sole perspective erroneously disregards that of the person complaining of harassment. By endorsing the Committee's opinion to that effect, which was thus vitiated, the impugned decision itself became unlawful.

20. The Tribunal finds that Interpol breached the complainant's right to have her complaint of institutional harassment of 31 October 2018 properly determined. Given the nature of that complaint, the Organization had a duty to consider whether the complainant had been a victim of harassment in view of the conduct complained of, whatever conclusions it might reach on the question of possible unsatisfactory conduct or misconduct which might warrant the institution of disciplinary proceedings against any individual.

It is clear from the initial decision of 28 December 2018 and the impugned decision of 28 July 2021 that the Secretary General only took a view on possible disciplinary action, which was an error of law on his part, vitiating both the process followed and the resulting decisions. By so doing, he did not in fact examine or respond to the question of whether the complainant had been harassed, according to her own perception and regardless of any intent to cause harm, malicious or otherwise, in view of all the allegations she had made in her harassment complaint.

21. In its written submissions, the Organization also wrongly submits that the aim of conducting an inquiry is to determine the nature and the circumstances of the case in order to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the institution of formal disciplinary proceedings, that it is therefore natural for the inquiry to aim to establish the facts from the standpoint of misconduct and that there is no other way of undertaking such an inquiry.

By wrongly focusing the assessment solely on disciplinary measures that could possibly result, the Organization committed a further error of law by seeking proof of intent on the part of the alleged harassers, which, once again, misconstrues the Tribunal's well-established case law.

22. In Judgment 4900, consideration 18, the Tribunal recalled that, with regard to harassment complaints, it is accepted that there is no need to prove that the perpetrator intended to cause harm, the main factor being the perception that the person concerned may reasonably and objectively have of acts or remarks liable to demean or humiliate her or him (see also Judgments 4808, consideration 17, 4663, consideration 3, 4541, consideration 8, 4207, consideration 20, and 3318, consideration 7).

Since the decision of 28 December 2018 clearly shows that the Secretary General expressly stated that an intention to cause harm had not, in his view, been proven, his decision was fundamentally flawed. In Judgment 4663, consideration 13, the Tribunal noted the following in this regard:

“Nor could the Organization ignore the complainant's perception of herself as a victim of harassment and her assertion that she had felt demeaned, degraded and humiliated by the behaviour to which she had been subjected. As the Tribunal similarly noted in Judgment 4541, consideration 8, the main factor in the recognition of harassment is the perception that the person concerned may reasonably and objectively have of acts or remarks liable to demean or humiliate her or him.”

The Tribunal considers that this case law also applies *a fortiori* to complaints of institutional harassment.

23. These errors of law, coupled with the error constituted by the failure to conduct an inquiry, render the Secretary General's contested decisions unlawful.

24. It follows from considerations 10 to 23 above that the Secretary General's decision of 28 July 2021 and his earlier decision of 28 December 2018 must be set aside, without there being any need to rule on the complainant's other pleas.

25. At this stage of the Tribunal's findings, the case should ordinarily be sent back to the Organization so that the procedure for examining the complaint of institutional harassment can be followed correctly. However, the complainant does not request this in her submissions. She merely claims various sums in compensation for the moral injury she considers she has suffered.

In these circumstances, the Tribunal considers it inappropriate to send the case back to the Organization. Rather, the appropriate course in this instance is to award the complainant adequate compensation for the moral injury caused by the decisions that the Tribunal will set aside. The file contains sufficient evidence and information to enable it to determine the extent of this injury.

26. The complainant claims that she should be awarded compensation for the moral injury suffered in the amount of, firstly, at least 50,000 euros on account of the damage to her dignity and, secondly, at least 30,000 euros on account of the failure to conduct an inquiry and the flaws in handling her harassment complaint.

When assessing the injury suffered by the complainant, the Tribunal will take account of the fact that, although the contested decisions must be set aside on account of various flaws, it does not follow from this setting aside that the complainant's harassment complaint is well-founded. However, the complainant suffered moral injury in that she was denied her right to have that complaint properly investigated. In view of all the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal considers that all the moral injury caused to the complainant by the unlawful decisions will be fairly redressed by awarding her, under this head, compensation in the amount of 15,000 euros.

The Tribunal observes that none of the other pleas against those decisions is such as to entail an increase in the amount of damages awarded.

27. Moreover, as regards the length of the internal appeal procedure, for which the complainant claims additional moral damages of 17,000 euros, it is the Tribunal's settled case law that officials are

entitled to have their appeals examined with the necessary speed, in particular having regard to the nature of the decision which they wish to challenge (see, for example, Judgments 4922, consideration 22, 4660, consideration 24, 4457, consideration 29, or 4063, consideration 14). Furthermore, the unreasonableness of a delay in examining an internal appeal must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and the amount of compensation liable to be granted under this head ordinarily depends on two considerations, namely the length of the delay and the effect of the delay on the employee concerned (see, for example, Judgments 4844, consideration 11, 4727, consideration 14, 4684, consideration 12, 4635, consideration 8, 4457, consideration 29, 4037, consideration 15, or 3160, consideration 16).

In this case, the time that has elapsed between the submission of the internal appeal on 26 February 2019 and the adoption of the impugned decision on 28 July 2021 is excessive, particularly in view of the nature of the contested decisions, which relate to a complaint of institutional harassment. Although the Tribunal emphasized in aforementioned Judgment 5018 that this delay occurred in specific and exceptional circumstances where the complainant submitted five consecutive internal appeals stemming from the same continuum of events, resulting in extensive written exchanges of submissions that concluded in March 2020 and an examination by the Joint Appeals Committee that lasted several weeks and that those submissions reveal a particularly acrimonious antagonism between the parties which undoubtedly hindered the efficient and expeditious handling of the cases, the fact remains that, in Judgment 4922, consideration 22, the Tribunal recalled that it has consistently emphasized the need to deal with appeals relating to harassment complaints especially quickly (see also Judgments 5058, consideration 19, 4663, consideration 19, and 4243, consideration 24).

In the circumstances, the complainant is entitled to submit that she suffered additional moral injury as a result of the excessive length of the internal appeal proceedings relating to her ninth complaint. The Tribunal considers that the moral injury suffered by the complainant on

this account will be fairly redressed by ordering the Organization to pay her compensation of 5,000 euros.

28. Lastly, the complainant claims moral damages of at least 30,000 euros on account of what she describes as the Organization's "wrongful reporting of her lawyer"* to the professional bodies to which he belongs.

However, as the Tribunal stated in aforementioned Judgment 5018, firstly, under its Statute, it is not within the Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine whether reports made by an international organisation to the professional bodies of a staff member's counsel can be described as wrongful or unfounded. In addition, the professional bodies did not take any action in response to Interpol's reports. Secondly, the complainant's allegation that these reports hindered her right to an effective internal appeal is not established in the present case.

This additional claim for moral damages is therefore unfounded.

29. As she succeeds, the complainant is entitled to costs, which the Tribunal sets at the requested amount of 8,000 euros.

DECISION

For the above reasons,

1. The decision of the Secretary General of Interpol of 28 July 2021 as well as his decision of 28 December 2018 are set aside.
2. Interpol shall pay the complainant moral damages in a total amount of 20,000 euros.
3. It shall also pay her 8,000 euros in costs.
4. All other claims are dismissed.

* Registry's translation.

In witness of this judgment, adopted on 21 May 2025, Mr Patrick Frydman, President of the Tribunal, Mr Jacques Jaumotte, Judge, and Mr Clément Gascon, Judge, sign below, as do I, René M. Vargas M., Registrar.

Delivered on 3 July 2025 by video recording posted on the Tribunal's Internet page.

(Signed)

PATRICK FRYDMAN JACQUES JAUMOTTE CLEMENT GASCON

RENÉ M. VARGAS M.