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Interpretation of rules (899,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Interpretation of rules
Total judgments found: 48
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Judgment 5170
141st Session, 2026
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges Eurocontrol’s refusal to grant him, for the year 2021, the two days’ compensatory special leave to which he considers he is entitled as an emergency response officer (volunteer firefighter).
Consideration 4
Extract:
« [I]l convient de donner aux mots leur sens évident et ordinaire et les termes d’un texte doivent être analysés de manière objective en fonction de leur contexte, de leur objet et de leur but […]. »
Keywords:
interpretation of rules;
Judgment 5160
141st Session, 2026
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose on him the disciplinary sanction of downgrading.
Considerations 7-9
Extract:
« Il ressort des dispositions [applicables à Eurocontrol] que, contrairement à ce que fait valoir la défenderesse, toute enquête administrative doit être menée par le Comité d’examen […] la conduite de l’enquête administrative par le Comité d’examen offrait des garanties d’impartialité supplémentaires […] En confiant l’enquête […] au seul responsable de la sécurité, Eurocontrol a privé l’intéressé de son droit à une procédure régulière et des garanties procédurales prévues par ses propres règles. Il y a donc lieu de conclure à l’irrégularité de l’enquête administrative conduite dans la présente affaire […] la décision [attaquée] ainsi que les décisions de rétrogradation […], doivent être annulées […] Cependant, le Tribunal ne fera pas droit aux demandes en réparation du préjudice matériel que le requérant estime avoir subi du fait de sa rétrogradation. En effet, l’intéressé a lui-même reconnu avoir falsifié la date de la prescription médicale, soumise à l’appui de sa demande de remboursement de frais médicaux […] le Tribunal estime que le Directeur général pouvait conclure au-delà de tout doute raisonnable que le requérant s’était rendu coupable de tentative de fraude et qu’une enquête administrative menée par le Comité d’examen n’aurait pas pu, en tout état de cause, avoir d’incidence sur cette conclusion […] Le non-respect par Eurocontrol des garanties procédurales prévues par ses propres règles a néanmoins causé au requérant un préjudice moral.»
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; fraud; interpretation; interpretation of rules; investigation; material injury; moral injury;
Judgment 5137
141st Session, 2026
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns what she considers to be the refusal to provide her with full access to her personal file.
Consideration 5
Extract:
“The complainant’s contention that the investigation reports into her harassment complaints should have been included in her personal file is also unfounded […] no provision obliged Interpol to include in the complainant’s personal file her harassment complaints and the investigation reports regarding them.”
Keywords:
harassment; interpretation of rules; investigation report; personal file;
Judgment 5110
141st Session, 2026
International Atomic Energy Agency
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, who suffers from service-incurred injuries, contests the decision to deny full reimbursement for her laboratory test expenses.
Consideration 3
Extract:
“The Tribunal has previously stated, in consideration 6 of Judgment 3650, involving the complainant, that the right to payment of medical expenses arising under Article 16 [of Appendix D] is conditioned by the consideration of any claim for payment by the organisation of whether the medical expenses incurred were reasonably incurred, which would include considering any evidence supporting that conclusion. Thus, the right to payment of medical expenses cannot be said to be a right to an immediate payment of the claimed amount. In line with this case law, the person who makes such a claim must also provide evidence to show that the amounts claimed were reasonably incurred for the treatment as a result of the service-incurred illness or injury.”
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; medical expenses; service-incurred;
Judgment 5107
141st Session, 2026
World Trade Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant, the widow of a former employee of the WTO who died on 5 May 2021, challenges an email from the WTO of 23 May 2023, whereby the Organization refused to provide her with a copy of his contract of employment, on the grounds that they were no longer married on the date of his death.
Consideration 3
Extract:
« [L]es Statut et Règlement du personnel de l’OMC ne prévoient aucune disposition permettant aux ayants droit d’un fonctionnaire d’user des voies de recours interne. Les dispositions des Statut et Règlement du personnel relatives à la procédure de recours interne s’appliquent exclusivement au ‘fonctionnaire’ . Il s’ensuit que la requérante avait directement accès au Tribunal et qu’elle n’était pas soumise à l’exigence d’épuisement préalable des voies de recours interne. »
Keywords:
former official; internal appeal; internal remedies exhausted; interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 5098
141st Session, 2026
European Southern Observatory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the non-recognition of her illness as occupational.
Consideration 6
Extract:
“[I]n Judgment 4818, consideration 18, the Tribunal emphasized the following: ‘[…] the primary rule of interpretation is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see Judgments 4321, consideration 4, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Where the text is clear and unambiguous, the Tribunal will apply it without reference to the preparatory work or the supposed intent of the lawmaker. Strict textual interpretation is an essential safeguard of the stability of the position in law and so of the organisation’s efficiency (see Judgments 4506, consideration 5, 3701, consideration 4, and 691, consideration 9).’ In Judgment 4796, consideration 3, it furthermore recalled that ‘words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (see, for example, Judgments 4639, consideration 3, 4506, consideration 5, 4066, consideration 7, 4031, consideration 5, and 3744, consideration 8)’. Lastly, in Judgment 4639, consideration 3, the Tribunal [reminded] that it is only in situations where an ambiguity remains after these rules of interpretation have been applied that it may be justified to interpret a provision in favour of the interests of the staff rather than those of the organisation itself.”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4639, 4818
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 5071
140th Session, 2025
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the amount of the salary advancement he received under transitional provisions applicable to chairmen and members of the Boards of Appeal following the introduction of a new career system.
Considerations 7-8
Extract:
According to the Tribunal’s case law, it is a primary rule of interpretation that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (see, for example,Judgments 4796, consideration 3, 4066, consideration 7, 4031, consideration 5, or 3744, consideration 8).
Should an ambiguity remain in the relevant provision after this method of construction is applied, the regulations or rules of an international organisation must, in principle, be construed in favour of the interests of its staff and not those of the organisation (see, for example, Judgments 4639, consideration 3, 3539, consideration 8, 3355, consideration 16, or 2276, consideration 4).
[T]he Tribunal considers that, while the wording [...] would certainly have been clearer had it expressly specified which grade the Administrative Council was referring to, there can be no doubt that this was the new grade assigned pursuant to decision CA/D 10/14.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2276, 3355, 3539, 3744, 4031, 4066, 4639, 4796
Keywords:
grade; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 5036
140th Session, 2025
International Atomic Energy Agency
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the communication, addressed by the IAEA to all of its staff members of British nationality, informing them that officials holding a residence permit under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union would be considered as having obtained permanent residence status in the country of their duty station (Austria), which would affect their home leave and repatriation grant entitlements as well as the privileges and immunities granted to them.
Consideration 10
Extract:
[T]he provision concerning home leave contained a clause that declared that '[a] staff member who has changed his/her residential status in such a way that he/she may, in the opinion of the Director General, be deemed to be a permanent resident of a country other than that of his/her nationality may lose or incur a change in his/her entitlement to home leave'. This element of the provision conferred a discretion in two respects. Firstly, a discretion was conferred on the Director General to 'deem' a staff member a permanent resident though, by necessary implication, there was a discretion not to deem a staff member a permanent resident. A multitude of considerations could potentially be relevant. The second element of discretion was that even if deemed a permanent resident, the staff member could either, as possible alternatives, lose an entitlement to home leave or incur a change in that entitlement. The provision does not expressly state who makes that assessment and on what basis though it is more likely than not, it is another discretionary power of some width, vested in the Director General.
Keywords:
discretion; home leave; interpretation; interpretation of rules; residence;
Consideration 11
Extract:
[G]enerally an instrument should be construed as a whole and language in one provision construed to the same effect as another.
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 5035
140th Session, 2025
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: Le requérant conteste les décisions de rejet de ses demandes de remboursement spécial des frais de garde-malade de son épouse.
Consideration 10
Extract:
Selon la jurisprudence du Tribunal, il est de règle, en matière d’interprétation des textes, qu’il convient de donner aux mots leur sens évident et ordinaire et que les termes d’un texte doivent être analysés de manière objective en fonction de leur contexte, de leur objet et de leur but (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4959, au considérant 8, 4796, au considérant 3, 4066, au considérant 7, 4031, au considérant 5, ou 3744, au considérant 8).
Lorsque, après mise en œuvre de cette méthode d’interprétation, subsiste une ambiguïté dans le texte à appliquer, les dispositions statutaires ou réglementaires édictées par une organisation internationale doivent, par principe, être interprétées dans le sens favorable aux intérêts de ses fonctionnaires, et non à ceux de l’organisation elle-même (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4639, au considérant 3, 3539, au considérant 8, 3355, au considérant 16, 2396, au considérant 3 a), 2276, au considérant 4, ou 1755, au considérant 12).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1755, 2276, 2396, 3355, 3539, 3744, 4031, 4066, 4639, 4796, 4959
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; staff member's interest;
Judgment 5018
140th Session, 2025
International Criminal Police Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: La requérante conteste son placement d’office en congé.
Consideration 7
Extract:
[D]ès lors que le présent litige porte sur l’interprétation d’une disposition réglementaire, il y a lieu de rappeler les règles primordiales définies par la jurisprudence du Tribunal en matière d’interprétation des textes. Ainsi que le Tribunal l’a notamment rappelé dans le jugement 4796, au considérant 3, selon ces règles, «il convient de donner aux mots leur sens évident et ordinaire et les termes d’un texte doivent être analysés de manière objective en fonction de leur contexte, de leur objet et de leur but (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4639, au considérant 3, 4506, au considérant 5, 4066, au considérant 7, 4031, au considérant 5, ou 3744, au considérant 8)».
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3744, 4031, 4066, 4506, 4639, 4796
Keywords:
interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4969
139th Session, 2025
World Intellectual Property Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to dismiss her complaint of harassment directed against the external company mandated by WIPO to investigate allegations of misconduct involving her.
Consideration 5
Extract:
WIPO raises, as a threshold issue, whether this complaint is receivable given that, as it argues, the initial complaint of harassment [directed against an external investigation company] was irreceivable and unsupportable under either the relevant Staff Rule or Office Instruction. WIPO’s construction of the relevant provisions is correct. It is plain that Staff Rule 11.4.1 and Office Instruction 47/2016 were concerned with complaints against another staff member or members within the framework of procedures to avoid or eliminate workplace-related conflicts and grievances. It was not intended to have any wider application or operation.
Keywords:
harassment; interpretation of rules; receivability of the complaint;
Judgment 4931
139th Session, 2025
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to recognise his same-sex marriage for the purpose of dependency benefits entitlements.
Consideration 10
Extract:
It is true that in Judgment 2643, consideration 6, there is a discussion that might be thought to embrace and establish the legal position in relation to both registered partnerships (the position then under consideration) and same-sex marriages. Even if, on a fair reading of that discussion it applied to both, which may be doubted, the observations about same-sex marriages were clearly obiter dicta. That is to say, it is not a pronouncement of the law binding either ITU nor this Tribunal by operation of the principle of stare decisis. The other judgments also relied on by ITU are Judgments 3203 and 2826.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2643, 2826, 3203
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; same-sex marriage; stare decisis;
Considerations 11-12
Extract:
A convenient starting point is what the Tribunal decided in Judgment 2590. As the Tribunal noted, the complainant, “whose personal status is governed by Dutch law, validly contracted a same-sex marriage”. The Tribunal then observed:
“According to the Tribunal’s case law, ‘[a]s a general rule, and in the absence of a definition of the term, the status of a spouse will flow from a marriage publicly performed and certified by an official of the State where the ceremony has taken place, such marriage being then proved by the production of an official certificate’ (see Judgment 1715, under 10); thus, ‘a link [is established] between the word “‘spouse’” and the institution of marriage, whatever form it may take’ (see Judgment 2193, under 10). In the present case, the FAO’s Staff Rules and Regulations give no definition of the term spouse, apart from a passing reference to husband and wife in the English version of Staff Regulation 301.3.22, which cannot justify interpreting all the relevant texts as denying legally married, same-sex spouses any right to benefits.”
This reasoning is equally applicable to the present case. The complainant was married to his partner. An interpretation of Staff Regulation 3.12 cannot be justified which denies legally married, same-sex spouses any rights to benefits. Moreover, and this is common ground, by operation of Article 29 of the ITU Constitution, any discrepancy or dispute, relevantly between the English and French versions of the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules, the French text shall prevail. In the present case and notwithstanding what was decided in Judgment 2643 by reference to the English version of the applicable provisions, the French version should prevail and clearly, as mentioned earlier, it was gender neutral in relation to who is a spouse or “conjoint”.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1715, 2193, 2590, 2643
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; same-sex marriage; stare decisis;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
complaint allowed; dependant; interpretation of rules; same-sex marriage;
Judgment 4921
139th Session, 2025
European Southern Observatory
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests ESO’s decision not to apply the ceilings defined in its Staff Rules and Regulations to the cost-of-living differential of the monthly household and children’s allowances paid to him.
Consideration 3
Extract:
The foregoing submissions accord with the Tribunal’s case law, stated, for example, in consideration 3 of Judgment 4639, that it is a basic rule of interpretation that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and that words must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose, but that should an ambiguity remain in the relevant provision after this method of construction is applied, the regulations or rules of an international organisation must in principle be construed in favour of the interests of its staff and not those of the organisation itself. As the Joint Advisory Appeals Board (JAAB) correctly concluded, the Tribunal holds that the complainant’s submission that the abovementioned operative words in Annex R A 5, 5.03 of the Staff Rules and Regulations are clear and unambiguous. Those words defined the applicable ceiling for the cost-of-living differential for the complainant’s household and children’s allowances, which should have been reflected in the complainant’s payslips […].
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4639
Keywords:
allowance; contra proferentem; interpretation of rules; staff regulations and rules;
Judgment keywords
Keywords:
allowance; complaint allowed; complaint allowed in part; contra proferentem; cost-of-living weighting; interpretation of rules; practice;
Judgment 4897
138th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges her appraisal report for 2018.
Consideration 8
Extract:
[T]he complainant perceives a breach in the fact that those goals were imposed on her by her reporting officer although she had expressed reservations in their regard [...] It is true that the Guidelines of 20 December 2017 define performance development as “the process by which managers and staff collaboratively agree upon the contribution to be made by individual staff members to enable the EPO to fulfil its mission”. But this statement, which merely aims to explain the general principle underlying the assessment system introduced by the Guidelines, cannot be construed as having intended to lay down a rule according to which any individual goal assigned to a staff member by her or his reporting officer must mandatorily be adopted by mutual agreement.
In Section III.1 concerning “[g]oal setting”, the Guidelines provide that “[t]he translation of business area goals into individual goals [...] is discussed by the reporting officer [...] and the staff member at a meeting”. Even if the text goes on to refer – somewhat awkwardly – to the goals set following that meeting as “the agreed goals”, the Tribunal considers that these provisions must be construed as only requiring that the reporting officer consult the staff member concerned on the goals that the reporting officer intends to assign to her or him, and not that those goals must receive the staff member’s assent.
Keywords:
consultation; interpretation of rules; performance report; rating;
Consideration 12
Extract:
[T]he complainant argues that the goals assigned to her should have been updated during the year. However, aforementioned Section III.1 of the Guidelines provides in this connection that the goals set “may [...] be reviewed in the course of the year, depending on business requirements”. This is therefore merely an option [...].
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; performance report; rating;
Judgment 4836
138th Session, 2024
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges his non-selection for several positions.
Consideration 10
Extract:
External advertisement of vacant positions may only be done pursuant to Staff Regulation 5.4.1(d). Under its provision, vacant positions may be advertised externally, only when the position requires technical skills, experience or professional qualifications are unlikely to be available among current Federation staff, or when a different skill set and external experience for the post or within the existing team is needed. Outside of these circumstances, the Federation’s rules do not permit external recruitment. The Federation, who is required by the case law, stated, for example, in consideration 20 of Judgment 3601, to prove that the procedure it had put in place was duly followed, has not shown that it advertised the subject positions because the requirements in Staff Regulation 5.4.1(d) existed at the material time.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3601
Keywords:
burden of proof; external candidate; internal candidate; interpretation of rules; selection procedure; vacancy notice;
Judgment 4827
138th Session, 2024
International Atomic Energy Agency
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to pay him a repatriation grant upon his separation from service.
Considerations 5-6
Extract:
The Tribunal recalls that the principles of statutory interpretation are well established in the case law. The primary rule is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see, for example, Judgments 4681, consideration 5, 4477, consideration 4, 4145, consideration 4, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Moreover, as the Tribunal stated in Judgment 3734, consideration 4, “[i]t is the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words in the provision that must be discerned and not just a phrase taken in isolation”.
[…] Given the plain language of the above provisions of Staff Rules 3.03.1(H)(3), 3.03.1(I), 6.01.1(B)(5) as well as Staff Rule 6.01.01 of AM.II/12 and their interrelationship, the phrase “five years of continuous service” as set forth in Staff Rule 6.01.1(B)(5) cannot be read in isolation. It must be interpreted as a period of service that satisfies the requirements contained in Staff Rule 3.03.1(I) and Staff Rule 6.01.01 of AM.II/12. Accordingly, in calculating the “five years of continuous service” for purposes of determining a staff member’s eligibility to receive a repatriation grant under Staff Rule 6.01.1(B)(5), the period of service under a Short-Term appointment shall not be counted. The Tribunal further finds that the above provisions are unambiguous and that the complainant’s reliance on the principle established in Judgments 3701, 2276 and 1755 that texts which are ambiguous are to be construed in favour of the staff member is therefore misplaced.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 1755, 2276, 3310, 3701, 3734, 4145, 4477, 4681
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules; repatriation allowance;
Judgment 4818
138th Session, 2024
Green Climate Fund
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision denying her and her dependents an individual medical insurance plan following her separation from service.
Consideration 18
Extract:
According to the Tribunal’s case law, the primary rule of interpretation is that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning (see Judgments 4321, consideration 4, 3310, consideration 7, and 2276, consideration 4). Where the text is clear and unambiguous, the Tribunal will apply it without reference to the preparatory work or the supposed intent of the lawmaker. Strict textual interpretation is an essential safeguard of the stability of the position in law and so of the organisation’s efficiency (see Judgments 4506, consideration 5, 3701, consideration 4, and 691, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 691, 2276, 3310, 3701, 4321, 4506
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4800
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the rejection of her requests for special leave for very serious illness of a child.
Consideration 16
Extract:
[I]f the Office were to submit requests for special leave for serious illness of a child made under the aforementioned Article 59(3)(h) to the medical adviser for an opinion and, in order that those requests might be investigated, were to require the production of a medical certificate including a diagnosis of the medical condition involved, as in the case of requests for special leave for very serious illness, this would, in fact, breach the applicable provisions of the Service Regulations.
The Tribunal must point out that, in contrast to Article 59(3)(i), which deals with leave for very serious illness of a child, Article 59(3)(h) does not, in this regard, provide that the seriousness of the illness must be attested to by a doctor. The provisions of Article 89 of the Service Regulations are therefore not applicable to requests for leave made under Article 59(3)(h). The same goes for Rule 8 of Circular No. 22, which [...] only governs special leave for very serious illness (or hospitalisation) of a child referred to in Article 59(3)(i), and there is no other rule in that circular, nor [...] in any other existing set of rules, that contains similar provisions in relation to the leave referred to in Article 59(3)(h).
[...] However, it is clear that there is no requirement, when a request of that type is made, for the seriousness of the illness relied on to be evident from the medical certificate produced or for the grant of that leave to be conditional on the medical adviser’s opinion.
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; sick leave;
Consideration 3
Extract:
It is clear from [Article 59(3) and Article 89 of the Service Regulations and Rule 8 of Circular No. 22 of 11 May 2015] that special leave requested by an employee for “very serious illness of a child” can only be granted following an opinion from the medical adviser, who must determine the seriousness of the illness in question, and that this opinion must be given in the light of a medical certificate provided by the doctor who examined the child – or, if applicable, on the basis of other documents or information provided by that doctor – containing sufficient details of the condition diagnosed to allow the medical adviser to make the necessary assessment.
[...]
[W]hile it is true that [...] Rule 8(b)(i) of Circular No. 22 does not, when listing the matters to be included in the medical certificate, expressly mention a diagnosis of the illness in question, the need for that diagnosis to be mentioned necessarily follows from the wording of that subparagraph where it specifies that the medical adviser is to inform the Office “whether in his opinion the medical conditions of Article 59(3)i) are met”, which means that the medical adviser must be in a position to verify the “very serious” nature of the illness in question.
[A]lthough it is true that the reference in Article 89(3) of the Service Regulations to the “employee’s doctor” is not appropriate in the particular case of leave requested for the illness of a child, it is clearly to be taken, in the legal context relevant to that situation, as a reference to the doctor consulted to examine the child, as is also clear from the wording used in Article 59 and in Circular No. 22.
Keywords:
interpretation of rules; sick leave;
Judgment 4796
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to deduct from the amount of the education allowance paid in respect of his child the remuneration received by the latter during an internship.
Consideration 3
Extract:
[I]t is appropriate to recall the basic rules of statutory interpretation defined by the Tribunal’s case law. These state that words are to be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and must be construed objectively in their context and in keeping with their purport and purpose (see, for example, Judgments 4639, consideration 3, 4506, consideration 5, 4066, consideration 7, 4031, consideration 5, and 3744, consideration 8).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3744, 4031, 4066, 4506, 4639
Keywords:
interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Considerations 3-7 & 10
Extract:
[T]his dispute essentially revolves around the interpretation of the aforementioned provisions of Article 71(9) of the Service Regulations [of the EPO].
[...]
[T]he Tribunal considers it apparent from the provision in question – even though the wording could undoubtedly be better – that the two particular kinds of allowance mentioned are not exhaustive and that allowances other than scholarships and grants, which are only referred to because they are the most common forms of educational assistance, could also give rise to such a deduction. The way in which the words “scholarships” and “grants” appear in the text, being placed in brackets and separated by a comma, rather than by a conjunction such as “or” or “and”, supports this interpretation. This is further confirmed by the fact that Article 71(9) refers to the “deduction [...] of any allowance received from other sources for the child’s education (scholarships, grants)” [...].
In addition, when called upon to rule on complaints challenging the lawfulness of Article 71 of the Service Regulations, the Tribunal stated, in Judgment 2870, consideration 12, that “[p]rovision is also made in Article 71(9) for the deduction of allowances from other sources (e.g. scholarships) payable in respect of the child’s education” [...]. While not entirely addressing the matter at hand in the present case, the wording used by the Tribunal in that sentence was already leading towards the above interpretation.
However, the Tribunal also considers that [...] internship payments made to the child of an employee during an internship carried out with an employer as part of her or his studies [...] do not constitute an allowance received for the child’s education within the meaning of Article 71(9) and cannot, therefore, be lawfully deducted from the amount of the education allowance.
The reference made in that provision to “any allowance received [...] for the child’s education” must be understood as an allowance the purpose of which is to contribute to the expenditure involved in the child’s studies, which, once again, is confirmed by the reference in the text, quoted above, to “any allowance received [...] for the child’s education” [...].
But that is not the purpose of internship payments made by employers to students or pupils carrying out an internship with them as part of their studies. Such payments are principally intended as remuneration for the services provided by the intern to the employer. Even though [...] such payments can certainly not be regarded as a salary, they are still, by their very nature, a form of remuneration made to the child, and not a contribution to the cost of her or his education.
It is true that internship payments can sometimes include a contribution from the employer towards the expenses incurred by the child or by her or his family in connection with the internship. Even on this assumption, however, that is not their essential purpose, which is still to remunerate the intern as described above, and such a contribution cannot, in any event, be regarded as a payment “for the child’s education” within the meaning of the aforementioned Article 71(9).
[...]
The aforementioned Article 71(9) does not provide, in letter or in spirit, that any allowance which derives from a source other than the Office and which could potentially be set towards those costs can be deducted from the amount of the education allowance. It only permits the deduction of those allowances the specific purpose of which is to contribute to the expenditure connected with the child’s studies, which, as already stated, is not the case with internship payments.
[...]
It follows from the[se] considerations that [...] the EPO was wrong to deduct the amount of the internship payments made to the complainant’s son from the amount of the education allowance paid to the complainant and that, in making such a deduction, the EPO breached the aforementioned provisions of Article 71 of the Service Regulations [...]
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2870
Keywords:
education expenses; interpretation; interpretation of rules;
Judgment 4795
137th Session, 2024
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges his performance evaluation report for 2018.
Consideration 5
Extract:
[T]he complainant submits that Communiqué 2/17 is unlawful because Rule 12d of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention, concerning the appointment and re-appointment of the members of the Boards of Appeal, which is one of the provisions forming the basis for the Communiqué, was itself adopted under a flawed procedure. He considers that, to the extent that Rule 12d governs the way in which the performance of the members of the Boards is evaluated, it should have been submitted for an opinion to the Committee on Patent Law which was created by a decision of the Administrative Council (CA/D 3/94) [...].
Under paragraph 5 of Decision CA/D 3/94, “[t]he Committee [on Patent Law] shall advise the Administrative Council” on various questions connected with its object [...]
[I]t is clear from the aforementioned provisions, and also from other provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of Decision CA/D 3/94, that consulting the Committee on matters falling within the scope of its competence is merely an option for the Administrative Council and not a mandatory formality.
Keywords:
consultation; interpretation of rules;
Consideration 4
Extract:
[T]he complainant argues, in the first place, that the procedure leading to the adoption of Communiqué 2/17 was flawed because it was not submitted to the General Consultative Committee (GCC) [for consultation].
[...]
Article 1(4) of the Service Regulations provides that the regulations are to apply to members of the Boards of Appeal “in so far as they are not prejudicial to their independence”. The appraisal of members of those Boards is one of the particular problems associated with the guarantees of independence from which those members benefit. In addition, relating more generally to measures that specifically deal with the conditions of employment of members of the Boards of Appeal, it is apparent from the file [...] that, in view of this requirement for independence, it was increasingly seen as inappropriate for such measures to be subject to consultation with the GCC, especially given that that body is chaired by the President of the Office and half of its members are appointed by him. As a consequence, it became the practice, for measures of this type, to replace consultation with the GCC by consultation with the Presidium of the Boards of Appeal, an autonomous authority provided for in Rule 12b of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention, whose role, under paragraph 3 of that rule, includes “advis[ing] the President of the Boards of Appeal on matters concerning the functioning of the Boards of Appeal Unit in general” [...]. This practice was eventually codified in 2019 by the insertion of paragraph 8 into Article 38 of the Service Regulations, which expressly provides for consultation with the Presidium in such a situation rather than with the GCC.
This is the procedure that was followed for the drafting of Communiqué 2/17. Admittedly, the new version of Article 38 was not in force at that time. However, as just explained, even before the amendment was made to the Service Regulations, a practice existed to that effect and, contrary to what the complainant maintains, was already in use at the time when the Communiqué was issued, as evidenced by examples supplied by the EPO of previous consultations on other matters. Furthermore, although it is well-established case law that a practice cannot become legally binding where it contravenes rules already in force (see, for example, Judgments 4555, consideration 11, and 4026, consideration 6), the Tribunal considers that, in view of the aforementioned wording of Article 1(4) of the Service Regulations, the practice in question cannot be regarded as contravening the applicable rules. The lack of consultation with the GCC did not, therefore, constitute an irregularity.
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4026, 4555
Keywords:
consultation; independence; interpretation of rules; practice; rating;
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