Duty of care (645,-666)
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Keywords: Duty of care
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Judgment 5156
141st Session, 2026
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests her dismissal for misconduct.
Consideration 8
Extract:
“Due process mandates that the health condition of the staff concerned be taken into consideration, striking a balance between the right to defense of the staff concerned and the need for an expeditious investigation in cases of harassment (see Judgments 4065, considerations 7 and 8, and 4064, considerations 8 to 10). In Judgment 4064, considerations 8 and 9, the Tribunal held that, in the absence of statutory rules or proven practice providing guidance on how the requirement of due process was to be fulfilled where a staff member who is accused of harassment is on certified sick leave, and given the duty of an organization to investigate harassment complaints, it was reasonable that it could ask a staff member who was on sick leave to comment upon an investigation report if doing so would not have exacerbated the illness which occasioned the grant of sick leave and if the staff concerned was fit to do so […] In the present case, the Tribunal is satisfied that IOS struck a proper balance, considering that the complainant’s interview was accommodated to her needs, and extended over several days. IOS made several attempts to afford the complainant the opportunity to answer questions in writing. Once it became clear that her medical condition prevented her from even responding in writing, IOS opted to limit the scope of the investigation to ‘those allegations which IOS was able to fully discuss with, seek comments from, and present relevant evidence to [the complainant]’.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4064, 4065
Keywords:
due process; duty of care; harassment; investigation; investigation report; sick leave;
Judgment 5152
141st Session, 2026
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a review of the measures taken following the Organization’s acknowledgment of the violation of its duty of care towards him and asks that it be ordered to publish a press release to clear his reputation and to pay him additional amounts in moral damages and legal “fees”.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
breach; complaint allowed; duty of care;
Consideration 8
Extract:
The Tribunal cannot, however, accept the complainant’s fourth and last argument that UNAIDS violated its duty of care by placing him on special leave with full pay or that the subsequent extensions thereof were invalid. Pursuant to Staff Rule 650.2, the Executive Director had the authority to place a staff member on special leave with full pay if he considered that it was in the interest of the Organization to do so. There were no other criteria in the applicable provisions limiting the exercise of this discretion by the Executive Director. To suggest that the Executive Director should have given priority, at that time, to the complainant’s interests and the protection of his reputation over those of the Organization would invite the Tribunal to second-guess what was otherwise a reasonable exercise of discretion by the executive head of the Organization faced with the situation that he then had to manage.
Keywords:
duty of care; investigation; leave with pay; organisation's interest; organisation's reputation; staff member's interest;
Consideration 14
Extract:
The Tribunal case law has it that, as a general rule, the Tribunal does not have the competence to issue injunctions against international organisations (see, for example, Judgments 5057, consideration 22 (order to institute disciplinary proceedings), 5045, consideration 19 (order the issuance of a directive), 4802, consideration 2 (order to publish an internal decision), 4065, consideration 9 (order to issue an official announcement to clear reputation), 4039, consideration 17 (order to provide apologies), 3506, consideration 18 (order to instruct an organisation to do something), and 2626, consideration 13 (order to sanction staff members)). When addressing this issue recognizing that its competence in this regard is limited, the Tribunal indeed refers to the expression of not having the competence to “order injunctions of this kind” (see, for example, Judgment 5045, consideration 19). But in a situation like this one, where the context involves a clear defamatory statement circulated by an international organization and affecting a complainant’s honour and reputation, the Tribunal is prepared to proceed on the basis of the approach in Judgment 2720, considerations 17 and 18.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2626, 2720, 3506, 4039, 4065, 4802, 5045, 5057
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; duty of care; duty of discretion; injunction; professional injury; publication; respect for dignity; right to privacy; staff member's interest;
Consideration 5
Extract:
The Tribunal agrees with the complainant that the five-month duration of the WHO/IOS preliminary review was excessive and unreasonable, and that the Organization did not investigate promptly the allegations against him. The allegations made were serious; they related to alleged sexual harassment and depicted the complainant as a sexual predator and skirt chaser. By the time the preliminary review was requested from WHO/IOS […], the matter had become public […]. Clearly, time was of the essence, and it was urgent to proceed rapidly, in the interests of both justice in general and the interests of the complainant in particular. The Organization’s duty of care towards him required that the preliminary review proceed without delay. […]. Five months to complete a preliminary review in a matter such as the instant one was unacceptable. […]. The Tribunal finds the answers offered in this regard by the Organization unconvincing. The fact that there was no formal complaint made, that [the accuser] was not a staff member, and therefore not subject to internal rules, or that she could not be compelled to accept to be interviewed are insufficient to relieve the Organization from abiding with its well-recognized duty of care towards its officials in circumstances such as the present.
Keywords:
delay; duty of care; investigation;
Consideration 6
Extract:
[T]he email with the “talking points” circulated […] left little doubt that the UNAIDS staff member to whom it referred was indeed the complainant. As well, by alluding to the fact that the Organization had a zero-tolerance policy on sexual harassment, it was clearly publicly linking the complainant to this kind of behaviour. Secondly, the record shows that the Organization made similar references and allusions in its press release […]. Later on, […] in her interview to a major press agency, a UNAIDS spokesperson referred to the complainant having been placed on administrative leave over sexual harassment allegations when, in fact, the complainant had been placed on special leave due to general allegations of misconduct pursuant to the notification that he had received from the Organization […]. The Tribunal agrees with the complainant’s assertion that the circulation of this incorrect, misleading but nevertheless detailed information, both internally and to the press, was inappropriate and in violation of the Organization’s duty to refrain from conduct that may harm the dignity and reputation of its officials. […]. These communications were a serious affront to the complainant’s name, professional reputation and dignity, reflecting adversely on his person while infringing on his privacy.
Keywords:
duty of care; duty of discretion; organisation's duties; professional injury; professional reputation; publication; respect for dignity; right to privacy; staff member's interest;
Consideration 7
Extract:
[S]till on the violation of the Organization’s duty of care, the complainant further argues that UNAIDS failed to take the necessary concrete measures to ensure a prompt correction of the inaccurate public statements made internally and to the press. On this point, the Tribunal observes that even though the GBA report identified a fault of UNAIDS and that the latter acknowledged its violation of its duty of care in the impugned decision, the actions taken to remedy the harm done, considering the nature of its communications and press release, were insufficient and less than what would have been expected from an international organisation. Having affected, albeit not intentionally or maliciously, the complainant’s reputation and image through what were incomplete and misleading public statements, it was reasonable to expect the Organization to redress the situation through similar public means, which it refused to do. The Tribunal considers that UNAIDS’ mere removal of the inaccurate press release from its website and its action to correct its spokesperson’s inaccurate characterization of the nature of the complainant’s leave to the press agency were insufficient in this respect. More required to be done in that context.
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; duty of care; duty of discretion; injunction; organisation's duties; professional injury; publication; respect for dignity; right to privacy; staff member's interest;
Consideration 15
Extract:
The press release issued by UNAIDS on 14 September 2018 caused prejudice to the complainant’s honour and reputation. Similarly to the situation that prevailed in Judgment 2720, the Organization was, pursuant to its duty of care, under a continuous obligation to take steps to remedy, as far as possible, the injury it caused to the complainant. The Tribunal has the authority to order specific performance of such an obligation, bearing in mind that the nature of the specific performance that is to be ordered must be clear and unambiguous so that it does not lead to further disputes between the parties. […] The order of the Tribunal in this respect should rather be kept as simple as possible. […]. This, in the Tribunal’s view, is the proper way to vindicate the harm caused to the reputation of the complainant because of the Organization’s violations of its duty of care towards him. Given that press statements publicly accessible on mediums like the Internet end up remaining available for very long periods of time after their initial publication, issuing such an order in the circumstances remains appropriate even though the relevant events go back many years.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2720
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; duty of care; duty of discretion; injunction; professional injury; publication; respect for dignity; right to privacy; staff member's interest;
Judgment 5144
141st Session, 2026
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the non-renewal of his fixed-term appointment.
Consideration 12
Extract:
“[A]n [o]rganization has the duty to explore options or to make reasonable efforts for the reassignment of a staff member whose post has been abolished (see, for example, Judgments 4097, consideration 9 […]). Unlike in cases where an organization actively reached out to other offices and documented efforts to secure reassignment, the record here shows only that the complainant was encouraged to apply for posts. But, in the circumstances of this case, […] the FAO was obliged to make more efforts […] In Judgment 3908, consideration 16, the Tribunal explained that […] a concomitant of [the right to abolish position] is an obligation to deal fairly with the staff […]This obligation extends to finding, if they exist, other positions within the organisation for which [they] have the experience and qualifications […] [T]he Tribunal generally considered the extent of an organization’s duty to reassign staff members whose positions were abolished mainly in relation to [their] type of contract […], the nature of [their post/role], their length of service […], and recognized a greater duty in respect of staff who held permanent positions (see, for example, Judgment 3754, consideration 16). There is no evidence that the complainant’s long service [or background] were considered against positions later filled by external candidates. […] [T]here is no evidence that [the fact that he worked in a hardship duty station] was taken into account in the reassignment exercises.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3754, 3908
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; reassignment;
Judgment 5132
141st Session, 2026
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decisions to abolish the post she encumbered and not to renew her fixed-term contract.
Considerations 12-13
Extract:
"[T]he Tribunal recalls that in Judgment 3908, consideration 16, it stated that:
“[...] [T]he Tribunal has long recognised the right of an international organisation to restructure and abolish positions [...] This will imperil the continuing employment of the occupants of those abolished positions. However, a concomitant of that right to abolish positions is an obligation to deal fairly with the staff who occupy those abolished positions. That extends to finding, if they exist, other positions within the organisation for which those staff have the experience and qualifications.”
In Judgment 4841, consideration 6, in a situation of non-renewal of a contract in connection with the abolition of a post at IOM, the Tribunal also held that “[...] the Organization ‘was obliged to explore with the complainant other employment options prior to his separation’”.
The Tribunal emphasized, however, that “[...] the Organization was not bound by any specific provision to identify an alternative post. Where the non-renewal of a fixed-term contract is justified, the direct reassignment of the staff member to another adequate post, if it exists, is not mandatory.” The Tribunal also found that it was consistent with the duty of care of the Organization to place the complainant on special leave without pay after the expiry of her fixed-term contract “in order to enable her to apply to post vacancies within IOM as an internal candidate”.
In the instant complaint, the record establishes, amongst other things, that the complainant was provided with a list of public vacancies […], that upon confirmation of her post abolition, […] alternative employment options [were explored] […], and that the Organization has assisted her in applying for no less than 32 vacancies since 2018. […]. In addition, it is not disputed that the complainant was placed on special leave without pay after her separation to allow her to continue to apply to vacancies as an internal candidate.
While none of these opportunities materialized for the complainant, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that she was unsuccessful in applying for a range of positions for the Tribunal to conclude that IOM violated its duty towards her in this regard […].”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3908, 4841
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; reassignment;
Judgment 5131
141st Session, 2026
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decisions to place him on special leave with full pay and subsequently on sick leave pending a reassessment of his state of health.
Consideration 2
Extract:
“An international organization has a duty of care to provide for staff members who are ill as well as protect the staff with whom they work (see, for example, Judgments 4239, consideration 21, and 3689, consideration 5). That duty of care may require the organization to provide leave to a staff member whose health is in question and to provide sick leave if it has been determined the staff member is ill and consequently incapable of working. This obligation is subject to the applicable staff rules concerning leave and sick leave. The granting of either form of leave would usually be on a consensual basis. But rare and unusual occasions could arise where an organisation, in order to meet the duty presently being discussed both in relation to the ill staff member and other staff members working with her or him, would have to require a staff member to take leave unless expressly prohibited by the applicable staff rules.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3689, 4239
Keywords:
duty of care; organisation's duties; sick leave;
Judgment 5130
141st Session, 2026
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to renew his fixed-term contract further to the abolition of his position due to budgetary constraints.
Consideration 12
Extract:
It is well-established case law that an organisation has a duty to explore possible options or to make reasonable efforts for the reassignment of a staff member whose post has been abolished (see, for example, Judgments 4097, consideration 9, and 2902, consideration 14). In consideration 16 of Judgment 3908, the Tribunal stated that, while it has long recognized the right of an international organization to abolish positions, which will imperil the continuing employment of the occupants of those abolished positions, a concomitant of that right is an obligation to deal fairly with the staff who occupy those abolished positions. This obligation extends to finding, if they exist, other positions within the organization for which those staff have the experience and qualifications.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2902, 3908, 4097
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; financial considerations; non-renewal of contract; organisation's duties; reassignment;
Consideration 12
Extract:
[I]t was stated in Judgment 4935, consideration 21:
“Historically, the Tribunal generally considered the extent of an organization’s duty to reassign staff members whose positions were abolished mainly in relation to the type of contract they held, the nature of the post and/or the role to which they were assigned, their length of service with the organization, and recognized a greater duty in respect of staff who held permanent positions (see, for example, Judgment 3754, consideration 16). Nonetheless, in consideration 10 of Judgment 4097, the Tribunal stated that it does not follow that other classes of staff of differing status should be afforded no protection by principles it has developed in circumstances where their post is abolished and attempts are being made to reassign them.”
The Tribunal is cognizant of the nature of the IOM’s funding structure as a project-based organization. This is significant, among other things, in that the employment of a large number of staff members is linked to the duration of the specific projects for which they are engaged (see Judgment 4935, consideration 23).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3754, 4097, 4935
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; financial considerations; non-renewal of contract; organisation's duties; project personnel; reassignment;
Judgment 5119
141st Session, 2026
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests ITU’s decision to impose on him the disciplinary measure of dismissal with immediate effect.
Considerations 21-22
Extract:
“[T]he Tribunal relevantly observed in Judgment 4914, consideration 13, that a complainant was “mistaken to suggest that he was entitled to participate in the investigation in such a way that he could have, for instance, questioned or cross-examined himself, or through counsel, the persons that the investigator met at that stage of the process. The Tribunal’s case law does not support such an extensive right to an adversarial procedure at the investigation stage of the process as the complainant appears to be suggesting […]”.”
“[E]stablished precedents of the Tribunal […] confirm that an investigator has the duty to ascertain all relevant facts and that the accused person must be given the benefit of the doubt […], which entails that the investigator has to assess not only evidence against the accused person, but also exculpatory evidence […]. In the instant case, the investigation report indicates that exculpatory evidence identified by the complainant was indeed duly and sufficiently considered.
[…] Even though the complainant kept putting forward additional names of colleagues he thought would express positive opinions about their personal collaborations with him, at some point, having conducted the number of interviews that were done, the investigator could reasonably consider that she had gathered sufficient and adequate information on the case. In the context of what transpires from the record, to suggest, as the complainant does, that not all potential exculpatory witnesses were interviewed, or that some of these witness statements were ignored, remains highly insufficient to support an assertion that it amounted to a breach of his due process rights.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4914
Keywords:
adversarial proceedings; due process; duty of care; investigation; right to be heard;
Judgment 5113
141st Session, 2026
Energy Charter Conference
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests his Performance Appraisal Report (PAR) for the period from 1 June 2021 to 31 May 2022 and the decision not to renew his appointment due to unsatisfactory performance.
Consideration 10
Extract:
“[T]he reinstatement of an official on a fixed-term contract is ordered only in exceptional cases […]. In the present case, having also regard to the time that has elapsed since the complainant’s separation from the organisation, the Tribunal considers that reinstatement would not be appropriate. However, as a result of the unlawful decision not to renew his appointment, the complainant lost a valuable opportunity to pursue his employment with the organisation, in respect of which he is entitled to an award of material damages. In the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal assesses those damages in the amount of 60,000 euros. The complainant is also entitled to moral damages for the breach of the organisation’s duty of care, which the Tribunal assesses at 15,000 euros.”
Keywords:
duty of care; fixed-term; loss of opportunity; material damages; moral damages; non-renewal of contract; reinstatement;
Judgment 5111
141st Session, 2026
Energy Charter Conference
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to renew his appointment.
Consideration 14
Extract:
“[T]he complainant requests reinstatement or, alternatively, material damages […]. The Tribunal recalls that, according to its consistent case law, a temporary appointment carries no expectation of renewal […]. Even if the reasons for non-renewal had not been flawed, there would have been no guarantee that the complainant’s contract would have been renewed. His request for reinstatement is therefore rejected. However, because the complainant lost a valuable opportunity to have his contract renewed due to the defects established above, he is entitled to material damages to compensate for that loss of opportunity, which the Tribunal assesses at a lump sum of 30,000 euros.”
Keywords:
duty of care; fixed-term; loss of opportunity; material damages; moral damages; non-renewal of contract; reinstatement;
Consideration 14
Extract:
“The complainant is entitled to moral damages, as the flaws in the appraisal process referred to earlier constitute a breach of the principle prohibiting an organisation from breaching the rules which it has itself established as well as the organisation’s duty of care, which the Tribunal assesses at 5,000 euros.”
Keywords:
duty of care; moral damages; patere legem;
Judgment 5074
140th Session, 2025
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to grant her diplomatic privileges and immunities following the introduction of a new career system and the transposition of her grade into that system.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The complainant further contends that the EPO breached its duty of care towards staff by accepting, or proposing, said interpretation. The Tribunal notes that after the new career system entered into force, Article 10 of the Seat Agreement was no longer literally applicable in the terms in which it was expressed, as grades A5 and A4(2) explicitly mentioned therein no longer existed, and Article 10 did not mention the new grades. A renegotiation of the Seat Agreement would have been necessary, which would have taken time, and its outcome would not have been foreseeable. There is evidence in the record that the host State declared how it would have interpreted Article 10, in light of the new career system, and that the EPO informed staff about this interpretation. Even assuming that the interpretation adopted by the host State was the outcome of a negotiation with the EPO, such negotiation between the EPO and the host State can in no way be regarded as an infringement of the EPO’s duty of care towards its staff.
Keywords:
duty of care; host state; international instrument; interpretation;
Judgment 5073
140th Session, 2025
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants challenge the decisions not to grant them diplomatic privileges and immunities following the introduction of a new career system and the transposition of their grades into that system.
Consideration 8
Extract:
The complainants further contend that the EPO breached its duty of care towards staff by accepting, or proposing, the said interpretation. The Tribunal notes that after the new career system entered into force, Article 10 of the Seat Agreement was no longer literally applicable in the terms in which it was expressed, as grades A5 and A4(2) explicitly mentioned therein no longer existed, and Article 10 did not mention the new grades. A renegotiation of the Seat Agreement would have been necessary, which would have taken time, and its outcome would not have been foreseeable. There is evidence in the record that the host State declared how it would have interpreted Article 10, in light of the new career system, and that the EPO informed staff about this interpretation. Even assuming that the interpretation adopted by the host State was the outcome of a negotiation with the EPO, such negotiation between the EPO and the host State can in no way be regarded as an infringement of the EPO’s duty of care towards its staff.
Keywords:
duty of care; host state; international instrument; interpretation;
Judgment 5035
140th Session, 2025
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: Le requérant conteste les décisions de rejet de ses demandes de remboursement spécial des frais de garde-malade de son épouse.
Consideration 21
Extract:
[L]e requérant est fondé à soutenir, comme il le fait par ailleurs, que la procédure de recours interne relative à la décision contestée dans sa deuxième requête n’a pas été menée avec la diligence requise. Il s’est en effet écoulé, entre le dépôt de sa réclamation […] et la notification de la décision statuant sur celle-ci […] un délai de près de huit mois, dont le Tribunal relève qu’il s’explique pour moitié par le fait que la chef de l’Unité des ressources humaines et services a tardé, sans raison pertinente, à se prononcer sur la réclamation après la remise de l’avis du CGRAM. Si un tel délai n’est certes pas déraisonnable dans l’absolu, il n’en apparaît pas moins excessif dans les circonstances particulières de l’espèce, où l’âge avancé du requérant – 77 ans au moment des faits – et la charge financière très élevée que représentaient pour lui les frais en litige commandaient que l’Organisation s’attache à traiter son recours avec davantage de célérité.
En outre, l’intéressé est également fondé à soutenir que l’absence de toute réponse apportée par Eurocontrol à la demande de remboursement spécial qu’il avait présentée […] témoigne, eu égard à ces mêmes circonstances particulières, d’un manquement de l’Organisation au devoir de sollicitude qui lui incombait à son égard.
[I]l sera fait une juste réparation du préjudice moral occasionné par les décisions attaquées en condamnant Eurocontrol au paiement, à ce titre, d’une indemnité de 3 000 euros.
Keywords:
duty of care; internal procedure; moral injury;
Judgment 5023
140th Session, 2025
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: La requérante conteste le rejet de sa plainte pour harcèlement institutionnel.
Consideration 6
Extract:
[I]l ressort du considérant 15 du jugement 4207, rendu en formation plénière, qu’en l’absence de procédure légale complète à appliquer en cas de plainte pour harcèlement dans ses Statut et Règlement du personnel, une organisation internationale doit répondre à une telle plainte conformément à la jurisprudence pertinente du Tribunal. Dans ce jugement, le Tribunal a en outre relevé ce qui suit à ce sujet:
«Il est de jurisprudence constante qu’une organisation internationale a le devoir d’assurer aux membres de son personnel un environnement sûr et adéquat (voir le jugement 2706, au considérant 5, citant le jugement 2524). De plus, “étant donné la gravité que revêt une plainte pour harcèlement, une organisation internationale a l’obligation d’engager […] [une] enquête […]” (voir le jugement 3347, au considérant 14). L’enquête doit en outre être engagée rapidement, menée de manière approfondie, et les faits doivent être établis objectivement et dans leur contexte général. Une fois l’enquête terminée, le requérant est en droit de recevoir une réponse de l’administration concernant la plainte pour harcèlement. De plus, comme le Tribunal l’a affirmé dans le jugement 2706, au considérant 5, “une organisation internationale est responsable de l’ensemble des torts causés à un membre de son personnel par un supérieur hiérarchique de l’intéressé, agissant dans le cadre de ses fonctions, lorsque la victime subit un traitement portant atteinte à sa dignité personnelle et professionnelle” (voir également les jugements 1609, au considérant 16, 1875, au considérant 32, et 3170, au considérant 33). Ainsi, une organisation internationale doit prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger une victime de harcèlement.»
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1609, 1875, 2524, 2706, 3170, 3347, 4207
Keywords:
applicable law; case law; duty of care; harassment;
Judgment 5022
140th Session, 2025
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: La requérante conteste le rejet de ses plaintes pour harcèlement moral contre deux de ses supérieurs hiérarchiques.
Consideration 4
Extract:
[I]l ressort du considérant 15 du jugement 4207, rendu en formation plénière, qu’en l’absence de procédure légale complète à appliquer en cas de plainte pour harcèlement dans ses Statut et Règlement du personnel, une organisation internationale doit répondre à une telle plainte conformément à la jurisprudence pertinente du Tribunal. Dans ce jugement, le Tribunal a en outre relevé ce qui suit à ce sujet:
«Il est de jurisprudence constante qu’une organisation internationale a le devoir d’assurer aux membres de son personnel un environnement sûr et adéquat (voir le jugement 2706, au considérant 5, citant le jugement 2524). De plus, “étant donné la gravité que revêt une plainte pour harcèlement, une organisation internationale a l’obligation d’engager […] [une] enquête […]” (voir le jugement 3347, au considérant 14). L’enquête doit en outre être engagée rapidement, menée de manière approfondie, et les faits doivent être établis objectivement et dans leur contexte général. Une fois l’enquête terminée, le requérant est en droit de recevoir une réponse de l’administration concernant la plainte pour harcèlement. De plus, comme le Tribunal l’a affirmé dans le jugement 2706, au considérant 5, “une organisation internationale est responsable de l’ensemble des torts causés à un membre de son personnel par un supérieur hiérarchique de l’intéressé, agissant dans le cadre de ses fonctions, lorsque la victime subit un traitement portant atteinte à sa dignité personnelle et professionnelle” (voir également les jugements 1609, au considérant 16, 1875, au considérant 32, et 3170, au considérant 33). Ainsi, une organisation internationale doit prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger une victime de harcèlement.»
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1609, 1875, 2524, 2706, 3170, 3347, 4207
Keywords:
applicable law; case law; duty of care; harassment;
Judgment 5019
140th Session, 2025
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: La requérante conteste la décision de supprimer son poste.
Consideration 6
Extract:
S’agissant […] du droit de la requérante à être informée du fait qu’Interpol envisageait de supprimer purement et simplement son poste, le Tribunal rappelle qu’il résulte du principe général de bonne foi et du devoir de sollicitude qui y est lié que les organisations internationales doivent avoir pour leurs fonctionnaires les égards nécessaires afin que leur soient évités des dommages inutiles et qu’il appartient ainsi à ces dernières d’informer à temps leurs fonctionnaires de toute mesure susceptible de porter atteinte à leurs droits ou de léser leurs intérêts légitimes (voir les jugements 4777, au considérant 6, 4072, au considérant 8, 3861, au considérant 9, et 3071, au considérant 30).
Or le Tribunal constate que, si la requérante était au courant de la nécessité de prendre des mesures de restructuration en vue de la création de la nouvelle Direction des ressources humaines, elle n’avait en revanche été informée à aucun moment de la mesure projetée à son égard avant de recevoir la notification de la décision de suppression de son poste […]. Bien au contraire, l’Organisation avait, jusqu’à cette date, pris le soin de la rassurer à cet égard, en insistant sur le fait que son poste n’avait pas été supprimé et que le processus d’analyse et d’examen de la situation de ce poste, afin de notamment redéfinir ses fonctions au sein d’Interpol, se ferait en étroite collaboration avec elle.
Le Tribunal constate que, manifestement, cela n’a pas été le cas. Ainsi que le soutient à juste titre la requérante, elle n’a jamais été avisée des conséquences potentielles de la réorganisation de la Direction des ressources humaines sur sa situation, ni du risque de suppression de son poste qui pouvait en découler. De la même manière, elle n’a pas été prévenue du risque que la création du poste de directeur de la nouvelle direction faisait peser sur l’existence de son propre poste et n’a jamais été informée du projet de l’Organisation de supprimer son poste avant que celui-ci ne se matérialise […].
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3071, 3861, 4072, 4777
Keywords:
duty of care; duty to inform; good faith;
Judgment 5018
140th Session, 2025
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: La requérante conteste son placement d’office en congé.
Considerations 10-11
Extract:
Dans le jugement 4231, aux considérants 13 et 14, le Tribunal a souligné, dans une affaire impliquant une disposition statutaire analogue à la disposition litigieuse et portant sur un placement en congé spécial qui constituait un avantage accordé aux fonctionnaires, qu’une organisation internationale commet une erreur de droit et un détournement de pouvoir en recourant d’office à une telle disposition pour servir une fin non énoncée dans celle-ci (voir également dans ce sens les jugements 4819, au considérant 9, et 3596, au considérant 7).
Le Tribunal relève en outre que, dans la décision attaquée, le Secrétaire général a expliqué, afin de justifier sa décision précédente […] de placer d’office la requérante en congé, que le retour de celle-ci à la Direction des ressources humaines l’aurait exposée à de possibles représailles de la part de sa hiérarchie, si bien que l’Organisation était tenue de l’en préserver en vertu du devoir de sollicitude qui lui incombe.
[L]e Tribunal considère que cela ne saurait constituer un motif valable pour imposer un congé à un fonctionnaire qui ne l’a pas demandé. Dans un tel cas de figure, le devoir de sollicitude de l’Organisation lui imposait plutôt de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin de protéger le fonctionnaire qui s’était plaint de harcèlement contre les représailles potentielles de ses présumés harceleurs non pas en le tenant à l’écart du service mais en s’assurant, par exemple, que ces personnes soient sensibilisées à l’interdiction de mener de telles représailles.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3596, 4231, 4819
Keywords:
duty of care; mistake of law; misuse of authority; special leave;
Judgment 5000
139th Session, 2025
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the “deemed rejection” of his request for an investigation into the alleged misconduct of the Assistant Director-General at the WHO Headquarters in Geneva; the determination by the Office of Compliance, Risk Management and Ethics that he had not suffered retaliation, and that he was not entitled to protection against retaliation; and WHO’s decision to accept his resignation which he claims constitutes constructive dismissal.
Consideration 26
Extract:
As to the Organization’s alleged failure to “publicly disassociate itself from [Mr G.]’s defamatory statements”, it is not necessarily the duty of an international organization, although it has in principle a duty to protect its staff members when they are exposed to public criticism in relation to their functions, to engage in public press releases in defense of or against them. However, in the circumstances of the case, taking into account the position of Mr G., who was Assistant Director-General, it was the Organization’s duty to publicly distance itself from his declarations, which otherwise could be perceived as attributable to the Organization. In this respect, there was a breach of the Organization’s duty of care. This does not justify the impugned decision to be set aside. However, this violation of the duty of care entitles the complainant to an award of moral damages.
Keywords:
duty of care; moral damages; moral injury;
Judgment 4948
139th Session, 2025
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to suspend him from duty with pay and with immediate effect.
Consideration 19
Extract:
S’agissant du troisième moyen du requérant, portant sur la violation alléguée des devoirs de sollicitude, de protection et de bonne foi de la CPI, ce dernier invoque diverses circonstances entourant la décision de suspension et sa mise en application afin de soutenir qu’il y aurait eu manquement à ces devoirs de la part de l’organisation dans les faits. Mais le Tribunal considère qu’au regard de toutes ces circonstances, l’intéressé n’établit pas de violation ou d’erreur qui relève du contrôle restreint auquel il est astreint et qui pourraient justifier son intervention quant à l’exercice du pouvoir d’appréciation du chef exécutif de l’organisation pour appliquer une suspension avec maintien du traitement et avec effet immédiat, ainsi que cela a été fait en l’espèce.
D’abord, le Tribunal a déjà expliqué en quoi la mesure de suspension était justifiée. La mauvaise application alléguée du principe de proportionnalité ne saurait donc constituer un manquement de la CPI à son devoir de sollicitude.
Ensuite, le requérant n’a pas établi un manquement de l’organisation à ses obligations en raison de la durée déraisonnable de la suspension, de sa publicité ou de sa soudaineté. Ainsi qu’il ressort du rapport de la Commission de recours et de la décision attaquée, à la date où cette dernière a été rendue, soit le 4 mai 2022, la durée de la suspension s’expliquait par la procédure de recours interne qui avait requis un premier examen par le Mécanisme et ensuite un processus devant la Commission de recours. Le délai d’environ sept mois qui s’est écoulé entre la date de l’application de la mesure et celle de la décision attaquée n’apparaît pas en soi déraisonnable et, au-delà de sa seule affirmation, l’intéressé n’établit pas en quoi cela pourrait être le cas. Le Tribunal ajoute que, dans le cadre de la présente requête, il n’est saisi que de la décision portant sur l’application de la mesure de suspension initiale d’une durée de trois mois, et non des deux décisions subséquentes de prolongation de cette suspension pour des durées respectives additionnelles de trois mois chacune. Dans le jugement 4658, au considérant 2, le Tribunal a relevé que, lorsqu’une mesure de suspension a été prolongée, c’est son rôle de déterminer si les conditions de chaque décision de prolongation sont remplies au moment où cette décision est prise (voir également à ce sujet le jugement 4586, au considérant 11). Il s’ensuit qu’il s’agit là de décisions définitives qui sont distinctes et qui, le cas échéant, doivent faire l’objet de requêtes distinctes.
Par ailleurs, il n’y a pas lieu non plus de conclure que l’organisation aurait diffusé la décision de suspendre l’intéressé aux collègues de ce dernier ou à l’extérieur de la CPI de manière à porter atteinte à son intégrité professionnelle. Le Tribunal a déjà reconnu que le fait d’informer les fonctionnaires d’un département d’une mesure imposée peut parfois être nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l’organisation (voir, par exemple, le jugement 4237, au considérant 9). Le Tribunal considère que la manière dont l’annonce de la décision de suspendre le requérant a été faite demeurait adéquate dans les circonstances de l’espèce, ainsi que l’a d’ailleurs relevé la Commission de recours dans son rapport.
En ce qui concerne la circonstance que le requérant a été escorté hors des locaux de la Cour immédiatement après la décision de le suspendre, aucun élément de preuve versé au dossier ne vient appuyer l’assertion selon laquelle la mesure aurait été mise à exécution de manière déraisonnable. Là encore, dans le jugement 4831, au considérant 10, s’appuyant sur un jugement antérieur (voir le jugement 3649, au considérant 13), le Tribunal a rappelé que, si le fait d’être escorté hors des locaux de l’organisation peut être ressenti comme une expérience humiliante, procéder ainsi est parfois justifié et, en l’absence de conduite des représentants de l’organisation qui exacerberait cette humiliation (par exemple, en faisant escorter le fonctionnaire hors des bureaux par le personnel de sécurité), cela relève simplement de bonnes pratiques de gestion au même titre que le sont la désactivation immédiate du compte de messagerie ou l’interdiction d’accès aux installations de l’organisation.
Quant à la notification de la décision de suspension en remettant au requérant une notification écrite de celle-ci à son domicile, l’organisation a raison de souligner que ce document lui a été remis en main propre à son domicile afin de s’assurer qu’il le reçoive en temps utile et compte tenu du contexte où il ne se trouvait dorénavant plus dans les locaux de l’organisation. Ni les écritures ni les pièces dossier n’appuient l’affirmation du requérant selon laquelle la notification aurait été d’une extrême violence pour lui et sa famille du fait qu’elle aurait eu lieu au moment où sa fille était de retour de l’école.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3649, 4237, 4586, 4658
Keywords:
duty of care; judicial review; role of the tribunal;
Judgment 4935
139th Session, 2025
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decisions to abolish his position and terminate his appointment.
Consideration 4
Extract:
Firm precedent has it that in order to achieve greater efficiency or to make budgetary savings international organisations may undertake restructuring entailing the redefinition of posts and staff reductions. However, each and every individual decision adopted in the context of such restructuring must respect all the pertinent legal rules and in particular the fundamental rights of the staff concerned (see, for example, Judgment 3238, consideration 7). The case law also states that decisions concerning restructuring within an international organisation, including the abolition of posts, may be taken at the discretion of the executive head of the organisation and are consequently subject to only limited review. Accordingly, the Tribunal will ascertain whether such decisions are taken in accordance with the relevant rules on competence, form or procedure, whether they rest upon a mistake of fact or law, or whether they constituted abuse of authority. The Tribunal will not rule on the appropriateness of the restructuring, as it will not substitute the organisation’s view with its own (see, for example, Judgment 4004, consideration 2). Nevertheless, any decision to abolish a post must be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 3582, consideration 6).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3238, 3582, 4004
Keywords:
abolition of post; discretion; duty of care; duty to substantiate decision; executive head; judicial review; limits; reorganisation;
Consideration 4
Extract:
[A] decision to abolish a post must be communicated to the staff member occupying the post in a manner that safeguards that individual’s rights. These rights are safeguarded by giving proper notice of the decision, reasons for the decision and an opportunity to contest the decision. The Tribunal has further stated that the need to give reasons in support of adverse administrative decisions arises precisely because the affected staff member must be given an opportunity of knowing and evaluating whether or not the decision should be timely contested (see, for example, Judgment 3041, considerations 8 and 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3041
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; duty to substantiate decision; notice; notification; reorganisation; right of appeal;
Consideration 10
Extract:
The central question […] is whether IOM gave the complainant the required notification of the abolition of his post and the termination of his appointment. [T]he Tribunal does not impose on international organizations a duty to provide staff members whose positions are abolished with the full set of internal documents used as a basis for such decision. Rather, the Tribunal requires an organization to give such staff members notice within the required time and sufficient reasons for the decision to abolish their post and for any subsequent decision, including the termination of their appointment. This is the expressed purport of Regulation 9.4. It also accords with the well-settled case law that an international organisation necessarily has power to restructure, and, in so doing, may abolish posts. As well, it accords with the case law stated, for example, in consideration 7 of Judgment 3234, that a decision to abolish a post must be communicated to the staff member occupying the post in a manner that safeguards that individual’s rights and that these rights are safeguarded by giving proper notice of the decision.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3234
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; duty to substantiate decision; notice; notification; reorganisation; right of appeal; termination of employment;
Consideration 16
Extract:
The complainant’s submission, in effect, that the P-4 position, which the Administration created, served the same overall functions as those attached to his P-3 position it replaced “though ostensibly with a few heightened responsibilities”, suggests, in line with IOM’s submission, that his abolished position and the created position were different in terms of the overall scope and expertise required. The complainant’s further suggestion that he could have occupied the created position, as he was qualified to do so, does not advance his case further. As IOM points out, he could have applied for the position but elected not to and he had no right to be directly promoted to it, as he suggests. It was within the discretion of the Director General to determine, as he did, that IOM’s interests required that new positions be filled through competition. The Tribunal finds no reason to depart from the JARB’s conclusion that it (the JARB) recognized that the decision to restructure RSC was based on operational needs, which required a position with a higher level of expertise at the higher P-4 grade, and that IOM had no obligation to promote the complainant to that position for which he had not applied.
Keywords:
abolition of post; appointment without competition; duty of care; reassignment; reorganisation;
Considerations 17-19
Extract:
[T]he complainant submits that, contrary to the case law, the internal appeal process was flawed and the Administration violated its duty to provide him with an effective internal appeal remedy because the JARB failed to examine the substance of his arguments. […]
[He] argues that the JARB “explicitly refused” to rule on whether the Administration violated its duty to reassign him, with the result that the impugned decision which accepted the JARB’s report was incomplete and flawed. […]
[…] In the present case, the JARB considered the pleas the complainant proffered in his internal appeal and rejected his submission that the obligation to find a possible reassignment for him had not been met by IOM. Notwithstanding that the JARB’s analysis of the complainant’s pleas was brief and concise, it was sufficiently clear, understandable and adequate to permit the complainant to pursue his complaint before the Tribunal.
Keywords:
appointment without competition; duty of care; judicial review; reassignment; report of the internal appeals body; right of appeal;
Considerations 20-21
Extract:
The case law states that an organisation has a duty to explore possible options or to make reasonable efforts for the reassignment of a staff member whose post has been abolished (see, for example, Judgments 2902, consideration 14, and 4097, consideration 9). In consideration 16 of Judgment 3908, the Tribunal stated that, while it has long recognized the right of an international organization to abolish positions, which will imperil the continuing employment of the occupants of those abolished positions, a concomitant of that right is an obligation to deal fairly with the staff who occupy those abolished positions. This obligation extends to finding, if they exist, other positions within the organisation for which those staff have the experience and qualifications.
Historically, the Tribunal generally considered the extent of an organization’s duty to reassign staff members whose positions were abolished mainly in relation to the type of contract they held, the nature of the post and/or the role to which they were assigned, their length of service with the organization, and recognized a greater duty in respect of staff who held permanent positions (see, for example, Judgment 3754, consideration 16). Nonetheless, in consideration 10 of Judgment 4097, the Tribunal stated that it does not follow that other classes of staff of differing status should be afforded no protection by principles it has developed in circumstances where their post is abolished and attempts are being made to reassign them.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2902, 3754, 3908, 4097
Keywords:
abolition of post; appointment; contract; duty of care; fixed-term; reassignment; reorganisation; temporary-indefinite;
Consideration 23
Extract:
The Tribunal is cognizant of the nature of the IOM’s funding structure as a project-based organization, which is significant, among other things, in that the employment of a large number of staff members is linked to the duration of the specific projects for which they are engaged. The Tribunal finds that in light of this, and IOM’s then discernible operational needs at that time, the Administration made reasonable efforts to reassign the complainant, thereby discharging its obligation and its duty towards him. Specifically, IOM invited the complainant to apply for vacant positions matching his qualifications and experience. IOM also considered other positions and reached out to eight other Missions and Regional Offices for the purpose of finding suitable reassignment options, but no available position matching the complainant’s qualifications and experience could be found. In the result, the complainant unsuccessfully applied for other positions. Against this background, the Tribunal cannot conclude that IOM violated its duty of care towards the complainant.
Keywords:
abolition of post; duty of care; project personnel; reassignment; reorganisation;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
abolition of post; complaint dismissed; duty of care; project personnel; reassignment; reorganisation; right of appeal; termination of employment;
Judgment 4922
139th Session, 2025
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to close his complaint of moral harassment at the end of the preliminary assessment procedure.
Considerations 8-11
Extract:
Le délai de recours était inopposable au requérant à un triple titre.
En premier lieu, il résulte d’une jurisprudence constante du Tribunal que la charge de la preuve de la notification d’une décision administrative incombe à l’organisation concernée (voir, par exemple, les jugements 3871, au considérant 9, 3034, au considérant 13, ou 2494, au considérant 4). En outre, il va de soi que cette notification n’est régulière que si elle permet au fonctionnaire intéressé d’avoir une connaissance exacte de la teneur de la décision en cause. Or, compte tenu des ambiguïtés, ci-dessus mises en évidence, que comportaient les indications fournies au requérant lors de la réunion du 5 décembre 2016, le Tribunal estime que, en l’espèce, la preuve d’une notification régulière de la décision prise par la Conseillère pour l’éthique n’est pas formellement rapportée, sachant que l’éventuelle notification officieuse dont celle-ci aurait fait l’objet ne saurait être reconnue comme valable. Dès lors, le délai d’un mois imparti par l’alinéa a) du paragraphe 7 des anciens Statuts du Conseil d’appel pour former une réclamation ne courait pas à l’encontre de cette décision.
En deuxième lieu, il sied de relever que, même si l’on admettait que la notification de la décision ait été régulière, le fait que Mme T. ait laissé sans réponse les courriels des 19 décembre 2016 et 10 janvier 2017 précités, et plus spécifiquement le premier, qui lui avait été adressé dans le délai d’un mois ainsi prévu, ferait obstacle à l’opposabilité de ce délai. Selon la jurisprudence du Tribunal, une organisation est en effet tenue, en vertu de son devoir de sollicitude à l’égard de ses fonctionnaires, de dissiper l’erreur dans laquelle se trouve un agent quant à l’exercice de son droit de recours, lorsqu’elle constate que celui-ci se méprend à ce sujet et qu’il serait encore possible pour lui d’agir en temps utile (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4369, au considérant 4, 2713, au considérant 3 d), et 2345, au considérant 1 c)). Dès lors qu’il ressortait du courriel du 19 décembre 2016, comme il a été dit, que le requérant n’avait pas compris qu’aucune décision écrite ne lui serait notifiée après la réunion, et étant donné que le délai de recours contre la décision du 5 décembre 2016 n’avait pas encore expiré à la date de ce courriel, il appartenait à la Conseillère pour l’éthique de clarifier ce malentendu afin de mettre l’intéressé à même d’user de son droit de recours. Le non-respect de cette exigence exclut, en tout état de cause, que la réclamation ultérieurement introduite puisse être regardée comme tardive.
En troisième lieu, il convient de souligner que […] le classement d’une plainte pour harcèlement relevait en réalité de la compétence de la Directrice générale, et non de celle de la Conseillère pour l’éthique. Or, il résulte de la jurisprudence du Tribunal que, lorsqu’il ne ressort pas clairement des indications données à un fonctionnaire que celles-ci constituent la communication d’une décision administrative, «il peut exister des circonstances qui amènent le fonctionnaire à conclure raisonnablement qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une décision définitive» et qu’il en va ainsi «surtout si [...] rien ne permet de penser que la question en cause a été examinée par une personne habilitée à prendre une décision définitive en la matière» (voir notamment les jugements 3861, au considérant 5, 3849, au considérant 8, et 2644, au considérant 8). Le Tribunal estime que, dans la mesure où la Conseillère pour l’éthique n’avait ainsi pas compétence pour procéder au classement de la plainte du requérant et où ce dernier pouvait dès lors légitimement douter que les explications données par Mme T. lors de la réunion du 5 décembre 2016 visaient à lui communiquer une décision prise par celle-ci à cet effet, le présent cas d’espèce relève de cette jurisprudence. En telle hypothèse, le délai de recours ne court à l’égard du fonctionnaire concerné qu’à compter de la notification ultérieure d’une décision formelle.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2345, 2494, 2644, 2713, 3034, 3849, 3861, 3871, 4369
Keywords:
administrative decision; duty of care; internal appeal; notification; time limit;
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