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Redefinition of contract (846,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Redefinition of contract
Total judgments found: 8
Judgment 5096
141st Session, 2026
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a retroactive redefinition of his employment relationship.
Considerations 13-14
Extract:
The complainant failed to challenge the decision granting him a fixed-term contract within the applicable time limit for appeal and also accepted his new contract without reservation. Consequently, he was precluded from seeking a redefinition of his employment relationship at a later date. As in Judgment 4655, consideration 11, the Tribunal notes that the complainant was plainly aware that he was in a similar situation to that of the staff members in Judgments 4160 and 4159, and that he sensed that the resulting case law would therefore be applicable to his own case. Indeed, the evidence in the record shows that, on 13 May 2019, pending the internal appeal, the parties, including the present complainant, were notified of the WAB’s decision to suspend consideration of the appeal, pending the Tribunal’s decision on the two cases, which later culminated in Judgments 4160 and 4159. The complainant maintains that his request for redefinition cannot be considered as time-barred because it is solely an action for compensation for misuse of precarious contracts, and such actions are not subject to time limits under WIPO’s rules. He further argues that no decision on his request for redefinition existed before 24 January 2014, and that the grant of his first fixed-term contract was not a decision concerning recharacterization and compensation. These arguments are unfounded.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4159, 4160, 4655
Keywords:
redefinition of contract; time limit;
Consideration 12
Extract:
In Judgments 4160 and 4159, delivered on 3 July 2019, the Tribunal ruled on complaints seeking redefinition of the employment relationships of two WIPO staff members who had been employed from 2002 to 2012 under short-term contracts renewed several times before being awarded temporary contracts and then, in the case of one of them, a fixed-term contract. The Tribunal dismissed these complaints on the grounds that the complainants’ internal appeals in both cases were time-barred since they had not challenged the decisions to appoint them under temporary contracts within the applicable time limit. The Tribunal held that, in view of the modification of the legal relationships between the parties resulting from the grant of these contracts, which were of a fundamentally different nature from the short-term contracts which had preceded them, and given that the conclusion of these contracts also regularised the complainants’ contractual situation, the absence of any challenge to these decisions within the time limit for filing appeals necessarily barred the complainants from requesting the redefinition of their previous employment relationships. The Tribunal also emphasized that these complainants’ situations differed radically from those in Judgments 3225 and 3090, where complainants were still on short-term contracts when seeking redefinition (see Judgments 4160, consideration 8, and 4159, consideration 8).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4159, 4160
Keywords:
redefinition of contract;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; redefinition of contract; time limit;
Consideration 14
Extract:
Furthermore, endorsing the argument that a claim for recharacterization and compensation has no time limits – which would contradict Judgments 4655, 4654, 4160, and 4159 – would allow staff members to circumvent appeal time limits by seeking compensation at any time for injury caused to them by an individual decision they failed to challenge promptly. Such a situation is unacceptable given the necessity of legal stability, which is the very justification for time limits and their enforcement (see Judgment 3406, consideration 12, and the case law cited therein). Additionally, the Tribunal notes that the decisions granting the complainant a sequence of short contracts were, in themselves, decisions negatively affecting him, and, as such, challengeable decisions. Indeed, as recalled above, other staff members in the same situation as the complainant did challenge their short-term contracts. In any event, the decision to grant the complainant his first fixed-term contract clearly showed detrimental effects, insofar as it ignored the 25 past short-term contracts and failed to retroactively reclassify his employment. Consequently, contrary to the complainant’s contention, a decision denying recharacterization and compensation did exist prior to 24 January 2014. The Tribunal, consistent with Judgment 4655, holds that it was the decision on his first fixed-term contract.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3406, 4159, 4160, 4654, 4655
Keywords:
impugned decision; redefinition of contract; time limit;
Judgment 4809
137th Session, 2024
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a contractual redefinition of his employment relationship and the setting aside of the decision not to renew his last contract.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint allowed; redefinition of contract;
Judgment 4675
136th Session, 2023
International Office of Epizootics
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks the reclassification of her employment relationship and the consequential regularisation of her pension entitlements.
Consideration 4
Extract:
[A]lthough, in those judgments, the Tribunal found that the successive short-term contracts given to the complainants in question actually constituted a continuous employment relationship which warranted a reclassification to that effect, the Tribunal had already found – and expressly pointed out – that those contracts had been renewed without any notable breaks (see Judgments 3225, consideration 8, and 3090, consideration 7). It was clear from the evidence adduced in the cases in question that the complainants’ short-term contracts had followed one another seamlessly, subject only to very brief interruptions, which showed that breaking down the employment relationship into multiple temporary appointments, as the organisation had done, was artificial. In the present case, the requirement to have no notable breaks, as established by this case law, is not met. It is apparent from a table summarising the complainant’s employment contracts, that she herself supplied in her complaint, that the employment relationship between her and WOAH between 2 January 2002 and 31 January 2013 was subject to many long breaks, loosely corresponding to the second half of every year, and lasting up to eight months. Accordingly, over the period in question, the duration of all of the complainant’s temporary contracts when added together was only five years and four months (and not six months, as the complainant erroneously stated in her submissions), in other words, not even half of the overall duration of 11 years and one month that the period represented.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3090, 3225
Keywords:
conversion of contract; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; conversion of contract; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Judgment 4655
136th Session, 2023
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainants challenge the decisions rejecting their requests for redefinition of their employment relationships.
Consideration 10
Extract:
[T]he case law [...] established by Judgments 4159 and 4160 is fully applicable to the cases of the complainants in the present proceedings, and accordingly the Organization’s objection to the receivability of all the complaints, based on the fact that the complainants’ internal appeals were time-barred, is well founded. With regard to the eight complainants who were granted temporary contracts at the end of periods when they were employed under short-term contracts, it is clear that they did not challenge the decisions whereby they were granted these temporary contracts within the eight-week period available to them for this purpose under Staff Rule 11.1.1(b)(1), in the version applicable at the time. Moreover, examination of these contracts shows that the complainants explicitly stated when signing them that they “accept[ed] without reservation the temporary appointment[s] offered to [them]”. The requests for redefinition of their employment relationships that they subsequently submitted were therefore time-barred. Moreover, the Tribunal notes that the approach adopted in Judgments 4159 and 4160, concerning the consequences of a failure to challenge within the applicable time limit a decision awarding a temporary employment contract at the end of a period of employment under short-term contracts, must apply a fortiori to a decision awarding a fixed-term contract at that point. The grant to some staff members, at the end of a such a period of employment, of this type of contract, which is still more fundamentally different in nature from a short-term contract, constituted a fortiori a modification of the legal relationships between the parties as well as regularising the contractual situation of the staff members in question. However, the three complainants who were directly awarded fixed-term contracts on the expiry of renewals of their short-term contracts failed to challenge the decisions granting them these contracts within the applicable time limit for appeal and also accepted their new contracts without reservation. Consequently, they were not entitled to seek a redefinition of their employment relationships at a later date.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4159, 4160
Keywords:
conversion of contract; fixed-term; late appeal; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Consideration 10
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal observes that, while the various complainants requested that the contractual redefinition apply not only to the period during which they were employed under short-term contracts but also, subsidiarily, to the subsequent period, their claims on this point are also barred by this case law. Firstly, the periods during which the complainants were employed under temporary appointments or fixed-term contracts did not in themselves necessitate a redefinition, since the complainants were lawfully employed during those periods. Secondly, since the requests for redefinition of their initial employment relationships in the form of short-term contracts are irreceivable, those requests, even if well-founded, could not in any event give rise to an entitlement to redefinition concerning the subsequent period.
Keywords:
conversion of contract; late appeal; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; conversion of contract; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Consideration 15
Extract:
[T]he complainants maintain [...] that the requests for redefinition of their employment relationships cannot be considered as time-barred because they are “actions involving compensation”, their sole purpose being “to obtain redress for the injury caused by the misuse of precarious contracts”, and that actions of this type are not, as such, subject to a time limit specified in WIPO’s rules. However, the Tribunal considers this manner of presenting the cases contrived, because in a dispute involving a challenge to individual decisions, as here, compensation for injury arising from the alleged unlawfulness of those decisions could only be granted as a consequence of their being set aside, which presupposes by definition that they have been challenged within the applicable time limit. The complainants’ reference to the case law on which they consider they can base this argument, which relates to different situations, is irrelevant in the present case. Furthermore, endorsing this argument – which would, once again, involve departing from the approach taken in [...] Judgments 4159 and 4160 – would have the effect of authorising the Organization’s staff members in practice to evade the effects of the rules on time limits for filing appeals by allowing them to seek compensation at any time for injury caused to them by an individual decision, even though they did not challenge that decision in time. Such a situation would scarcely be permissible having regard to the requirement of stability of legal relations which, as the Tribunal regularly points out in its case law, is the very justification for time bars (see, for example, Judgment 3406, consideration 12, and the other judgments cited therein).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3406, 4159, 4160
Keywords:
compensation; conversion of contract; injury; late appeal; redefinition of contract; time bar;
Judgment 4654
136th Session, 2023
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a redefinition of his employment relationship and the setting aside of the decision not to renew his employment contract.
Consideration 10
Extract:
[T]he complainant maintains that the request for redefinition of his employment relationship cannot be considered as time-barred because it is “an action involving compensation”, its sole purpose being “to obtain redress for the injury caused” by “the fault committed by the Organization in applying the rules governing insecure and non-standard contracts in an abusive, aberrant manner” and that actions of this type are not, as such, subject to a time limit specified in WIPO’s rules. However, the Tribunal considers this manner of presenting the case contrived, because in a dispute involving a challenge to an individual decision, as here, compensation for injury arising from the alleged unlawfulness of that decision could only be granted as a consequence of it being set aside, which presupposes by definition that it has been challenged within the applicable time limit. Furthermore, endorsing this argument – which would, once again, involve departing from the approach taken in aforementioned Judgments 4159 and 4160 – would have the effect of authorising the Organization’s staff members in practice to evade the effects of the rules on time limits for filing appeals by allowing them to seek compensation at any time for injury caused to them by an individual decision, even though they did not challenge that decision in due time. Such a situation would scarcely be permissible having regard to the requirement of stability of legal relations which, as the Tribunal regularly points out in its case law, is the very justification for a time bar (see, for example, Judgment 3406, consideration 12, and the case law cited therein).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3406, 4159, 4160
Keywords:
conversion of contract; late appeal; redefinition of contract; time bar;
Consideration 7
Extract:
[T]he case law thus established by Judgments 4159 and 4160 is fully applicable to the case of the complainant in the present proceedings, [...]. Indeed, it is clear that the complainant did not challenge, within the eight-week period available to him for this purpose under Staff Rule 11.1.1(b)(1), in the version applicable at the time, the decision of 19 November 2012 whereby he was granted the temporary appointment which he held from that date. Moreover, examination of that contract shows that the complainant signed it on 23 November 2012, explicitly stating that he “accept[ed] without reservation the temporary appointment offered to [him]”. The request for redefinition of his employment relationship that he subsequently submitted on 16 September 2016 with the aim of having his career reconstructed was therefore time-barred.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4159, 4160
Keywords:
conversion of contract; late appeal; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
abolition of post; complaint dismissed; conversion of contract; late appeal; non-renewal of contract; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Consideration 7
Extract:
[T]he Tribunal observes that, while the complainant requested that the contractual redefinition apply not only to the period during which he was employed under short-term contracts but also, subsidiarily, to the subsequent period, his claims on this point must also fail in light of this case law. Firstly, the period during which the complainant was employed under a temporary appointment did not in itself necessitate a redefinition, since he was lawfully employed during that period. Secondly, since the request for redefinition of his initial employment relationship in the form of short-term contracts is irreceivable, that request, even if well founded, could not in any event give rise to an entitlement to redefinition concerning the subsequent period.
Keywords:
conversion of contract; late appeal; redefinition of contract; short-term;
Judgment 4160
128th Session, 2019
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a redefinition of his employment relationship.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; redefinition of contract;
Judgment 4159
128th Session, 2019
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant seeks a redefinition of his employment relationship and the setting aside of the decision not to renew his last contract of employment.
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint dismissed; redefinition of contract;
Judgment 3110
113th Session, 2012
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint allowed; contract; decision quashed; redefinition of contract; short-term;
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