ILOAT Statute (223,-666)
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Keywords: ILOAT Statute
Total judgments found: 200
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Judgment 5203
141st Session, 2026
The Pacific Community
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, on the basis of Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Tribunal, challenges what he considers to be an implied decision rejecting his request for further review of 6 April 2024.
Considerations 4-5
Extract:
«L’article VII, paragraphe 3, du Statut du Tribunal prévoit que, «[a]u cas où l’administration, saisie d’une réclamation, n’a pris aucune décision touchant ladite réclamation dans un délai de soixante jours à dater du jour de la notification qui lui en a été faite, l’intéressé est fondé à saisir le Tribunal, et sa requête est recevable au même titre qu’une requête contre une décision définitive. Le délai de quatre-vingt-dix jours [pour saisir le Tribunal] prévu [à l’article VII, paragraphe 2] est compté à dater de l'expiration du délai de soixante jours imparti à l'administration pour prendre une décision.» […] Le Tribunal considère que c’est à tort que le requérant s’appuie sur l’article VII, paragraphe 3, de son Statut. Il ressort clairement des dossiers que l’intéressé a reçu deux réponses de l’administration – les 10 avril et 8 mai 2024 – concernant sa demande de second réexamen du 6 avril 2024, soit dans un délai de soixante jours suivant la notification de cette demande. Ces réponses étaient suffisantes pour faire obstacle à la naissance d’une décision implicite de rejet susceptible d’être attaquée en vertu de l’article VII, paragraphe 3, du Statut du Tribunal (voir le jugement 4911, au considérant 4, et la jurisprudence qui y est citée). »
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4911
Keywords:
iloat statute; implied decision; receivability of the complaint;
Consideration 6
Extract:
« [Le requérant] s’est mépris dans le calcul des délais [prévus à l’article VII, paragraphe 3, du Statut du Tribunal] en assimilant respectivement le délai de soixante jours à un délai de deux mois et celui de quatre-vingt-dix jours à un délai de trois mois. »
Keywords:
iloat statute; receivability of the complaint; time limit;
Judgment 5118
141st Session, 2026
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to close her harassment complaint without carrying out an investigation following a preliminary review.
Consideration 5
Extract:
[T]he impugned decision thus immediately and adversely affected the complainant and that as a result, the present complaint is receivable and must be assessed on the merits. In Judgment 3860, consideration 5, the Tribunal recalled that its case law “establishes two principles. The first is that for a decision to be final it cannot, at least in the ordinary course, be amenable to internal appeal or review or further internal appeal or review. [...] The second principle is that a decision, to be a final decision for the purposes of Article VII, paragraph 1, must of itself have legal effect (see, for example, Judgments 2201, consideration 4, and 3141, consideration 21)” (see also Judgment 1203, consideration 2). These conditions are met in the instant case.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1203, 2201, 3141, 3860
Keywords:
condition; definition; final decision; iloat statute; receivability of the complaint;
Judgment 5107
141st Session, 2026
World Trade Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, the widow of a former employee of the WTO who died on 5 May 2021, challenges an email from the WTO of 23 May 2023, whereby the Organization refused to provide her with a copy of his contract of employment, on the grounds that they were no longer married on the date of his death.
Consideration 2
Extract:
« Conformément à l’article II, paragraphe 6, du Statut du Tribunal, ont accès au Tribunal le fonctionnaire, même si son emploi a cessé, ainsi que toute personne ayant succédé mortis causa aux droits du fonctionnaire. En l’espèce, le Tribunal considère qu’il est établi que […] la requérante et M. P. étaient bien mariés à la date du décès de celui-ci. Il ressort en effet du dossier qu’elle avait été désignée comme étant la ‘conjoint[e] survivant[e]’ dans un acte notarié du 3 décembre 2022 . Il ne fait donc pas de doute qu’elle a succédé mortis causa aux droits de son défunt époux et qu’elle a qualité pour agir à ce titre devant le Tribunal. »
Keywords:
iloat statute; locus standi; successor;
Consideration 4
Extract:
« [L]a requête, formée devant le Tribunal le 30 juillet 2024 à l’encontre du courriel de l’OMC du 23 mai 2023, est entachée de tardiveté. Aux termes de l’article VII, paragraphe 2, du Statut du Tribunal, ‘[l]a requête, pour être recevable, doit [...] être introduite dans un délai de quatre-vingt-dix jours, à compter de la notification au requérant de la décision attaquée’. Ainsi que le Tribunal a eu maintes fois l’occasion de le souligner, les délais de recours ont un caractère objectif et il ne saurait statuer sur la légalité d’une décision devenue définitive car toute autre solution, même fondée sur des motifs d’équité, aurait pour effet de porter atteinte à la nécessaire stabilité des situations juridiques, qui constitue la justification même de l’institution des forclusions (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4896, au considérant 6, 4374, au considérant 7, 4160, au considérant 9, 3828, au considérant 7, ou 3406, au considérant 12). Or, en l’espèce, la période de quatre-vingt-dix jours prévue au paragraphe 2 de l’article VII, précité, s’est achevée le 21 août 2023, soit environ onze mois avant la date de dépôt de la présente requête. »
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3406, 3828, 4160, 4374, 4896
Keywords:
iloat statute; receivability of the complaint; time limit;
Judgment 5075
140th Session, 2025
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants challenge the introduction of a quality monitoring system as well as the adoption of the Practice and Procedure Notice 09/11 and contest the validity of the internal appeals proceedings.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
compensation; competence of tribunal; complaint dismissed; consultation; iloat statute; staff union;
Consideration 5
Extract:
Cases arise in the Tribunal where the defendant organisation has failed to consult a person or a body, which should have been consulted under the relevant rules, and the Tribunal may make orders which require that consultation take place and the Tribunal may also set aside the decision made without consultation […]. However, setting aside the decision is not an inevitable outcome following a conclusion that consultation should have taken place, but did not. As explained by the Tribunal in Judgment 3883, considerations 22 and 23: “[…] [U]ltimately what relief can be granted by the Tribunal is governed by Article VIII of the Tribunal’s Statute […]. That provision clearly contemplates that if a complainant establishes that a decision was unlawfully made, the decision can berescinded. Equally, however, it contemplates that if the rescission of a decision is not ‘advisable’, then the Tribunal ‘shall award the complainant compensation for the injury caused to her or him’.[…]." In the present case, the failure to consult the GAC occurred over a decade ago. Indeed, the GAC was abolished in 2014, and, thus, it cannot now be consulted. It is not apparent to the Tribunal that the continued implementation of PPN 09/11 would cause any real prejudice or injury to the complainants or the the staff of the Office more generally. In these circumstances, it is clearly not advisable to rescind the decision adopting and promulgating PPN 9/11 notwithstanding the failure to consult the GAC […].
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3883
Keywords:
compensation; competence of tribunal; consultation; iloat statute;
Judgment 5004
140th Session, 2025
European Organization for Nuclear Research
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to refuse her an exceptional payment to reimburse the costs of medical and paramedical care.
Consideration 8
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal’s jurisdiction is governed solely by its own Statute (see, in particular, Judgments 4822, consideration 6, 3247, consideration 19, 2312, consideration 3, and 1509, consideration 14).
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; iloat statute;
Judgment 4965
139th Session, 2025
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision, taken without an investigation, to dismiss her complaint of harassment against Mr S.
Consideration 4
Extract:
[A]ccording to Article 14 of the Tribunal’s Rules, the President may shorten or extend any time limit set in accordance with these Rules or may, in exceptional cases, reopen a time limit which has expired and set a new one. However, Article 14 concerns time limits set by the Rules. In the present case the time limit is set by the Statute. Article 14 has, relevantly, no application (see, for example, Judgment 40, consideration 6).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 40
Keywords:
exception; iloat statute; ratione temporis; receivability of the complaint; time limit;
Considerations 3-6
Extract:
In a letter dated 12 October 2020 by which the complaint was filed, the complainant’s lawyer admits that the final decision on which the complaint is based, was received by him on or about 8 July 2020 and also admits, correctly, that the due date for filing a complaint with the Tribunal was 6 October 2020. He requested that the “tardy filing” be accepted by the Tribunal for reasons which he gave centrally concerning the health of his daughter who had, about this time, contracted the COVID-19 virus. […] [T]he Tribunal does not have a discretionary power to extend time under Article VII and, accordingly, whether the reasons given were compelling or not, is irrelevant. […] [T]he Tribunal generally has no power to waive non-compliance with Article VII or to extend time so as to alter its effect (see, for example, Judgment 59, consideration 3). Plainly enough, the source of the Tribunal’s powers and jurisdiction (and its limits) is the Statute. A necessary implication of Article VII, paragraph 2, is that those powers, and specifically the powers deriving from the competence of the Tribunal created by Article II, cannot be called in aid to alter the effect of Article VII, paragraph 2. By operation of Article VII, paragraph 2, the complaint is irreceivable and should be dismissed.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 59
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; iloat statute; ratione temporis; receivability of the complaint; time bar; time limit;
Judgment 4921
139th Session, 2025
European Southern Observatory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests ESO’s decision not to apply the ceilings defined in its Staff Rules and Regulations to the cost-of-living differential of the monthly household and children’s allowances paid to him.
Consideration 4
Extract:
Inasmuch as, in his internal appeal, the complainant only contested his December 2019 and January 2020 payslips and only asked for a revision of the calculation made in them, this complaint is irreceivable pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 1, of of the Statute of the Tribunal, to the extent that he requests the Tribunal to order ESO to annul all subsequent payslips in which the contested decision was implemented.
Keywords:
iloat statute; internal remedies not exhausted; payslip; receivability of the complaint;
Judgment 4820
138th Session, 2024
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decisions to dismiss his moral harassment complaints, and claims compensation for the injury which he considers he has suffered.
Considerations 6-7
Extract:
Insofar as the complaint is directed against the decision of the Director General to dismiss the complainant’s first complaint for moral harassment against Mr P.H. as unfounded, the Tribunal notes the following:
(a) Where the Administration takes any action to deal with a claim, by forwarding it to the competent internal appeal body for example, this step in itself constitutes a “decision upon the claim” within the meaning of Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Tribunal, which forestalls an implied rejection that could be referred to the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgments 3715, consideration 4, 3428, consideration 18, and 3146, consideration 12).
(b) Under Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations, the complainant should have filed a complaint before the Tribunal within 90 days from the expiry of the four-month time limit for the Administration to respond to his internal complaint, even if the matter had been referred to the Joint Committee for Disputes. The present complaint should therefore, in principle, be declared irreceivable as time-barred under Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, combined with Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations.
(c) However, in this case, the Tribunal considers that the complainant was misled by the Organisation when it indicated to him that, since his internal complaint had been referred to the Joint Committee for Disputes, he had, in accordance with the Tribunal’s case law on the application of Article VII, paragraph 3, of its Statute, to await the final decision of the Director General before being able to file a complaint with the Tribunal. By so doing, the Organisation overlooked the fact that, pursuant to Article 92(2) of the Staff Regulations, failure by the Director General to respond to an internal complaint within four months from the date on which it was lodged shall be deemed to constitute an implied decision rejecting it, which may be impugned before the Tribunal. There is no need to declare the complaint irreceivable as time-barred, insofar as it is directed against an implied decision to reject from the Director General. To rule otherwise would amount to unduly depriving the complainant of his right to refer the matter to the Tribunal solely due to the conduct of the Organisation.
(d) The Tribunal observes that, while the complainant’s failure to comply with the 90-day time limit to file a complaint with the Tribunal is recognized above as admissible due to the fact that he was wrongly informed by the Organisation that he had to await an express decision, the complainant did not wait for this decision to be issued before filing his complaint. The complaint should therefore, in principle, be declared irreceivable for failure to exhaust internal means of redress, as required by Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Tribunal. However, in this case, taking into account the period of one year and seven months that had elapsed between 5 June 2020, when the complainant filed his internal complaint, and 7 February 2022, when he filed his complaint with the Tribunal, and the fact that his counsel had followed up, to no avail, with the Director General, the Tribunal considers that the complainant was faced with a paralysis of the internal appeal procedure that would allow him to proceed directly to it. Under the Tribunal’s case law, a complainant is entitled to file a complaint directly with the Tribunal against the initial decision which she or he intends to challenge where the competent bodies are not able to determine the internal appeal within a reasonable time having regard to the circumstances, provided that she or he has done her or his utmost, to no avail, to accelerate the internal procedure and where the circumstances show that the appeal body was not able to reach a final decision within a reasonable time (see, for example, Judgments 4660, consideration 2, 4271, consideration 5, 4268, considerations 10 and 11, 4200, consideration 3, 3558, consideration 9, 2039, consideration 4, or 1486, consideration 11).
(e) In addition, the Tribunal notes that a final decision was ultimately taken by the Director General on 12 May 2022, as was the opinion of the Joint Committee for Disputes relating thereto, and that that decision was issued in the course of proceedings. Since the Tribunal has the complete dossier in its possession and the parties have had the opportunity to comment fully in their written submissions on the express decision to reject the complainant’s internal complaint of 5 June 2020, and thus on the decision to reject the first harassment complaint inasmuch as it was directed against Mr P.H., it considers that, in accordance with its case law, it is appropriate to treat the internal complaint as being directed against the latter decision of 12 May 2022 (see in particular, for similar cases, Judgments 4769, consideration 3, 4768, consideration 3, 4660, consideration 6, 4065, consideration 3, and 2786, consideration 3).
The present complaint is, accordingly, receivable insofar as it challenges the lawfulness of the Director General’s decision of 12 May 2022 to reject, as unfounded, the first moral harassment complaint directed against Mr P.H. It will therefore be examined from this standpoint by the Tribunal.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1486, 2039, 2786, 3146, 3428, 3558, 3715, 4065, 4200, 4268, 4271, 4660
Keywords:
absence of final decision; administrative delay; case law; delay; direct appeal to tribunal; exception; express decision; iloat statute; implied decision; impugned decision; internal appeal; internal remedies exhausted; judicial review; reasonable time; receivability of the complaint; staff member's duties; time limit;
Judgment 4817
138th Session, 2024
World Trade Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns a decision ordering a new investigation into her alleged misconduct and suspending the disciplinary measures pending the new investigation and a new decision in the matter.
Consideration 10
Extract:
In her rejoinder, the complainant submits that the Organization failed to order that she be reimbursed the amount of approximately 19,088 Swiss francs she had voluntarily repaid to the WTO on 13 March 2018 for the spouse allowance, the health insurance subsidy for 2015, and the home leave lump sums for 2016, pursuant to the finding of the OIO Report (some of which, she argues, she did not even lawfully owe). This claim seems inconsistent with the complainant’s former conduct, as she voluntarily offered to repay to the WTO the amounts which she had acknowledged were not owed to her. In any event, this is a new claim, submitted for the first time before the Tribunal, and it is, thus, irreceivable, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 1, of the Tribunal’s Statute.
Keywords:
claim; iloat statute; internal remedies not exhausted;
Judgment 4797
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants challenge the modifications made to the procedure for examining patent applications and contest the validity of the internal appeal proceedings.
Consideration 10
Extract:
Cases arise in the Tribunal where the defendant organisation has failed to consult a person or a body, which should have been consulted under the relevant rules, and the Tribunal may make orders which require that consultation take place and the Tribunal may also set aside the decision made without consultation (see, for example, Judgment 4230). But setting aside the decision is not an inevitable outcome following a conclusion that consultation should have, but did not, take place.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4230
Keywords:
compensation; competence of tribunal; consultation; iloat statute;
Consideration 11
Extract:
In the present case, the failure to consult the GAC occurred over a decade ago. Indeed, as noted earlier, the GAC was abolished in 2014, almost a decade ago. It cannot now be consulted. There is a suggestion in the pleas of both the complainants and the EPO that the Notice is no longer in force. If so, this would be relevant and militate strongly against granting relief based on the failure to consult. But even if it is in force, it is not apparent to the Tribunal that the Notice’s continued implementation would cause any real prejudice or injury to the complainants or the staff of the Office more generally. In these circumstances, it is clearly not advisable to rescind the decision adopting and promulgating the Notice notwithstanding the failure to consult the GAC. However, while Article VIII of the Tribunal’s Statute contemplates the awarding of compensation there should be none in the present case. That is because a staff representative, bringing proceedings in that capacity, is not entitled to an award of moral damages (see Judgment 4575, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4575
Keywords:
compensation; competence of tribunal; consultation; iloat statute;
Judgment 4129
127th Session, 2019
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant filed an application for review of Judgment 3893.
Consideration 3
Extract:
As the Tribunal has consistently held, pursuant to Article VI of its Statute, its judgments are “final and without appeal” and carry res judicata authority. They may therefore be reviewed only in exceptional circumstances and on strictly limited grounds. As stated, for example, in Judgments 1178, 1507, 2059, 2158 and 2736, the only admissible grounds for review are failure to take account of material facts, a material error involving no exercise of judgement, an omission to rule on a claim, or the discovery of new facts on which the author of the application was unable to rely in the original proceedings. Moreover, these pleas must be likely to have a bearing on the outcome of the case. On the other hand, pleas of a mistake of law, failure to admit evidence, misinterpretation of the facts or omission to rule on a plea afford no grounds for review (see, for example, Judgments 3001, under 2, 3452, under 2, and 3473, under 3).
The amendment of Article VI of the Statute of the Tribunal introduced in 2016 in order to recognise the parties’ right to file an application for review has no bearing on the grounds on which such applications may be admitted according to the case law cited above.
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article VI of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1178, 1507, 2059, 2158, 2736, 3001, 3452, 3473
Keywords:
admissible grounds for review; application for review; iloat statute; inadmissible grounds for review; res judicata;
Judgment 3975
125th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants, the successors of a former official of the EPO who passed away, filed a complaint with the Tribunal, considering that there has been an implied decision to reject his internal appeals.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; iloat statute; summary procedure;
Consideration 5
Extract:
The Tribunal’s case law makes it clear that where the Administration takes any action to deal with a claim, by forwarding it to the competent authority for example, this step in itself constitutes a “decision upon [the] claim” within the meaning of Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute, which forestalls an implied rejection that could be referred to the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgments 3428, consideration 18, and 3146, consideration 12).
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3146, 3428
Keywords:
direct appeal to tribunal; iloat statute;
Judgment 3974
125th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant considers that his request for review of a decision of the Administrative Council has been implicitly rejected.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; iloat statute; summary procedure;
Judgment 3883
124th Session, 2017
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants contest the implementation of new salary scales as from March 2012 in Bangkok.
Consideration 23
Extract:
[W]hat relief can be granted by the Tribunal is governed by Article VIII of the Tribunal’s Statute that confers and defines its jurisdiction. That provision clearly contemplates that if a complainant establishes that a decision was unlawfully made, the decision can be rescinded. [H]owever, it contemplates that if the rescission of a decision is not “advisable”, then the Tribunal “shall award the complainant compensation for the injury caused to her or him”. Plainly enough following this latter course depends on the opinion and assessment of the Tribunal in the exercise of what, in substance, is a discretionary power (see Judgment 1419, consideration 24).
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article VIII of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1419
Keywords:
allowance; iloat statute;
Judgment 3714
122nd Session, 2016
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the implied decision of the President of the European Patent Office not to accept the findings of the Medical Committee concerning his invalidity.
Considerations 6-7
Extract:
Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute relevantly provides that “[w]here the Administration fails to take a decision upon any claim of an official within sixty days from the notification of the claim to it, the person concerned may have recourse to the Tribunal and his complaint shall be receivable in the same manner as a complaint against a final decision”.
The “decision upon [a] claim” to which that provision refers does not necessarily mean the final decision on the claim. Indeed, as the Tribunal has often recalled, where the Administration takes any action to deal with a claim, by forwarding it to the competent advisory appeal body for example, this step in itself constitutes “a decision upon [the] claim” within the meaning of Article VII, paragraph 3, which forestalls an implied rejection that could be referred to the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgments 3552, consideration 2, 3456, consideration 4, 3428, consideration 18, and 3356, consideration 15).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3356, 3428, 3456, 3552
Keywords:
direct appeal to tribunal; iloat statute;
Judgment 3428
119th Session, 2015
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants unsuccessfully challenge decisions that were not followed by individual implementing decisions.
Consideration 11
Extract:
The Tribunal will not accept the complainants’ surprising argument that questions pertaining to the nature of the impugned decisions and their cause of action to request the setting aside thereof have no bearing on the receivability of their claims. According to the complainants, the only requirements regarding the receivability of complaints laid down by the Statute of the Tribunal are those mentioned in Article VII, namely that all internal means of redress must have been exhausted, that a final decision must have been taken and that the time limit for filing a complaint with the Tribunal must have been respected. However, these rules concern only the procedural aspect of receivability. Receivability is also governed by Article II of the Statute, which, by defining the nature of disputes which the Tribunal has competence to hear ratione personae and ratione materiae, establishes further rules of receivability pertaining to the substantive aspect thereof. Thus a complaint will be receivable only if it is directed against a decision which is of a kind that may be challenged before the Tribunal and if it is filed by an official who shows a cause of action (see, among innumerable examples, Judgments 1756, under 5, 1786, under 5 and 6, 2379, under 5, or 3136, under 11).
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Articles II and VII of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1756, 1786, 2379, 3136
Keywords:
cause of action; iloat statute; receivability of the complaint;
Consideration 18
Extract:
[T]he rules governing the receivability of complaints filed with the Tribunal are established exclusively by its own Statute. Thus, the possibility of filing a complaint against an implied decision of rejection is governed solely by Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute, which states that “[w]hen the Administration fails to take a decision upon any claim of an official within sixty days from the notification of the claim to it”, the person concerned may have recourse to the Tribunal. Article 109 of the Service Regulations could not therefore apply here. Moreover, that article unlawfully provides for a period of “two months” which is different, albeit only slightly, from the sixty days specified in the Statute. When, before the expiry of the latter time limit, an organisation forwards an appeal to the competent advisory appeal body or takes any other action to deal with it, this step in itself constitutes “a decision upon [the] claim” within the meaning of Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Tribunal which forestalls an implied rejection that could be challenged before the Tribunal (see, on these points, Judgments 532, 762, 786, 2681, 2948 or 3034).
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 3, of the Statute
Organization rules reference: Article 109 du Statut des fonctionnaires
Keywords:
direct appeal to tribunal; iloat statute;
Judgment 3426
119th Session, 2015
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants challenged decisions relating to tax adjustment for EPO pensioners, but the Tribunal found that those decisions had not caused them any injury.
Consideration 16
Extract:
The complainants’ position that cause of action is not a question of receivability is rejected. As the Tribunal stated in Judgment 1756, under 5, “[t]o be receivable a complaint must disclose a cause of action”. There are two aspects to receivability – the procedural aspect found in Article VII of the Statute and the substantive aspect found in Article II. That is, whether the Tribunal is competent to hear the case ratione personae and ratione materiae. Framed another way, Article II requires that a complaint must reveal a cause of action and that the impugned decision is one which is subject to challenge. Under Article II, two thresholds must be met for there to be a cause of action. First, the complainant must be an official of the defendant organization or other person described in Article II, paragraph 6. Second, Article II, paragraph 5, requires that a complaint “must relate to [a] decision involving the terms of a staff member’s appointment or the provisions of the Staff Regulations” (Judgment 3136, under 11).
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Articles II and VII of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1756, 3136
Keywords:
cause of action; competence of tribunal; iloat statute; ratione materiae; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint;
Consideration 5
Extract:
[E]ven if there is agreement, the Tribunal must still determine whether it is competent to hear the complaint under Article II of the Statute. As the competence of the Tribunal is statutory, it cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties or on consent.
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article II of the Statute
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; iloat statute;
Judgment 3302
116th Session, 2014
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complaints were dismissed for non-exhaustion of internal remedies under Article 7 of the Tribunal’s Rules.
Judgment keywords
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2780, 2811, 2939
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; decision; delay; duty of care; iloat statute; internal appeal; internal remedies exhausted; organisation's duties; reasonable time; staff member's duties;
Judgment 3225
115th Session, 2013
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant successfully asks for her short-term contracts to be converted into fixed-term contracts.
Consideration 5
Extract:
"The complaint form was filed within the time limit specified in Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, albeit without the brief and supporting evidence which, according to Article 6, paragraph 1(b) and (c), of the Rules of the Tribunal, had to be appended to it. Contrary to [the defendant]’s submissions, this does not signify that the complaint was submitted out of time, since paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned article affords the complainant the possibility of correcting a complaint that does not meet the requirements of the Rules. In the instant case, the complaint was corrected on 30 March 2011, within the time limit set by the Registrar of the Tribunal."
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Statute; Article 6, paragraph 1(b) and (c), of the Rules
Keywords:
correction of complaint; date; formal requirements; iloat statute; time bar; time limit;
Judgment 3152
114th Session, 2013
International Fund for Agricultural Development
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant applies for execution of Judgments 2867 and 3003.
Consideration 11
Extract:
The Tribunal recalls that, "according to the provisions of Article VI of its Statute, its judgments are “final and without appeal”, and they are therefore “immediately operative”, as its earliest case law established (see, in particular, Judgment 82, under 6). The Tribunal subsequently noted that the principle that its judgments are immediately operative is also a corollary of their res judicata authority [...]. For this reason, international organisations which have recognised the Tribunal’s jurisdiction are bound to take whatever action a judgment may require (see [...] Judgments 553 and 1328, or Judgment 1338, under 11). Lastly, there is no provision in the Statute or the Rules of the Tribunal stipulating that, notwithstanding these principles, the submission of an application for an advisory opinion to the International Court of Justice under [...] Article XII has the effect of staying the execution of the impugned judgment pending the rendering of that opinion."
Reference(s)
ILOAT reference: Articles VI and XII of the Statute
ILOAT Judgment(s): 82, 553, 1328, 1338
Keywords:
advisory opinion of icj; application for execution; competence of tribunal; consequence; decision; declaration of recognition; exception; execution of judgment; finality of judgment; icj; iloat statute; judgment of the tribunal; no provision; organisation's duties; request by a party; res judicata; suspensory effects;
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