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Standard of proof (725,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Standard of proof
Total judgments found: 41
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Judgment 5145
141st Session, 2026
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to reject his claim that his injury was service-incurred.
Consideration 3
Extract:
"[T]he standard of proof required by the Tribunal in order to establish that an illness is service-incurred, i.e. the balance of probabilities (see Judgments 4709, consideration 9, 3111, consideration 6, and 1971, consideration 15). As the case law sometimes frames it in another manner, it is enough for there to be “a causal link in the legal sense, that is to say, some fairly definite connection” between the diagnosed condition and the alleged occupational origin for a condition to be accepted as service-incurred (see Judgment 3111, consideration 6)."
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1971, 3111, 4709
Keywords:
illness; service-incurred; standard of proof;
Consideration 9
Extract:
"Based on the evidence in the record, the Tribunal is satisfied that it was open to the Organization to find that the complainant’s illness was not service-incurred based on the available scientific evidence. This finding adhered to the requisite standard of proof based on the balance of probabilities."
Keywords:
illness; judicial review; service-incurred; standard of proof;
Judgment 5133
141st Session, 2026
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests IOM’s decision to maintain its earlier decision to impose upon her the disciplinary measure of discharge from service after due notice and to pay her 50 per cent of the termination indemnity in execution of Judgment 4460.
Consideration 15
Extract:
The Tribunal has pointed out many times in its case law that bad faith may not be presumed and must be proved (see Judgments 4451, consideration 16, and 4345, consideration 6). The burden of proof is on the complainant, and to support her allegation she must demonstrate that there was malice, ill-will, improper motive, fraud or similar dishonest purpose (see Judgment 3902, consideration 11). Similarly, it is incumbent on the complainant to establish that actions or conduct complained of were retaliatory (see Judgments 4391, consideration 13, and 4363, consideration 12). A mere assumption or suspicion of retaliation does not meet the requisite standard of proof, the onus of which is borne by the complainant (see Judgment 4867, consideration 5).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3902, 4345, 4363, 4391, 4451, 4867
Keywords:
bad faith; burden of proof; retaliation; standard of proof;
Judgment 5122
141st Session, 2026
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose upon him the disciplinary measure of written censure and to bar him from any future employment with the OPCW for alleged breaches of his confidentiality obligations.
Consideration 3
Extract:
[C]onsistent precedent has it that decisions which are made in disciplinary cases are within the discretionary authority of the executive head of an international organization and are subject to limited review. The Tribunal will interfere only if the decision is tainted by a procedural or substantive flaw. Moreover, where there is an investigation by an investigative body in disciplinary proceedings, the Tribunal’s role is not to reweigh the evidence collected by it, as reserve must be exercised before calling into question the findings of such a body and reviewing its assessment of the evidence. The Tribunal will interfere only in the case of manifest error (see, for example, Judgments 4343, consideration 4, 4106, consideration 12, and 3872, consideration 2). The case law also states, in relation to the question of whether the alleged conduct took place, that the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgments 4749, consideration 5, 4227, consideration 6, and 3862, consideration 20).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3862, 3872, 4106, 4227, 4343, 4749
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; burden of proof; decision; disciplinary measure; discretion; executive head; investigation; investigative body; judicial review; limits; manifest error; role of the tribunal; standard of proof;
Judgment 5119
141st Session, 2026
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests ITU’s decision to impose on him the disciplinary measure of dismissal with immediate effect.
Consideration 5
Extract:
"[F]irm and constant precedents have it that the role of the Tribunal is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt, but rather to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion and whether the decision-maker properly applied the standard when evaluating the evidence […].
It is also worth recalling that in Judgment 4579, consideration 4, the Tribunal emphasized that “[it] shall not interfere with the findings of an investigative body in disciplinary proceedings unless there was a manifest error […]” […].
With respect to the burden of proof applicable in disciplinary proceedings, it is furthermore recognized that “the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove the allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed […]."
Lastly, in respect of harassment matters such as the instant case, established precedent of the Tribunal states that the question as to whether harassment occurred must be determined in the light of a careful examination of all the objective circumstances surrounding the acts or events complained of […].”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4579
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; harassment; judicial review; role of the tribunal; sexual harassment; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 5097
141st Session, 2026
European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose on him the disciplinary measure of a letter of warning.
Consideration 19
Extract:
“As to the standard of proof required in disciplinary matters, the Tribunal recalls that its case law has consistently found that a staff member accused of wrongdoing is presumed to be innocent and is to be given the benefit of the doubt […]. The burden of proof rests on an organization to prove the allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed […]. In respect of the standard of proof, the Tribunal stated that the relevant legal standard is beyond reasonable doubt […]. Part of the Tribunal’s role is to assess whether the decision-maker properly applied the standard when evaluating the evidence […].
The fact that an organization, in finding that misconduct occurred, fails to use the exact wording “beyond reasonable doubt” does not necessarily imply that misconduct has not been proven to the requisite standard. It is for the Tribunal to assess whether an organization could consider misconduct to be proven to that standard even though the decision-making authority did not expressly use the term “beyond reasonable doubt” […].
[…] As to the complainant’s argument that the investigator failed to apply the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard of proof, the Tribunal notes that the role of an investigative body is to conduct a fact-finding investigation, that is to gather evidence and to recollect the facts in light of the evidence available. It is not the investigator’s role to reach a conclusion of whether misconduct occurred beyond reasonable doubt. This evaluation is reserved to the decision-making authority […].”
Keywords:
benefit of doubt; beyond reasonable doubt; disciplinary measure; presumption of innocence; role of the tribunal; standard of proof;
Judgment 5008
140th Session, 2025
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to discharge him on disciplinary grounds.
Consideration 9
Extract:
[I]t is appropriate to recall the scope of the Tribunal’s review in disciplinary matters and the standard of evidence required for disciplinary convictions. The Tribunal shall not interfere with the findings of an investigative body in disciplinary proceedings unless there was a manifest error […]. In disciplinary matters, the Tribunal has consistently found that the burden of proof rests on an organization, which has to prove allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed […]. The role of the Tribunal is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt but rather to review the evidence and to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion […]. Part of the Tribunal’s role is to assess whether the decision-maker properly applied the standard when evaluating the evidence […].
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; burden of proof; disciplinary procedure; discretion; investigation; role of the tribunal; standard of proof;
Judgment 4949
139th Session, 2025
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges his summary dismissal for serious misconduct.
Consideration 10
Extract:
Dans le jugement 4749, au considérant 5, le Tribunal a rappelé ce qui suit sur la charge de la preuve qui incombe à l’organisation en matière de sanction disciplinaire, ainsi que sur le rôle du Tribunal dans l’appréciation du niveau de preuve requis:
«En matière de sanction disciplinaire, il ressort d’une jurisprudence bien établie du Tribunal que c’est à l’organisation qu’incombe la charge de prouver au-delà de tout doute raisonnable que le fonctionnaire visé est coupable des actes reprochés avant d’infliger une sanction disciplinaire. Au sujet de ce niveau de preuve, le Tribunal a notamment précisé ce qui suit dans le jugement 4362, aux considérants 7, 8 et 10:
7. [...] Le niveau de preuve requis est celui de “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable”. Dans une affaire comme le cas d’espèce, le Tribunal n’a pas pour rôle d’évaluer lui-même les éléments de preuve ni de déterminer si l’accusation de faute a été établie au-delà de tout doute raisonnable; il doit plutôt apprécier si le décideur disposait d’éléments de preuve lui permettant de parvenir à cette conclusion (voir, par exemple, le jugement 3863, au considérant 11). Une partie du rôle du Tribunal consiste à déterminer si le décideur a correctement appliqué le niveau de preuve au moment d’évaluer les éléments de preuve (voir le jugement 3863, au considérant 8).
8. Le niveau de preuve “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable” n’est pas censé créer un obstacle insurmontable qui empêcherait les organisations de sanctionner un fonctionnaire à l’issue d’une procédure disciplinaire. Il ne devrait assurément pas avoir cet effet. Le Tribunal s’est prononcé à de nombreuses reprises sur ce qui est exigé. En réalité, ce niveau de preuve est à mettre en relation avec le fait qu’une procédure disciplinaire peut souvent avoir de graves conséquences pour le fonctionnaire concerné – y compris son licenciement – et peut également porter gravement atteinte à sa réputation et à sa carrière de fonctionnaire international. Dès lors, il y a lieu d’exiger de l’organisation qu’elle ait une forte conviction que la mesure disciplinaire soit justifiée parce que la faute a été prouvée. La probabilité qu’une faute ait été commise ne suffit pas et n’offre pas une protection adéquate aux fonctionnaires internationaux. Il n’est guère utile d’affirmer, en substance, que le niveau de preuve requis correspond à la norme “de droit pénal” appliquée dans certains systèmes juridiques nationaux, et que la norme “de droit civil” appliquée dans ces mêmes systèmes conviendrait mieux en ce qu’elle implique d’apprécier les preuves selon la prépondérance des probabilités. Le niveau de preuve “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable” qui découle de la jurisprudence du Tribunal, telle qu’elle a évolué au fil des décennies, répond à un objectif propre au droit de la fonction publique internationale. [...]
10. [...] Le niveau de preuve “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable” concerne aussi bien l’établissement de faits précis que le degré global de conviction que les accusations portées contre le fonctionnaire ont été établies. En ce qui concerne la preuve de tout fait pertinent essentiel, la personne ou l’organe chargés d’apprécier les preuves et de prendre une décision au terme de la procédure disciplinaire doivent être convaincus au-delà de tout doute raisonnable qu’un fait particulier est avéré.»
(Voir également, à ce sujet, les jugements 4832, au considérant 36, 4764, au considérant 13, 4362, au considérant 10, et 4360, au considérant 11.)
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4360, 4362, 4749, 4764, 4832
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary measure; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 4936
139th Session, 2025
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to discharge him after due notice.
Consideration 6
Extract:
It is improbable that Ms C. could accurately be described as a contractor or otherwise a person working at the IOM [Manila Administration Centre] MAC in the Philippines. If so, the Policy had no application to her. The harassing conduct towards her was not proscribed by the Policy. She was beyond its reach. A decision-maker imposing a disciplinary sanction, including the serious sanction of discharge, must be satisfied that the factual foundation for the finding of misconduct is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is open to the Tribunal to assess whether there was probative evidence warranting this conclusion (see, for example, Judgments 4832, consideration 36, 4364, consideration 10, and the case law cited therein). Neither the Deputy Director General nor the Director General could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ms C. had been a contractor or otherwise a person working at the IOM MAC in the Philippines and the Policy applied. Thus, they could not have been satisfied the complainant contravened the Policy having regard to his conduct directed to Ms C.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4364, 4832
Keywords:
applicable law; disciplinary measure; external collaborator; standard of proof;
Judgment 4934
139th Session, 2025
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to summarily dismiss him for serious misconduct.
Consideration 8
Extract:
There are judgments in which the failure of a decision maker to expressly identify the standard of proof has led the Tribunal to consider the decision regarding misconduct unlawful (see, for example, Judgments 4633, considerations 9 to 11, and 4360, consideration 12). Whether the contention, in this case, that the standard of beyond reasonable doubt was not identified and applied, was correct is an entirely different matter. The JARB could probably have dealt with this issue in a relatively short compass, but it did not at all. In the result, there was, as the complainant contends, a violation of his right to an effective internal appeal.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4360, 4633
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; disciplinary measure; serious misconduct; standard of proof;
Judgment 4856
138th Session, 2024
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to dismiss him for misconduct.
Consideration 3
Extract:
As this complaint challenges a disciplinary decision, the Tribunal recalls its settled case law, that the burden of proof in such cases rests on an organization to prove the underlying allegations beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgment 3649, consideration 14).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3649
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; burden of proof; disciplinary measure; standard of proof;
Judgment 4839
138th Session, 2024
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to reject her sexual harassment claim.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The IOM’s legal framework does not specify the applicable standard of proof for a finding of harassment. Regarding this point, the Tribunal’s case law states that, while the standard of proof required to impose disciplinary measures on an individual charged with misconduct is that of “beyond a reasonable doubt”, the applicable standard of proof for a finding of harassment is a less onerous standard (see, for example, Judgments 4663, consideration 12, 4289, consideration 10, and 4207, consideration 20).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4207, 4289, 4663
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; disciplinary procedure; harassment; misconduct; standard of proof;
Judgment 4832
138th Session, 2024
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose on her the disciplinary sanction of demotion by two grades.
Considerations 36, 38-39 and 46
Extract:
Established precedent in the Tribunal’s case law has it that a staff member’s right to due process entails that the organization has an obligation to prove the misconduct complained of beyond reasonable doubt. This serves a purpose peculiar to the law of the international civil service and involves the recognition that often disciplinary proceedings can have severe consequences for the staff member concerned. In this regard, a staff member is to be given the benefit of the doubt (see, for example, Judgments 4697, consideration 12, and 4491, consideration 19). In this respect, in Judgment 4047, consideration 6, the Tribunal recalled that it is equally well settled that it will not engage in a determination as to whether the burden of proof has been met, instead, it will review the evidence to determine whether a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could properly have been made by the primary trier of fact (see also Judgments 4764, consideration 13, 4697, consideration 22, and 4364, consideration 10).
[…]
In its submissions, the organization has not pointed to any definition of serious misconduct short of arguing that, in its view, the complainant’s conduct even amounted to the equivalent of gross negligence. Also, it has not pointed to any jurisprudence of the Tribunal that establishes conduct of the type in question in these proceedings is serious misconduct or gross negligence. It is not disputed though that misconduct is quite different from serious misconduct and, here, the contention of the organization against the complainant is not that she committed misconduct but that she rather committed serious misconduct.
That being so, the Tribunal considers that ITU has manifestly failed to provide evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant committed serious misconduct or gross negligence in the present situation. The record indeed easily supports the conclusion that a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt with regard to an allegation of serious misconduct could not have been made properly by a primary trier of fact. To equate, as ITU did, the failures identified both in the notification of the disciplinary measure and in the impugned decision to a serious misconduct or a gross negligence was an error of law.
[…]
It follows […] that, on the facts of this case and considering the conduct identified by the organization in support of the disciplinary measure imposed on the complainant, a finding of serious misconduct established beyond reasonable doubt was clearly not open to any primary trier of fact on the record as it stands. The contrary conclusion reached by ITU was an error in law.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4047, 4364, 4491, 4697, 4764
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; evidence; standard of proof;
Judgment 4820
138th Session, 2024
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decisions to dismiss his moral harassment complaints, and claims compensation for the injury which he considers he has suffered.
Consideration 8
Extract:
The Tribunal has consistently held that the question as to whether harassment occurred must be determined in the light of a careful examination of all the objective circumstances surrounding the acts complained of (see, in particular, Judgment 4471, consideration 18) and that an allegation of harassment must be borne out by specific facts, the burden of proof being on the person who pleads it, but there is no need to prove that the accused person acted with intent (see, for example, Judgments 4344, consideration 3, 3871, consideration 12, and 3692, consideration 18). When a specific procedure is prescribed by the organisation concerned, it must be followed and the rules must be applied correctly. The Tribunal has also held that the investigation must be objective, rigorous and thorough, in that it must be conducted in a manner designed to ascertain all relevant facts without compromising the good name of the person implicated and to give that person the opportunity to test the evidence put against her or him and to answer the charges made (see, in particular, Judgments 4663, considerations 10 to 13, 4253, consideration 3, 3314, consideration 14, and 2771, consideration 15). It is, however, well settled that a staff member alleging harassment does not need to demonstrate, nor does the person or body evaluating the claim, that the facts establish beyond reasonable doubt that harassment occurred (see, in this connection, Judgments 4663, consideration 12, and 4289, consideration 10). The main factor in the recognition of harassment is the perception that the person concerned may reasonably and objectively have of acts or remarks liable to demean or humiliate her or him (see Judgments 4663, consideration 13, and 4541, consideration 8).
The Tribunal recalls, furthermore, that it is not its role to reweigh the evidence before an investigative body which, as the primary trier of facts, has had the benefit of actually seeing and hearing many of the persons involved, and of assessing the reliability of what they have said (see, in this respect, Judgments 4291, consideration 12, and 3593, consideration 12). Accordingly, the Tribunal will only interfere in the case of manifest error (see, in particular, Judgments 4344, consideration 8, 4091, consideration 17, and 3597, consideration 2).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2771, 3314, 3593, 3597, 3692, 3871, 4091, 4253, 4291, 4344, 4471, 4663
Keywords:
adversarial proceedings; appraisal of evidence; burden of proof; due process; harassment; inquiry; judicial review; manifest error; organisation's duties; procedure before the tribunal; right; right to reply; standard of proof;
Judgment 4764
137th Session, 2024
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to dismiss her for misconduct.
Consideration 13
Extract:
In relation to the question of whether conduct founding a disciplinary measure has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and what evidence the Tribunal considers, it has said its role is a limited one, as described in Judgment 4362, consideration 7:
“The role of the Tribunal in a case such as the present is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt but rather to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion [...]”
Plainly enough that role does not require, indeed contemplate, further evidence to be furnished in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The touchstone for error in this regard concerns the evaluation of the evidence by the relevant decision-maker, namely the evidence before him or her.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4362
Keywords:
competence of tribunal; disciplinary measure; evidence; standard of proof;
Judgment 4749
137th Session, 2024
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the termination of his appointment with compensation in lieu of notice.
Consideration 5
Extract:
In disciplinary matters, the Tribunal has consistently found that the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove the allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed. In respect of the standard of proof, the Tribunal relevantly stated the following in Judgment 4362, considerations 7, 8 and 10:
“7. [...] The relevant legal standard is beyond reasonable doubt. The role of the Tribunal in a case such as the present is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt but rather to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion (see, for example, Judgment 3863, consideration 11). Part of the Tribunal’s role is to assess whether the decision-maker properly applied the standard when evaluating the evidence (see Judgment 3863, consideration 8).
8. The standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt does not exist to create an insuperable barrier for organisations to successfully prosecute disciplinary proceedings against staff members. Indeed, it should not have that effect. What is required is discussed in many judgments of the Tribunal. Rather the standard involves the recognition that often disciplinary proceedings can have severe consequences for the affected staff member, including dismissal and potentially serious adverse consequences on the reputation of the staff member and her or his career as an international civil servant, and in these circumstances it is appropriate to require a high level of satisfaction on the part of the organisation that the disciplinary measure is justified because the misconduct has been proved. The likelihood of misconduct having occurred is insufficient and does not afford appropriate protection to international civil servants. It is fundamentally unproductive to say, critically, this standard is the ‘criminal’ standard in some domestic legal systems and a more appropriate standard is the ‘civil’ standard in the same systems involving the assessment of evidence and proof on the balance of probabilities. The standard of beyond reasonable doubt derived from the Tribunal’s case law as it has evolved over the decades, serves a purpose peculiar to the law of the international civil service.
[...]
10. [...] The standard of beyond reasonable doubt concerns both the finding of specific facts and the overall level of satisfaction that the case against the staff member has been made out. In relation to the proof of any essential relevant fact, the person or body charged with the task of assessing the evidence and making a decision in the context of determining disciplinary proceedings must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a particular fact exists.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3863, 4362
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; disciplinary measure; disciplinary procedure; standard of proof;
Judgment 4709
136th Session, 2023
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the refusal to recognise her illness as attributable to official duty.
Consideration 9
Extract:
Under the Tribunal’s case law, the standard of proof applicable in recognising that an illness is service-incurred is indeed that of the balance of probabilities (see, for example, Judgments 3111, consideration 6, 1971, consideration 15, 1373, consideration 16, and 528, considerations 4 and 5). As that case law sometimes frames it in another manner, it is enough for there to be “a causal link in the legal sense, that is to say, some fairly definite connection” between the diagnosed condition and the alleged occupational origin for a condition to be accepted as service-incurred (see Judgments 3111, consideration 6, and 641, consideration 8).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 528, 641, 1373, 1971, 3111
Keywords:
illness; service-incurred; standard of proof;
Judgment 4697
136th Session, 2023
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the Director General’s decision to impose on him the disciplinary sanction of downgrading.
Consideration 12
Extract:
The Tribunal’s case law [...] establishes that, in disciplinary matters, the official’s right to due process means that an organisation has an obligation to prove the misconduct complained of beyond reasonable doubt. This serves a purpose peculiar to the law of the international civil service and involves the recognition that often disciplinary proceedings can have severe consequences for the official concerned (see, for example, Judgments 4478, consideration 10, 4362, considerations 7, 8 and 10, and 4360, consideration 10).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4360, 4362, 4478
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; disciplinary procedure; standard of proof;
Consideration 23
Extract:
In light of these factors, the Tribunal considers that it was not possible for the Director General to depart from the unanimous opinions of the Disciplinary Board and the Joint Committee for Disputes in the way he did. The grounds he gave in the contested decisions do not meet the standard of a clear and cogent demonstration of the Organisation’s ability to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant was guilty.
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; motivation; standard of proof;
Consideration 21
Extract:
[A]ccording to the settled case law of the Tribunal, the level of proof to which the Organisation is subject in disciplinary matters is proof beyond reasonable doubt (see, for example, Judgments 4478, consideration 10, and 4247, considerations 11 and 12) [...].
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4247, 4478
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; standard of proof;
Judgment 4633
135th Session, 2023
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose on him the sanction of demotion.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
case sent back to organisation; complaint allowed; disciplinary measure; staff assessment; standard of proof;
Considerations 9-11
Extract:
It can be seen (and this is conceded by the EPO) that at no point does the Committee refer to the standard of proof applicable in proceedings alleging misconduct, namely beyond a reasonable doubt. It may be doubted that the all-encompassing expression in the “CONCLUSION” of “more than sufficiently probative” should be taken to replace earlier clear intimations that the evidence was simply “sufficient”. In the result, the assessment of the Committee was either that evidence was “sufficient”, “sufficiently detailed and probative”, an event was “overwhelmingly likely” to have occurred or evidence was “more than sufficient”.
There are several judgments of the Tribunal deprecating reliance simply on the sufficiency of evidence as establishing misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. One illustration is found in Judgment 3880, consideration 9, in which the Tribunal said:
“Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of misconduct is a far less onerous evidentiary burden than the requisite ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. The application of the incorrect standard of proof is a fundamental error of law and requires, on this ground alone, that the impugned decision be set aside.”
Similarly in Judgment 4360, consideration 12, the Tribunal said: “[t]here is a material difference between being satisfied there was sufficient evidence establishing a fact and being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the fact existed”.
The language used by the Committee casts real doubt on whether it turned its mind to the appropriate standard of proof. An illustration is found in the Committee’s consideration of the letter sent to the Swedish politician referred to in consideration 6 above. The Committee prefaced its conclusion as to whether the letter was sent by saying “we cannot be sure that this was the letter that was attached” to the email to the Swedish politician but that “it was overwhelmingly likely that it was”. The first part of this formulation manifests doubt. While it is true that the second part manifests a high degree of confidence, it is difficult to say with any certainty that applying the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, the Committee would have come to the conclusion it did.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4360
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; standard of proof;
Judgment 4598
135th Session, 2023
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose on her the disciplinary measure of loss of three steps in grade for her failure to observe the standards of conduct expected of staff members.
Consideration 12
Extract:
[A] mere declaration […] that [the Director-General] was satisfied of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt without explaining why, involves a failure to motivate a conclusion at odds with the conclusion of the internal appeals body. This failure, alone, would justify the setting aside of the impugned decision (see Judgments 4400, consideration 10, 4062, consideration 3, and 3969, considerations 10 and 16). What, at a minimum, the Director-General needed to have done was explain why the analysis of the GBA […] was flawed, or did not sustain the ultimate conclusion of the GBA, or both. He did neither.
Keywords:
impugned decision; motivation of final decision; standard of proof;
Consideration 13
Extract:
[T]he Director-General endorsed the conclusions of IOS […] notwithstanding it simply said, “there is sufficient evidence”. There is an obvious tension, if not inconsistency, between endorsing a conclusion based on findings of fact about misconduct on the basis of sufficient evidence and a declaration that the misconduct was proved beyond reasonable doubt. There are several judgments of the Tribunal deprecating reliance simply on the sufficiency of evidence as establishing misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. One illustration is found in Judgment 3880, consideration 9 […]
[I]t can be inferred, in this case, that the mere declaration of the Director-General that the misconduct was proved beyond reasonable doubt did not reflect a genuine and considered evaluation of the evidence, and an assessment of it by reference to the applicable standard of proof.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3880
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; motivation of final decision; standard of proof;
Judgment 4491
133rd Session, 2022
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to dismiss her with immediate effect for serious misconduct.
Consideration 19
Extract:
The case law of the Tribunal in a situation such as the present is clear. A staff member accused of wrongdoing is presumed to be innocent and is to be given the benefit of the doubt (see, for example, Judgment 2913, consideration 9). The burden of proof of allegations of misconduct falls on the organisation and it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (see, for example, Judgment 4364, consideration 10). In reviewing a decision to sanction a staff member for misconduct, the Tribunal will not ordinarily engage in the determination of whether the burden of proof has been met but rather will assess whether a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt could properly have been made (see, for example, Judgment 4362, considerations 7 to 10).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2913, 4362, 4364
Keywords:
benefit of doubt; beyond reasonable doubt; disciplinary measure; presumption of innocence; role of the tribunal; standard of proof;
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