Competence (84, 822, 823,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Competence
Total judgments found: 114
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | next >
Judgment 5155
141st Session, 2026
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to select her for the position of Head of the WHO Office in Dakar, Senegal.
Consideration 5
Extract:
The second matter concerns the complainant’s request for an order that she “be selected for the post of [Head of Office] in Senegal”. The Tribunal is not competent to make such an order. Pursuant to its case law, recalled in consideration 2 of this judgment, it is within the purview of the Director-General, and not within that of the Tribunal, to appoint her or any other staff member to a post.
Keywords:
appointment; competence; competence of tribunal; executive head; order; selection procedure;
Judgment 5000
139th Session, 2025
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the “deemed rejection” of his request for an investigation into the alleged misconduct of the Assistant Director-General at the WHO Headquarters in Geneva; the determination by the Office of Compliance, Risk Management and Ethics that he had not suffered retaliation, and that he was not entitled to protection against retaliation; and WHO’s decision to accept his resignation which he claims constitutes constructive dismissal.
Consideration 24
Extract:
The complainant bears the burden of establishing lack of legal competence and has failed to do so.
Keywords:
burden of proof; competence;
Judgment 4932
139th Session, 2025
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, a former staff member of ITU, challenges its alleged refusal to take steps to ensure that the organization’s insurers would cover his daughter’s medical expenses and his own non-medical expenses, as well as the lack of response to his requests for clarifications related to his health care contributions.
Considerations 4 and 6
Extract:
It is appropriate to recall the Tribunal’s case law on the role of international organizations with regard to disputes between staff members and insurance companies chosen by the organizations within the framework of collective insurance plans. In a case where an international organization submitted that a dispute between the staff member and the insurance company did not concern the organization itself, the Tribunal held that international civil servants’ social protection forms an integral part of their terms of employment, which are the responsibility of the organization for which they work. For this reason, where an organization entrusts the responsibility for providing social protection to a private insurance company, as was the case when ITU implemented the CMIP, the organization has a duty to ensure that the insurer correctly processes the claims submitted by the insured persons. In this situation, the organization is in fact liable for the acts of its insurer (see Judgment 3506, consideration 9; see also Judgments 3031, considerations 14, 18 and 19, and 2063, consideration 8). In such a case, the matter raised by the complainant is not a dispute between the complainant and the insurance company, but between the complainant and the organization itself, and it concerns precisely the latter’s compliance with its duty to ensure the proper examination of a claim for the reimbursement of medical expenses. This matter does fall within the Tribunal’s competence (see Judgments 3506, consideration 9, 3030 and 2249). When an organization is liable for the acts of its insurer, the organization itself must be ordered to reimburse the disputed expenses, which it may then seek to recover from the insurance company (see Judgment 3506, consideration 19).[…]
In light of the Tribunal’s case law quoted in consideration 4 […], the Tribunal notes that an organization must be held responsible for the acts of its private insurer within the framework of the collective insurance plan/fund/scheme, whilst it cannot be held responsible for additional services offered by the insurer to staff on an optional basis. These additional services stem from individual contracts and in this respect a dispute between a staff member (or a former staff member) and the insurance company is a private dispute which is outside the purview of the organization and of the Tribunal.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2063, 2249, 3030, 3031, 3506
Keywords:
competence; competence of tribunal; health insurance; insurance;
Judgment 4860
138th Session, 2024
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to renew her fixed-term contract upon expiry.
Consideration 8
Extract:
Judgment 4531 is relevant. In that case, a decision was made to reject a request by the complainant to extend her employment beyond normal retirement age. The initial decision to reject the request was not made by the executive head of the organisation who was the repository of the power to make the decision. However, the decision in a review, requested by the complainant, was to the same effect and was made by the executive head. As the Tribunal observed in consideration 11:
“Generally, the process of review creates an opportunity for an administration to reconsider an administrative decision earlier made and the correctness of that decision. It can, in this process, make a decision rectifying or remedying any deficiencies in that earlier decision. That is what happened in the present case. Thus, the failure of the Director-General to initially consider the extension request himself, was remedied by him doing so in the administrative review.”
Thus, in this matter, the decision of the Executive Director in the review remedied such flaws as may have existed in the initial decision, with the result that there was a decision not to extend by the person in authority to make that decision, namely the Executive Director. Accordingly, the plea that the decision not to renew the complainant’s appointment was not authorised is unfounded and should be rejected.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4531
Keywords:
administrative decision; competence; flaw;
Judgment 4857
138th Session, 2024
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant submits that the Organization committed serious misconduct that breached his rights and considers, in particular, that he was subjected to harassment.
Consideration 4
Extract:
[A] person engaged under a special services agreement did not have the status of an FAO official. The aforementioned Manual [...] provided, in paragraph 319.11, that a holder of such a contract, referred to as a “subscriber”, “is in no way considered to be a staff member of the Organization” and, in paragraph 319.12, that “[t]he Staff Regulations and Staff Rules [did] not apply to subscribers”.
Moreover, paragraph 319.25 provided that any dispute between the parties to a special services agreement would be settled by arbitration – in a procedure involving the establishment of a panel of three arbitrators – thereby precluding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in this area.
[...]
It is correct that, owing to a specific feature of the law applicable to human resources at the FAO, its “consultants”, the rules applicable to whom are set out in Section 317 of the Manual, are to a certain extent treated as officials and, as such, have access in particular to internal appeals procedures and the Tribunal (see for example, for a reminder of these rules, Judgment 3483 or, for their implicit confirmation, Judgment 4228).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3483, 4228
Keywords:
competence; non official; ratione personae;
Judgment 4816
138th Session, 2024
South Centre
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the calculation of the compensation for the short notice, due by the South Centre, after the non-renewal of his short-term appointment as well as the calculation of his last salary.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
administrative decision; case sent back to organisation; compensation; competence; complaint allowed; decision quashed; internal appeal; internal appeals body; payslip; receivability of the complaint; right of appeal; safeguard;
Considerations 4-6
Extract:
Before the Tribunal, the South Centre repeats its contention that the complainant’s internal appeal was irreceivable, premised mainly on its submission that the notification of intention to appeal was filed out of time and was accordingly time-barred. On the other hand, the complainant states, in his complaint, that by his internal appeal he challenged the calculation and the amount of “indemnities” he received with his last payslip dated 18 December 2020 and that the Tribunal has accepted that a payslip could be considered as a challengeable decision (see, for example, consideration 2 of Judgment 3833). The complainant states that his internal appeal was filed against the shortfall of his last salary and the compensation for the short notice within one month of receipt of his last salary and the emails of December 2020 explaining the organisation’s calculation. However, whether or not the complainant had challenged the non-renewal of his contract, as the defendant contends, the calculation and the amount of “indemnities” he received with his last payslip, or the shortfall of his last salary and the compensation for the short notice are matters which were to be considered by an ad hoc Appellate Body, which should have been established pursuant to Staff Regulation 11.2.
Regarding appeals, Staff Regulation 11.2 relevantly states that an ad hoc Appellate Body shall be established by the Board according to the criteria and procedures set out in Annex VII to hear and adjudicate on appeals from staff members. As to the procedure for an appeal from an administrative decision, Annex VII.B. requires a staff member wishing to appeal an administrative decision to notify the Board, through the Chairperson, of intent to appeal within one month of the date of receiving notification of the decision in writing. Within one month of receipt of the staff member’s notice of intent to appeal, the Chairperson of the Board is to refer the appeal to an ad hoc Appellate Body, consisting of three of its members, one of whom shall act as Chairperson. The ad hoc Appellate Body shall then receive the staff member’s written appeal, and a written reply thereto by the Chairperson of the Board. The Appellate Body may also hear further observations on, or rebuttals to, the initial written submissions, orally or in writing. It may also call for oral testimony from the parties or witnesses, including from members of the Secretariat, and for supporting documentation. Under Annex VII.C., a decision of the ad hoc Appellate Body may be brought for review to the Tribunal. The expression “appeal” in Annex VII.B is a reference to an appeal whether it is receivable or not. The obligation of the Chairperson is therefore to refer to the ad hoc Appellate Body a matter even if it is arguably not a receivable appeal. Moreover, there is no express provision in the Annex conferring power on the Chairperson to reject an appeal if it is irreceivable.
It is obvious from the foregoing provisions that the Executive Director and the Chairperson of the Board erred by responding to the notification of intention to appeal in the way they did, given that they were not empowered to do so under the rules governing appeals. The notification of intention to appeal was to be considered by an ad hoc Appellate Body which should have been constituted for that purpose and the Chairperson of the Board was required to refer the notification of intention to appeal to that body. As this did not occur, the complainant was denied the benefit and possibility of having the decision he challenged effectively reviewed by the competent internal appeal body, which was his right (see, for example, Judgments 4620, consideration 5, and 3067, consideration 20).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3067, 3833, 4620
Keywords:
administrative decision; competence; internal appeal; internal appeals body; payslip; receivability of the complaint; right of appeal; safeguard;
Judgment 4809
137th Session, 2024
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a contractual redefinition of his employment relationship and the setting aside of the decision not to renew his last contract.
Consideration 2
Extract:
The Organization submits that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint because the complainant, who held external collaboration contracts for most of the period in question, was not an official of the Office.
This challenge to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction – which, in the form in which it is presented, relates to the substance of the dispute – is irrelevant in this case.
It is true that, under the Tribunal’s case law, where an external collaboration contract confers jurisdiction for settling disputes concerning its performance on another judicial authority or – as is more often the case – on an arbitral body, the Tribunal cannot hear such a dispute, even where it concerns precisely the redefinition of the contract in question as a contract appointing an official (see, in particular, Judgments 4652, considerations 16 to 20 and 22, and 2888, considerations 5 and 6).
However, plainly this case law does not apply when that contract grants jurisdiction to the Tribunal to hear disputes relating to its performance, as permitted under Article II, paragraph 4, of the Tribunal’s Statute (see Judgments 4652, consideration 21, and 2888, consideration 7). In this case, the external collaboration contracts concluded by the ILO and the complainant all included a provision in paragraph 12 specifically conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear “[a]ny dispute arising out of [their] application or interpretation”. The Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute relating to their possible redefinition.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2888, 4652
Keywords:
arbitration; competence; external collaborator; non official; ratione personae;
Judgment 4733
136th Session, 2023
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, who was serving on a National Project Personnel contract with the FAO Representation in Malawi, contends that the FAO breached his right to due process and disregarded its own rules and regulations, and that he was subject to unequal treatment.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
competence; complaint dismissed; non official; ratione personae; summary procedure;
Considerations 3-4
Extract:
Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, “[t]he Tribunal shall [...] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials”. The Tribunal is therefore not competent to hear complaints filed by individuals who do not have the status of an official of an organization recognizing its jurisdiction (see Judgment 3049, consideration 4).
In his complaint, the complainant provides a copy of his NPP contract, which included general conditions as well as a specific clause on his legal status. In this clause it was clearly indicated that the complainant was retained to work as “an independent contractor” and not as “an official of [the] FAO”. Although certain other clauses in the contract were not incompatible with the existence of an employer-employee relationship (especially those referring to specific provisions of the FAO Administrative Manual), they cannot be construed as negating the clear indication in the specific clause on the complainant’s legal status. He is not an official and cannot invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3049
Keywords:
competence; non official; ratione personae;
Judgment 4652
136th Session, 2023
Green Climate Fund
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to pay him compensation equal to the difference between his remuneration as a consultant and the value of the salary and benefits received by staff members performing similar functions.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
competence; complaint dismissed; consultant; non official; ratione personae;
Considerations 8, 11-21
Extract:
The Tribunal is aware that in many States there is an ongoing debate as to whether the existence of an employment relationship can or should be recognised in certain situations where, although such a relationship is not expressly provided for in the contract, other factors support a conclusion that the person concerned is, in fact, an employee and must be treated as such.
[…]
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is established and defined by its Statute. It is bound to exercise the jurisdiction so conferred. Centrally, it is to hear complaints of officials having regard to the terms of Article II. Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, “[t]he Tribunal shall [...] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials”. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not therefore extend to complaints filed by individuals who do not have the status of an official in the defendant organisations (see Judgment 3049, consideration 4).
Although the determination of that status does not depend exclusively on the wording of the contract or the staff regulations and the Tribunal may need to rely on other documents (see, for example, Judgment 3359, consideration 13), in the present case each contract contains a very clear definition of the relationship between the parties.
In Clause G-19 it is clearly indicated that the contract “creates an independent contractor relationship” and that nothing contained in it “shall be construed as establishing or creating between the Fund and the Consultant a relationship of employer and employee [...]”. Although certain other clauses in these contracts are not incompatible with the existence of an employer-employee relationship, they cannot be construed as negating the clear indication in Clause G-19 as to the legal status of the complainant.
Whilst the complainant argues that offering the contracts to him as an “independent consultant” was an abuse of power, because they were offered in those terms for an ulterior purpose, namely, to disguise the true nature of the employer-employee relationship which was intended to be created, there is nothing in the file to suggest that the terms of the contracts did not reflect the parties’ true intentions.
There is no basis on which the complainant can claim that he should be retroactively assigned a different contractual status, given that he had freely signed both contracts (see, for example, Judgments 2734, consideration 1, 2415, consideration 4, and 2308, consideration 17).
Moreover, it is noteworthy that Clause G-21 provides specifically that any dispute not resolved amicably shall be finally settled by arbitration. The Tribunal has already had occasion to rule that it has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute relating to a contract concluded with an independent contractor or collaborator which contains such an arbitration clause (see Judgment 2888, consideration 5, and the case law cited therein).
In Judgment 2888, consideration 6, the Tribunal further explained that […]
These considerations apply, in the same way, to the present case.
The existence of an arbitration clause in some contracts has been treated by the Tribunal as evidencing an agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (see Judgments 3705, consideration 4, 2688, consideration 5, 2017, consideration 2a, and 1938, consideration 4).
It is obvious that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract of an official would be contrary to the Statute of the Tribunal and the basis on which organisations recognize the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Indeed, if a person is or was an official of an organisation which has recognized the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, that person has a right to commence and maintain proceedings alleging non-observance of the terms of appointment or of the staff regulations and can do so notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration clause in a contract between that person and the organisation concerned.
The inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract of a non-official is not unlawful in itself. In this case, as noted above, the arbitration clause specifically provides for arbitration by a single arbitrator in the Republic of Korea.
The Tribunal notes that there appears to be no time limit in the contract for the submission of the dispute to arbitration and the complainant may, if he so wishes, advance all his arguments before the arbitrator.
The Tribunal would be competent to hear disputes concerning the execution of a contract of a non-official where the contract itself provides for the Tribunal’s competence, as provided for by Article II, paragraph 4, of its Statute (see Judgments 967 and 803).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 803, 967, 1938, 2017, 2308, 2415, 2688, 2734, 2888, 3049, 3359, 3705
Keywords:
arbitration; competence; non official; ratione personae;
Judgment 4646
135th Session, 2023
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, who was employed under a series of Special Service Agreements, submits that she was requested without a valid reason to stop working immediately and that WHO did not grant her request for conciliation and amicable settlement.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
competence; complaint dismissed; ratione personae; special service agreement; summary procedure;
Consideration 3
Extract:
The complainant states in the complaint form that she filed the complaint in her capacity as a former official. However, according to the express terms of the SSA under which she was employed, the complainant did not have the status of a WHO official. As the complainant cannot be considered as an official or former official of WHO and is not covered by WHO’s Staff Rules and Regulations, she has no access to this Tribunal (see Judgments 3705, consideration 4, 3551, consideration 3, and 3049, consideration 4).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3049, 3551, 3705
Keywords:
competence; former official; ratione personae; special service agreement;
Judgment 4589
135th Session, 2023
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the recruitment process for the position of Staff Council Coordinator and her non-selection for that position.
Considerations 6-8
Extract:
[T]he complainant submits, by reference to consideration 12 of Judgment 3125, that the Appeal Board committed an error of law by unlawfully restricting its competence while examining her internal appeal. The Tribunal stated, in the referenced consideration, that the internal appeal body involved in that case was wrong to define its own competence by reference to the case law which defines the Tribunal’s own power of review of discretionary decisions. In consideration 14 of Judgment 3125, the Tribunal set aside the selection process solely because the internal appeal body had so restricted its competence. That however is not the end of the matter. The Tribunal’s case law also has it that where an organization’s rules restrict an appeal body’s power to review a discretionary decision, the rules, rather than the foregoing principle, apply (see, for example, Judgment 3077, consideration 3).
Importantly for the purpose of this case, however, the case law further has it that, notwithstanding that an Appeal Board wrongfully defines its competence to review a selection decision by reference to the Tribunal’s limited power of review, the report of the Board would not be vitiated if it is found that it in fact considered the submissions and materials the parties provided (see, for example, Judgment 4010, consideration 7). Accordingly, in consideration 2 of Judgment 3590, the Tribunal stated that by noting that the candidates had been treated equally, the Appeal Board recognized that the appointing authority enjoyed wide discretion to appoint the person whom it considered to be the most qualified for the post advertised from a shortlist of candidates, all of whom met the requirements specified by the vacancy notice. The Tribunal also stated that this self-restraint on the part of the appeal body is completely justified to the extent that, when conducted correctly, a competition and selection procedure calls for a complex assessment of multiple criteria that relate as much to the candidates’ personalities and qualities as to the organization’s particular interests. It further stated that without compromising the objective assessment of these criteria, the appeal body cannot be vested in every circumstance with the same power of review that must be granted to the bodies responsible for selecting candidates, but that this does not relieve the appeal body of its duty to examine the competition file closely and to provide plausible reasons for its recommendation within the limits of its power of review.
In the present case, the Appeal Board examined the competition file, although it did not disclose it to the complainant.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3077, 3125, 3590, 4010
Keywords:
competence; internal appeals body;
Judgment 4582
135th Session, 2023
Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks the reclassification of her employment contracts. She also claims that she was the victim of harassment and seeks compensation for the injury she alleges to have suffered.
Consideration 2
Extract:
The Organisation challenges the Tribunal’s competence to hear the complaint. However, the Tribunal recalls that, under Article II, paragraph 6(a), of its Statute, the Tribunal is open to any official, “even if her or his employment has ceased”. The challenge to the Tribunal’s competence will therefore be dismissed.
Keywords:
competence; former official; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint;
Judgment 4526
134th Session, 2022
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to terminate his contract for misconduct.
Consideration 8
Extract:
The Tribunal recently concluded in Judgment 3551, consistent with more recent case law, that a person in a situation broadly analogous to that of the complainant could not avail himself of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction as he was not an official of the defendant organisation. Not only was the existence of an arbitration clause viewed as relevant in Judgment 3551 in determining the status of the complainant, the existence of such a clause has, in a number of cases concerning individuals on contract, been treated as evidencing an agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgments 1938, consideration 4, 2017, consideration 2(a), 2688, consideration 5, 2888, consideration 5, and 3705, consideration 4).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1938, 2017, 2688, 2888, 3551, 3705
Keywords:
competence; non official; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
competence; complaint dismissed; non official; ratione personae; unops;
Judgment 4486
133rd Session, 2022
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the composition of the Munich Staff Committee and of the Central Staff Committee.
Consideration 4
Extract:
With regard to his standing as an alleged member of the MSC [Munich Staff Committee] and the CSC [Central Staff Committee], as rightly pointed out by the IAC and endorsed by the President, at the time of the appeal, the complainant was not a member of the MSC because he had resigned from it, regardless of the purpose underlying his resignation. He was not a member of the CSC either. Pursuant to Article 2 of the then Election Regulations, “[t]he local section [that is to say the MSC] shall appoint the Munich members of the [CSC]”. Therefore, his election to the MSC did not automatically mean that he was also elected to the CSC. On the contrary, a separate appointment is a prerequisite according to the above provision. The complainant did not produce any evidence that the MSC appointed him as a member of the CSC. Thus, his claims as a staff representative of either the MSC or the CSC, including claims for declaring the composition of the MSC and the CSC void, for recognising his mandate to represent in the CSC the category C employees and for accessing the tools of communication for Staff Committee’s members, are irreceivable ratione personae. Accordingly, his allegation that the denial of his participation in the CSC activities constitutes a violation of the prohibition of non-discrimination and of equal treatment is not receivable either.
Keywords:
competence; internal appeals body; member of an internal body; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint; staff representative;
Judgment 4458
133rd Session, 2022
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks the setting aside of the information circular which, according to her, announced the closure of the UNESCO Commissary.
Consideration 6
Extract:
[T]he contested measure affects the complainant not in her capacity as a former official of UNESCO, but in her – legally distinct – capacity as a member of the Commissary. The complainant herself makes this clear in her complaint by submitting that the decision to end the Commissary’s activity “directly breaches [her] entitlements as a member of the Commissary”, and the nature of the arguments raised in her submissions confirms that she intends to file a complaint with the Tribunal in that capacity.
However, the opportunity to use the services of the Commissary, which was merely a facility offered to UNESCO staff members – and indeed to other categories of persons [...] – was not covered by the provisions of the complainant’s employment contract when she retired nor by the provisions of the Organization’s Staff Regulations [...].
Keywords:
competence; facilities; locus standi; ratione materiae; status of complainant;
Judgment 4358
131st Session, 2021
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to place him on the shortlist for a position.
Consideration 2
Extract:
Article II of the Tribunal’s Statute recognises that officials whose employment has ceased can access the Tribunal (Article II, paragraph 6(a)), a circumstance which might, for example, involve the enforcement of rights which had arisen during the currency of their employment (see, for example, Judgment 4219, consideration 17). However it is nonetheless necessary, to render a complaint receivable, for a complainant to be seeking to vindicate non-observance of her or his terms of appointment or Staff Regulations as are applicable (Article II, paragraph 5, of the Tribunal’s Statute). Ordinarily, as is the case in the present proceedings, a person who has ceased to be a member of the staff of an international organisation has no subsisting terms of appointment nor are there ordinarily any applicable Staff Regulations and none applying to former staff members are pointed to in these proceedings.
Accordingly the complaint must be dismissed as irreceivable as the Tribunal has no competence to hear it (see, for example, Judgments 3774, consideration 1, and 3709, consideration 4).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3709, 3774, 4219
Keywords:
competence; former official; ratione personae;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
competence; complaint dismissed; former official; ratione personae;
Judgment 4219
129th Session, 2020
ITER International Fusion Energy Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, who had been seconded to the ITER Organization, challenges the decision to end his secondment and the failure to investigate his harassment allegations.
Consideration 7
Extract:
In relation to the challenge to the impugned decision, insofar as the Director-General concluded the complainant had no right of appeal, the following comment can be made. There can be no doubt that there is no general right of appeal available to staff of international organisations deriving, at least impliedly, from their terms of appointment to challenge decisions with which they are aggrieved irrespective of the provisions of applicable staff rules or regulations. However, even if the staff rules or regulations do not provide for an appeal, they cannot preclude the initiation of proceedings in the Tribunal (see, for example, Judgment 2312, consideration 3).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2312
Keywords:
competence; right of appeal;
Consideration 12
Extract:
The Tribunal now turns directly to the question of whether the complainant was an official for the purposes of the Tribunal’s Statute. In relation to seconded staff, it has been said by the Tribunal that “[a]s a general rule, the effect of secondment is to suspend the contractual relationship between the releasing agency and the employee, who retains the right to return to the releasing agency upon expiry of the secondment term without having to seek other employment. During secondment, [she or]he is subject to the staff regulations and rules of the receiving agency” (see Judgment 2184, consideration 4). Ultimately, of course, the status of a seconded employee has to be assessed having regard to the specific arrangements in place concerning the secondment. One case where a seconded employee was not viewed as an official or employee of the receiving organisation is Judgment 3247. Additionally, as the Tribunal observed in Judgment 2918, consideration 11, “[s]econdment is, in essence, a tripartite agreement which, ordinarily, involves an agreement between the person seconded and the receiving organisation, at least as to some matters”. In that case the applicability of the Staff Regulations depended on whether an individual had concluded an employment contract with the organisation and the Tribunal found the seconded staff had not. Additionally in that judgment reference was made to Judgment 703, which established that secondment does not necessarily preclude the person concerned from becoming a staff member of the organisation to which she or he is seconded.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 703, 2184, 2918, 3247
Keywords:
competence; official; ratione personae; secondment; staff member;
Consideration 17
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal has recognised that former officials can seek redress in the Tribunal when, inter alia, the former official is seeking to enforce rights which had arisen during the currency of her or his employment with the international organisation concerned (see, for example, Judgments 3505, consideration 3, and 3915, consideration 3).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3505, 3915
Keywords:
competence; former official; ratione materiae; ratione personae;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
competence; complaint allowed; harassment; ratione personae; secondment;
Judgment 4104
127th Session, 2019
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to deny her request for the issuance of a fixed-term project-based contract for a member of her team.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
administrative decision; competence; complaint dismissed; impugned decision; ratione materiae;
Judgment 3551
120th Session, 2015
World Health Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: As the complaint is clearly irreceivable, it is summarily dismissed.
Consideration 3
Extract:
"The Tribunal clearly has no jurisdiction to hear this complaint. Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 5, of its Statute, “[t]he Tribunal shall […] be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of appointment of officials”. The complainant stated in the complaint form that he filed the complaint in his capacity as a former official. However, according the express terms of the SSA under which he was employed, the complainant did not have the status of a WHO official. As the complainant cannot be considered as an official or former official of WHO and is not covered by WHO’s Staff Rules and Regulations, he has no access to this Tribunal (see Judgments 1034, under 3, and 3049, under 4)."
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1034, 3049
Keywords:
competence; non official; ratione personae; receivability of the complaint; special service agreement; staff regulations and rules; status of complainant;
Judgment 3494
120th Session, 2015
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her candidature for a position in Eurocontrol.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
appointment; candidate; competence; complaint allowed; decision quashed; delegated authority;
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 | next >
|
