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Freedom of speech (496,-666)
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Keywords: Freedom of speech
Total judgments found: 28
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Judgment 4971
139th Session, 2025
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests his dismissal from service for misconduct.
Consideration 8
Extract:
The complainant considers these charges “an assault on [his] right to freedom of expression, [his duty] to report misconduct and wrongdoings and [his] inalienable right to seek justice”. He contends that none of his statements rose to the level of abusive or offensive language. […]
In essence, he alleges that he duly exercised his freedom of expression and his duty to report misconduct and that his language should be contextualized. He tries, through multiple arguments, to demonstrate that the Organization mischaracterized his expressions. […]
In order to address the complainant’s pleas, which rely upon the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and of defence, it is appropriate to recall the Tribunal’s case law on the subject matters of freedom of speech and its limits, defamation, and “in court privilege”.
As to freedom of speech, in Judgments 4551 and 3156, the Tribunal stated that freedom of speech is not unlimited. The right to freedom of speech does not encompass action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service, or gross abuse of this right and, in particular, damage to the individual interests of certain persons through allusions that are malicious, defamatory, or which concern their private lives (see Judgments 4551, consideration 9, and 3156, consideration 15).
As to defamation, in Judgment 3106, consideration 9, the Tribunal identified two crucial aspects of the law of defamation, which is not concerned solely with the question of whether a statement is defamatory in the sense that it injures a person’s reputation or tarnishes her or his good name. It is also concerned with the question of whether the statement was made in circumstances that afford a defence. Broadly speaking, the defences to a claim in defamation mark out the boundaries of permissible debate and discussion. As illustrated in judgment 3106, consideration 9, as a general rule, a statement, even if defamatory in the sense indicated, will not result in liability in defamation if it was made in response to criticism by the person claiming to have been defamed or if it was made in the course of the discussion of a matter of legitimate interest to those to whom the statement was published and, in either case, the extent of the publication was reasonable in the circumstances. For the first aspect, it is for the organisation to prove the statement was defamatory. The standard is whether the publication of a statement injures a person’s reputation or tarnishes her or his good name (see also Judgment 4478, consideration 7). Neither the complainant’s intention nor malice are essential elements of defamation (see Judgment 4478, consideration 8). For the second aspect, it is for the complainant to prove that he has a valid defence. In Judgment 3106, consideration 9, the Tribunal listed two defences: a discussion of legitimate interest and a response to criticism or attack. In Judgment 2751, consideration 5, the Tribunal recognised another defence, namely that statements are privileged if made in legal proceedings, and the same applies to those of internal appeal bodies, because it is necessary for the proper determination of proceedings and the issues that arise in their course: “A litigant whose submissions contain language that is unacceptable, or ill-chosen, or damaging, or unseemly, does not thereby lose the immunity that attaches to statements made in judicial proceedings, however much the breach of good taste may be deplored.” The Tribunal’s case law affirms that “[s]tatements made in legal proceedings are privileged, whether those statements are made in writing in the pleadings or orally in the course of a hearing. The consequence is that, even if defamatory, they cannot be the subject of legal proceedings or sanction. The privilege, sometimes referred to as ‘in court privilege’, exists, not for the benefit of the parties or their representatives, but because it is necessary for the proper determination of proceedings and the issues that arise in their course” (see Judgment 2751, consideration 3). However, according to the cited case law, the “in court privilege” attaches to the Tribunal’s proceedings as well as those of internal appeal bodies (see again Judgment 2751, consideration 3, and the case law cited therein). The Tribunal’s case law does not attach the “in court privilege” to other proceedings.
In the present case, the letters sent by the complainant and considered in the charges, did not fall under a privileged category, as they were not made in legal proceedings before Courts or internal appeal bodies. Nor might these letters be considered as a due report of misconduct, because they were not addressed to the authority in charge of receiving reports of misconduct. Accordingly, the complainant’s letters of April and May 2018 cannot be considered as an exercise of his right of defence. Thus, in order to assess whether the language used by the complainant was justified, it is inappropriate to rely on the right of defence. Reference will be made only to the freedom of speech. In light of the abovementioned case law, freedom of speech is not unfettered, as it “does not encompass action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service” and does not allow defamation. In turn, defamation does not require intention or malice. Its requirements are (i) injuring statements and (ii) the lack of valid reasons for making those statements.
Having regard to the content of the complainant’s letters of April and May 2018 and 2019, to the charges against him, and to his arguments submitted in the present proceedings, the Tribunal is satisfied that the impugned decision and the disciplinary decision are free from legal flaws. The complainant used inappropriate and offensive language which was apt to impair the dignity of the international civil service and was defamatory towards staff whose alleged responsibility had never been proven. Moreover, the complainant’s language was gratuitous and not required by the need to defend his rights or to report misconduct. Nor is there any evidence that he was “provoked” and that he had to react in response to criticism against him.
In conclusion, the Organization has proven that the complainant’s statements were defamatory, and the complainant has not proven the occurrence of circumstances that afforded a defence, namely that he made his statements in response to criticism or in the course of the discussion of a matter of legitimate interest. In addition, the complainant has been charged not only with the accusation of inappropriate criticism and abusive language but also with breach of Article 1.7(e) of the Staff Regulations, that is for statements made “with reckless disregard for accuracy of the information”. In conclusion, the Organization correctly and lawfully found that the complainant had engaged in inappropriate criticism of WIPO and WIPO staff members at large, abusive language against a number of WIPO staff members, former staff members, and parties external to the Organization, dissemination of false and defamatory statements, airing of personal grievances and criticism in public, and failure to protect the image of the international civil service and of WIPO.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2751, 3106, 3156, 4478, 4551
Keywords:
freedom of speech;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; burden of proof; complaint dismissed; freedom of association; freedom of speech; summary dismissal;
Judgment 4551
134th Session, 2022
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants contest modifications made with respect to the use of mass emails within the Office.
Considerations 9-10
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal’s case law has long recognised that staff of international organisations have a general right to associate freely. There can be no doubt that freedom of association is a well-recognised and acknowledged universal right which all workers should enjoy. It is recognised as a right by the Tribunal as well as by a large number of international conventions and declarations (see, for example, the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Article 2(a); the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22; the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 8), and by the Administrative Council of the EPO itself, which recognised the importance of human rights when formulating the rights and obligations of staff (see Judgment 4482, considerations 12 and 13). Article 30 of the Service Regulations, entitled “Freedom of association”, provides: “Permanent employees shall enjoy freedom of association; they may in particular be members of trade unions or staff associations of European civil servants”. The role of staff associations or unions is to represent the interests of members primarily in dealing with their employing organisation on issues concerning the staff. Staff associations or unions should be able to do so unhindered or uninfluenced by the Administration of the employing organisation. Were it otherwise, the role would be compromised (see Judgment 4482, consideration 8).
Freedom of association necessarily involves freedom of discussion and debate. In Judgment 274, under 22, the Tribunal stated that “this freedom when feelings run strong [...] can spill over into extravagant and even regrettable language”. Nonetheless, the Tribunal also acknowledged that freedom of discussion and debate is not absolute and that there may be cases in which an Administration can intervene if, for example, there is “gross abuse of the right to freedom of expression or lack of protection of the individual interests of persons affected by remarks that are ill-intentioned, defamatory or which concern their private lives” (see Judgments 2227, consideration 7, and 3106, consideration 8).
The Tribunal’s case law has it that a staff association enjoys broad freedom of speech and the right to take to task the Administration of the organisation whose employees it represents, but that like any other freedom such freedom has its bounds. Thus, any action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service, and likewise gross abuse of freedom of speech, are inadmissible. But the prevention of such abuse cannot give the Administration a power of prior censorship over the communication of written information produced by the groups and associations concerned (see Judgment 911 and Judgment 2227, consideration 7).
In Judgment 3156 the Tribunal held that, in specific cases, a prior authorisation for the dispatching of mass emails could be justified: “The freedom of speech and the freedom of communication [...] are not, however, unlimited. Not only is an organisation entitled to object to misuse of the means of distribution made available to its staff committee [...], but it also follows from the case law [...] that the right to freedom of speech does not encompass action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service, or gross abuse of this right and, in particular, damage to the individual interests of certain persons through allusions that are malicious, defamatory or which concern their private lives. [...] Since organisations must prevent such abuse of the right of free speech, the Tribunal’s case law does not absolutely prohibit the putting in place of a mechanism for the prior authorisation of messages circulated by bodies representing the staff. An organisation acts unlawfully only if the conditions for implementing this mechanism in practice lead to a breach of that right, for example by an unjustified refusal to circulate a particular message” (see Judgment 3156, considerations 15 and 16).
As observed earlier, the right to freely associate is a general right that enshrines more specific rights, which are necessary or useful in order to ensure that the right to freely associate is effective. It includes the rights to freedom of communication, information, and speech in all forms, including discussion and debate (see Judgment 3106, considerations 7 and 8). Such rights are vested not only in their authors (usually the staff representatives), but also in the recipients. The right of each staff member to freely associate also includes their right to freely receive communications and information, and their right to listen to speeches. In this perspective, every limitation to the right of staff representatives to send mass emails to the staff members, is also a limitation to the right of the staff members to receive mass emails.
Free communication, information, and speech also imply:
(i) the right to the confidentiality of communication, information, and speech; and
(ii) the right to freely choose the means by which the communications are sent, information is provided, and speeches are given.
An organisation is entitled to issue reasonable guidelines in order to govern the use of the office emails by staff members and staff representatives, and to establish authorised and non-authorised uses. Insofar as the criteria on the use of mass emails are underpinned by general interests, such as those listed in Communiqué No. 10 of 29 March 2006, they shall be considered lawful, as they ensure a reasonable balance between the interests of the organisation and the fundamental rights to free communication, information, and speech, vested in the staff members and their staff unions and representatives. This general balance should not allow a prior supervision or preventive censorship by the organisation on the content of the communications, information, and speech (see Judgment 2227, consideration 7). However, the Tribunal’s case law considers lawful a mechanism of prior authorisation under exceptional circumstances (see Judgment 3156, considerations 15 and 16 quoted in full in consideration 9 [...]).
Staff members and their representatives are not allowed an indiscriminate and unfettered exercise of their rights to freedom of communication, information, and speech. Their “freedom” must be consistent with the duties of the staff members towards the Organisation and towards fellow staff members. Freedom of communication, information, and speech is not freedom to insult or to offend (see Judgment 3106, considerations 7 and 8). The communication, information, and speech fall within the responsibility of their authors. Those that exceed the boundaries of freedom and fail to respect the duties of a staff member or result in insults or offences should be subject to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions.
Whether a communication, information, or speech violates the duty of the staff members can be established only on a case-by-case basis, and, normally, after the communication, information, and speech are divulged.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 274, 911, 2227, 2227, 3106, 3106, 3156, 4482
Keywords:
email; freedom of association; freedom of speech; international instrument; staff representative;
Judgment 4148
128th Session, 2019
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to impose on her the disciplinary measure of suspension without pay for five working days.
Consideration 7
Extract:
If comments by a staff member made in the context of a debate about employment matters are defamatory of another staff member (in the sense that the comments have injured a person’s reputation or tarnished her or his good name), the fact that they are defamatory does not, by itself, deny the staff member making the comments the protection afforded by the principle of freedom of association. So much is apparent from the observations of the Tribunal in Judgment 3106, consideration 9. In that judgment the Tribunal noted in consideration 8 (citing Judgment 274, consideration 22) that the existence of a freedom of discussion and debate, inherent in the freedom of association, can have the consequence that when feelings run strong the discussion and debate can spill over into extravagant and even regrettable language. There are, of course, limits on the freedom of discussion and debate that the Tribunal noted in consideration 8 of Judgment 3106. In the present case, the GBA and the Director-General did take into account the complainant’s right to freedom of expression within the umbrella of the freedom of association but found that the language was inappropriate. However, the complainant clearly had strong and not obviously illegitimate views about the procedure finally adopted involving the use of the Clinical Attendance Memo form and the role of the President of the Staff Association as a member of the working group. The complainant was able to criticise him and was not obliged to do so, within the umbrella of the freedom of discussion and debate inherent in the freedom of association, in entirely temperate or polite language. The Tribunal is satisfied that what the complainant said was comprehended by her right to freedom of association and was thus not misconduct.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 274, 3106
Keywords:
defamation; freedom of association; freedom of speech;
Judgment 4043
126th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to dismiss him for misconduct.
Consideration 18
Extract:
[T]he complainant was entitled to share the letter with others in SUEPO, as a general critique of the lawfulness of the general agreement. It is well settled that staff representatives must enjoy a broad freedom of speech (Judgment 3156, consideration 12) and it was not unlawful for the complainant, in the circumstances of this case, to disseminate the letter [...] as he admitted doing.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3156
Keywords:
freedom of association; freedom of speech; staff representative;
Judgment 4042
126th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to downgrade her for misconduct.
Consideration 15
Extract:
[T]he complainant was entitled to share the letter with others in SUEPO, both as a general critique of the lawfulness of the general agreement and a manifestation of the Administration’s view of her conduct said to be an “implementation” of it. It is well settled that staff representatives must enjoy a broad freedom of speech (Judgment 3156, consideration 12) and it was not unlawful for the complainant to disseminate the letter of 2 November 2015 as she admitted doing.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3156
Keywords:
freedom of speech; staff representative;
Judgment 3156
114th Session, 2013
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants, who are former staff representatives, unsuccessfully challenge decisions which, in their view, constituted violations of the right of staff representation.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; freedom of speech; staff representative;
Consideration 16
Extract:
"Since organisations must prevent [any] abuse of the right of free speech [enjoyed by bodies representing the staff], the Tribunal’s case law does not absolutely prohibit the putting in place of a mechanism for the prior authorisation of messages circulated by [such] bodies [...]. An organisation acts unlawfully only if the conditions for implementing this mechanism in practice lead to a breach of that right, for example by an unjustified refusal to circulate a particular message."
Keywords:
bias; breach; collective rights; condition; facilities; flaw; freedom of speech; judicial review; limits; organisation's interest; refusal; right; staff representative; staff union;
Judgment 3106
113th Session, 2012
United Nations Industrial Development Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 11
Extract:
Any republication of the e-mail at that time amounted to excessive publication and, thus, it is not entitled to the same protection that attached to the original e-mail. This notwithstanding, there is no evidence to suggest that the e-mail on the bulletin board was widely read. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that its presence on the bulletin board was the result of ill will or any intentional act that can be attributed to the Organization. Moreover, it was removed before the complainant sought that course in his request for review of the decision of the Director of PSM/HRM of 15 January 2007. Even so, an organisation has a duty of care to ensure that material that injures the reputation or dignity of its staff members does not find its way into any of its authorised channels of communication. The complainant is entitled to claim against the Organization for its breach of that duty, even though the offending material was removed from the bulletin board before he lodged his internal appeal. In these circumstances, the complainant is entitled to material and moral damages. Given that the evidence does not permit
of a finding that the e-mail was widely read on the bulletin board and, in the absence of evidence of any actual damage to the complainant’s reputation by reason of its presence on the board, the Tribunal assesses those damages at 1,000 euros.
Keywords:
duty of care; freedom of speech;
Consideration 9
Extract:
"The law of defamation is not concerned solely with the question whether a statement is defamatory in the sense that it injures a person’s reputation or tarnishes his or her good name. It is also concerned with the question whether the statement was made in circumstances that afford a defence. Broadly speaking, the defences to a claim in defamation mark out the boundaries of permissible debate and discussion. As a general rule, a statement, even if defamatory in the sense indicated, will not result in liability in defamation if it was made in response to criticism by the person claiming to have been defamed or if it was made in the course of the discussion of a matter of legitimate interest to those to whom the statement was published and, in either case, the extent of the publication was reasonable in the circumstances."
Keywords:
freedom of speech; liability; limits; mitigating circumstances; moral injury; publication; respect for dignity;
Judgment 2751
105th Session, 2008
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Considerations 3 and 6
Extract:
"Statements made in legal proceedings are privileged, whether those statements are made in writing in the pleadings or orally in the course of a hearing. The consequence is that, even if defamatory, they cannot be the subject of legal proceedings or sanction. The privilege, sometimes referred to as 'in court privilege', exists, not for the benefit of the parties or their representatives, but because it is necessary for the proper determination of proceedings and the issues that arise in their course. In Judgment 1391 the Tribunal recognised that the privilege attaches to its proceedings, as well as those of internal appeal bodies. [...]
[T]he Tribunal's consideration of the extent of the privilege that attaches to statements made in the course of internal appeal proceedings or proceedings before the Tribunal has concentrated on statements made by staff members. However, the privilege is the same in the case of statements made by or on behalf of defendant organisations, and they must be allowed a similar degree of freedom in what they say and the manner of its expression. Even so, a statement will constitute a perversion of a defendant organisation's right of reply if it is wholly irrelevant and it can only serve an improper purpose."
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1391
Keywords:
abuse of power; breach; confidential evidence; consequence; disciplinary measure; formal requirements; freedom of speech; iloat; internal appeals body; judicial review; language; misuse of authority; official; oral proceedings; organisation; privileges and immunities; procedure before the tribunal; purpose; reply; respect for dignity; right; settlement out of court;
Judgment 2672
104th Session, 2008
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Considerations 9-10
Extract:
"A staff association or union is, in essence, a voluntary association of employees and/or others in a relationship pursuant to which they perform services by way of personal exertion, who have agreed together to act collectively [...] to protect and promote their industrial interests. The powers of the association may extend to the protection and promotion of the industrial interests of those who are eligible to belong to the association. Many countries require other formalities including, sometimes, registration under the relevant domestic law. Those laws cannot apply to a staff association or union the membership of which is restricted to international civil servants. However, that is not to say that no formality is necessary for the formation of a staff association or union representing international civil servants.
For the creation of a staff association or union representing international civil servants, there must, at the very least, be some means of identifying the agreement voluntarily to associate for the purpose of protecting and promoting the industrial interests of members, the terms of that agreement and the means by which it may be varied, both in relation to individual employees and the purposes or objects of the association. [...] [B]ecause it is a voluntary association, there must be an agreement as to the persons by or through whom the association acts, the means by which those persons are selected or elected, the matters in respect of which they have authority to act and the powers that they have in relation to those matters. In the absence of agreement as to each of those matters, the agreement to associate would, in accordance with general principles of law, be void for uncertainty. And to have an agreement covering those matters, there must be rules incorporated in a charter, a statute or some other document to which the members subscribe and by which they agree to be bound."
Keywords:
applicable law; collective bargaining; collective rights; effect; freedom of association; freedom of speech; general principle; staff claim; staff representative; staff union agreement; written rule;
Judgment 2656
103rd Session, 2007
International Atomic Energy Agency
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7
Extract:
The complainant was accused of having deliberately made false allegations of misconduct against other staff members. At the end of the disciplinary procedure he was dismissed for serious misconduct. "[A]lthough it is not correct to equate deliberate falsehood with reckless indifference to the truth in all circumstances, the nature of the allegations may be such that there is little, if any, room for difference in the consequent sanction. The more serious the allegation, the greater is the need for care. In the present case the allegations were indeed serious, and were of a kind which, in the absence of cogent evidence, should never have been made. That being so, there was no error in this case in equating the appropriate sanction for reckless indifference with that for deliberate falsehood. The complainant showed a callous disregard for the feelings of the persons concerned and a lack of judgement that was wholly incompatible with the standards of conduct required of an international civil servant. In the circumstances, these matters do not warrant a finding that the disciplinary action was disproportionate to the conduct in question."
Keywords:
breach; conduct; disciplinary measure; disciplinary procedure; freedom of speech; lack of evidence; liability; misconduct; official; proportionality; respect for dignity; serious misconduct; staff member's duties; termination of employment; working relations; written rule;
Judgment 2626
103rd Session, 2007
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 5(a)
Extract:
"A decision to refuse to publish in an international organisation's in-house magazine the corrigendum of an article which, in the opinion of the staff member concerned, injures his personal interests may constitute a breach of that staff member's personal rights and an infringement of his freedom of expression. Insofar as such a decision in itself produces legal effects and infringes the rights of the staff member concerned, it constitutes an administrative act causing injury."
Keywords:
amendment to the rules; breach; cause of action; effect; freedom of speech; individual decision; injury; moral injury; organisation; publication; refusal; respect for dignity; right; staff member's interest;
Judgment 2315
96th Session, 2004
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Considerations 28-29
Extract:
The complainant submits that the impugned decision is vitiated by a breach of due process of law, inasmuch as the recommendation of the Personnel Advisory Panel was kept from him. The Commission points out that this recommendation is confidential and, thus, there was no breach of due process. "Should a claim of confidentiality be made, for example, where a recommendation contains immaterial information on a third party, it is for the party making that claim to establish the grounds upon which the claim is based. In such a case, precautions may be taken to maintain confidentiality. In the present case, the Commission provides no grounds for its argument of confidentiality other than the need for the Personnel Advisory Panel to be able freely to discuss relevant matters. In a decision-making process which is subject to internal review and to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, that is not an acceptable basis for a claim of confidentiality."
Keywords:
advisory body; breach; burden of proof; complaint; confidential evidence; decision; formal flaw; freedom of speech; grounds; iloat; internal appeal; procedure before the tribunal; recommendation; request by a party; right to reply;
Judgment 2228
95th Session, 2003
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 11
Extract:
The Staff Committee's access to the organisation's internal electronic mail system was withdrawn after the organisation made an objection on technical grounds following the mass distribution of documents. "The Staff Committee is responsible for [...] maintaining "suitable contacts between the competent administrative authorities and the staff", which necessarily implies the availability of adequate means of communication within the organisation... Nevertheless, the incident mentioned by the [organisation] involving the mass distribution of a union report [...] shows that some degree of control is necessary, without jeopardising the Staff Committee's freedom of expression and speech."
Keywords:
acceptance; consequence; facilities; freedom of speech; liability; official; organisation; publication; purpose; rebuttal; refusal; report; staff union;
Consideration 11
Extract:
The Staff Committee, which is a statutory body of the organisation, made the facilities derived from its access to the organisation's internal electronic mail system available to the Staff Union. Its access to the system was withdrawn. "The organisation [submits that] the facilities offered to the Staff Committee cannot be made available to the Staff Union without creating confusion with regard to the attribution of roles and responsibilities, even if those in charge of one of these bodies are also, or may be, in charge of the other. This does not mean to say that the unions should not be provided with certain facilities by the organisations. On the contrary, their freedom of expression should not be hampered, as indicated by the Tribunal in Judgment 1547, [...] and unions must clearly be provided with sufficient facilities, within the framework of negotiated agreements or, if need be, administrative regulations, to enable them to carry on their activities. It is legitimate, however, for the organisation to ensure that the facilities made available to a body officially representing the staff as a whole are not misused for the benefit of a union, or any other body having its own assets and representing only part of the staff."
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1547
Keywords:
administrative instruction; case law; collective bargaining; facilities; freedom of speech; grounds; liability; limits; organisation's duties; purpose; refusal; staff representative; staff union; staff union activity; staff union agreement; written rule;
Judgment 2227
95th Session, 2003
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7
Extract:
The complainant was informed by a letter of 22 December 1999 that the administration reserved the right to approve the photocopying and distribution of circulars issued by staff representatives. "The Tribunal recalled, in Judgment 911 [...], that a staff association enjoys broad freedom of speech and the right to take to task the administration of the organisation whose employees it represents, but that like any other freedom such freedom has its bounds. thus any action that impairs the dignity of the international civil service, and likewise gross abuse of freedom of speech, are inadmissible. But the prevention of such abuse cannot give the administration a power of prior censorship over the communication of written information produced by the groups and associations concerned. Herein lies the problem in this case: the Office considers it has a general right to authorise, which it maintains it uses only with moderation, but the limits of such authorisation are by no means clear. The Tribunal cannot set aside a general decision on the grounds that it does not offer the guarantees that are in any case available to staff members on the basis of the general principles of international civil service law, as established and interpreted by the Tribunal and other international administrative tribunals. These principles confine the administration's scope of action to cases where there is gross abuse of the right to freedom of expression or lack of protection of the individual interests of persons affected by remarks that are ill-intentioned, defamatory or which concern their private lives. And it is in the light of these principles that the letter of 22 December 1999 [...] should be interpreted. a refusal to grant an authorisation may be regarded as lawful only if it complies with the above principles."
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 911
Keywords:
acceptance; case law; collective rights; exception; freedom of speech; general decision; general principle; iloat; international civil service principles; interpretation; judicial review; limits; official; organisation; outside activity; publication; refusal; respect for dignity; right; safeguard; staff member's interest; staff representative; staff union; staff union activity; tribunal;
Judgment 2114
92nd Session, 2002
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 14
Extract:
"When the measure takes the form of a reprimand, the Tribunal will exercise a limited power of review. It will not interfere 'unless the measure was taken without authority, or violates a rule of form or procedure, or is based on an error of fact or of law, or if essential facts have not been taken into consideration, or if it is tainted with abuse of authority, or if a clearly mistaken conclusion has been drawn from the facts'. (see Judgment 274, [...], under 2.)"
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 274
Keywords:
abuse of power; censure; conduct; decision-maker; disciplinary measure; disregard of essential fact; duty of discretion; formal flaw; freedom of speech; judicial review; limits; mistake of fact; mistaken conclusion; misuse of authority; procedural flaw;
Judgment 2048
91st Session, 2001
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Considerations 12 and 15
Extract:
Sending a threatening letter to a colleague is unacceptable conduct by an international civil servant. The Tribunal is of the opinion that this is a valid reason for not renewing a contract.
Keywords:
conduct; contract; decision; disciplinary measure; freedom of speech; grounds; misconduct; non-renewal of contract; staff member's duties; working relations;
Judgment 1547
81st Session, 1996
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Considerations 12-14
Extract:
"The EPO had no formal agreement with the union about facilities such as the distribution of a summons to a meeting. But it admitted to the Appeals Committee that its consistent practice since 1992 had been to distribute any unsealed unofficial internal mail, whether private or not, save any text containing a personal attack on someone. Was such usage binding in law? [...] The plain expectation of the staff was that the EPO would deliver notices from their union without let or hindrance." Therefore the complaints succeed.
Keywords:
binding character; discretion; facilities; flaw; freedom of association; freedom of speech; judicial review; limits; organisation's duties; practice; staff union; staff union activity;
Consideration 8
Extract:
"Precedent has it that an organisation has some latitude in affording facilities to a staff union and its decisions are not subject to judicial review. That is not so, however, where it is charged with breach of freedom of association. The Tribunal will indeed interfere if the effect of the impugned decision is to hamper the freedom of speech that any union must enjoy. Refusal to deliver invitations to a union meeting is unquestionably a breach of the privacy of mail and of the freedom of speech that is part and parcel of freedom of association."
Keywords:
case law; discretion; facilities; flaw; freedom of association; freedom of speech; judicial review; limits; staff union; staff union activity;
Judgment 1532
81st Session, 1996
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 13
Extract:
"Claim 8 is to costs. Again the Tribunal reminds [the complainant], in view of the intemperate language of his submissions, that he owes a duty of respect to the Organization and to its staff. Because he has failed in that duty the Tribunal disallows his claim to costs, even though one of his claims succeeds."
Keywords:
claim; complaint; conduct; costs; freedom of speech; limits; no award of costs; organisation's reputation; staff member's duties;
Judgment 1531
81st Session, 1996
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 15
Extract:
As for his claim to costs, "the Tribunal observes, in view of the intemperate language of his submissions, that he owes a duty of respect to the defendant and to its staff. Though his complaint succeeds in part, his claim to costs is disallowed because he has not fulfilled that duty."
Keywords:
complainant; conduct; freedom of speech; limits; no award of costs; official; organisation's reputation; staff member's duties;
Judgment 1431
79th Session, 1995
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Consideration 7
Extract:
The EPO described [the complainant's] complaint as "an abuse". But it does not ask the Tribunal to dismiss it as irreceivable for that reason. "The defendant is merely exercising the freedom of speech that any litigant must be allowed, short of resorting to offensive or insulting language." the complainant's claim to damages on that account fails.
Keywords:
criteria; freedom of speech; limits; new claim; organisation; rejoinder; reply; submissions; vexatious complaint;
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