|
|
 |
|
|
Standard of proof in disciplinary procedure (909,-666)
You searched for:
Keywords: Standard of proof in disciplinary procedure
Total judgments found: 9
Judgment 5133
141st Session, 2026
International Organization for Migration
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests IOM’s decision to maintain its earlier decision to impose upon her the disciplinary measure of discharge from service after due notice and to pay her 50 per cent of the termination indemnity in execution of Judgment 4460.
Consideration 7
Extract:
According to the Tribunal’s well-settled case law, a decision-maker imposing a disciplinary sanction, including the serious sanction of discharge, must be satisfied that the factual foundation for the finding of misconduct is proven beyond reasonable doubt (see Judgment 4936, consideration 6). Moreover, the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgments 4227, consideration 6, 4106, consideration 11, and 3649, consideration 14). It is equally well settled that the role of the Tribunal is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt but rather to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion (see, for example, Judgments 4949, consideration 10, and 4362, consideration 7).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3649, 4106, 4227, 4362, 4936, 4949
Keywords:
beyond reasonable doubt; decision-maker; disciplinary measure; evidence; misconduct; role of the tribunal; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 5119
141st Session, 2026
International Telecommunication Union
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests ITU’s decision to impose on him the disciplinary measure of dismissal with immediate effect.
Consideration 5
Extract:
"[F]irm and constant precedents have it that the role of the Tribunal is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt, but rather to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion and whether the decision-maker properly applied the standard when evaluating the evidence […].
It is also worth recalling that in Judgment 4579, consideration 4, the Tribunal emphasized that “[it] shall not interfere with the findings of an investigative body in disciplinary proceedings unless there was a manifest error […]” […].
With respect to the burden of proof applicable in disciplinary proceedings, it is furthermore recognized that “the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove the allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed […]."
Lastly, in respect of harassment matters such as the instant case, established precedent of the Tribunal states that the question as to whether harassment occurred must be determined in the light of a careful examination of all the objective circumstances surrounding the acts or events complained of […].”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4579
Keywords:
disciplinary measure; harassment; judicial review; role of the tribunal; sexual harassment; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 4949
139th Session, 2025
International Criminal Court
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges his summary dismissal for serious misconduct.
Consideration 10
Extract:
Dans le jugement 4749, au considérant 5, le Tribunal a rappelé ce qui suit sur la charge de la preuve qui incombe à l’organisation en matière de sanction disciplinaire, ainsi que sur le rôle du Tribunal dans l’appréciation du niveau de preuve requis:
«En matière de sanction disciplinaire, il ressort d’une jurisprudence bien établie du Tribunal que c’est à l’organisation qu’incombe la charge de prouver au-delà de tout doute raisonnable que le fonctionnaire visé est coupable des actes reprochés avant d’infliger une sanction disciplinaire. Au sujet de ce niveau de preuve, le Tribunal a notamment précisé ce qui suit dans le jugement 4362, aux considérants 7, 8 et 10:
7. [...] Le niveau de preuve requis est celui de “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable”. Dans une affaire comme le cas d’espèce, le Tribunal n’a pas pour rôle d’évaluer lui-même les éléments de preuve ni de déterminer si l’accusation de faute a été établie au-delà de tout doute raisonnable; il doit plutôt apprécier si le décideur disposait d’éléments de preuve lui permettant de parvenir à cette conclusion (voir, par exemple, le jugement 3863, au considérant 11). Une partie du rôle du Tribunal consiste à déterminer si le décideur a correctement appliqué le niveau de preuve au moment d’évaluer les éléments de preuve (voir le jugement 3863, au considérant 8).
8. Le niveau de preuve “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable” n’est pas censé créer un obstacle insurmontable qui empêcherait les organisations de sanctionner un fonctionnaire à l’issue d’une procédure disciplinaire. Il ne devrait assurément pas avoir cet effet. Le Tribunal s’est prononcé à de nombreuses reprises sur ce qui est exigé. En réalité, ce niveau de preuve est à mettre en relation avec le fait qu’une procédure disciplinaire peut souvent avoir de graves conséquences pour le fonctionnaire concerné – y compris son licenciement – et peut également porter gravement atteinte à sa réputation et à sa carrière de fonctionnaire international. Dès lors, il y a lieu d’exiger de l’organisation qu’elle ait une forte conviction que la mesure disciplinaire soit justifiée parce que la faute a été prouvée. La probabilité qu’une faute ait été commise ne suffit pas et n’offre pas une protection adéquate aux fonctionnaires internationaux. Il n’est guère utile d’affirmer, en substance, que le niveau de preuve requis correspond à la norme “de droit pénal” appliquée dans certains systèmes juridiques nationaux, et que la norme “de droit civil” appliquée dans ces mêmes systèmes conviendrait mieux en ce qu’elle implique d’apprécier les preuves selon la prépondérance des probabilités. Le niveau de preuve “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable” qui découle de la jurisprudence du Tribunal, telle qu’elle a évolué au fil des décennies, répond à un objectif propre au droit de la fonction publique internationale. [...]
10. [...] Le niveau de preuve “au-delà de tout doute raisonnable” concerne aussi bien l’établissement de faits précis que le degré global de conviction que les accusations portées contre le fonctionnaire ont été établies. En ce qui concerne la preuve de tout fait pertinent essentiel, la personne ou l’organe chargés d’apprécier les preuves et de prendre une décision au terme de la procédure disciplinaire doivent être convaincus au-delà de tout doute raisonnable qu’un fait particulier est avéré.»
(Voir également, à ce sujet, les jugements 4832, au considérant 36, 4764, au considérant 13, 4362, au considérant 10, et 4360, au considérant 11.)
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 4360, 4362, 4749, 4764, 4832
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary measure; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 4227
129th Session, 2020
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to dismiss him for misconduct.
Consideration 6
Extract:
The role of the Tribunal in a case such as the present, in relation to the question of whether the alleged conduct took place, was summarised in Judgment 3862, consideration 20. According to the well-settled case law of the Tribunal, the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgment 3649, consideration 14). It is equally well settled that the “Tribunal will not engage in a determination as to whether the burden of proof has been met, instead, the Tribunal will review the evidence to determine whether a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could properly have been made by the primary trier of fact” (see Judgment 2699, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2699, 3649, 3862
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary measure; misconduct; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 4106
127th Session, 2019
International Labour Organization
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to apply to him the sanction of discharge.
Consideration 11
Extract:
The complainant claims that the ILO failed to prove the misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt, because it did not verify the exact amount of money received by him nor did it establish how his actions “undermined the ILO’s strategy”. This claim is unfounded. As the Tribunal said in Judgment 3649, under 14, “it is useful to reiterate the well settled case law that the burden of proof rests on an organization to prove the allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction is imposed. It is equally well settled that the ‘Tribunal will not engage in a determination as to whether the burden of proof has been met, instead, the Tribunal will review the evidence to determine whether a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could properly have been made’.”
The allegations against the complainant were set out in the Investigation Report as follows:
(a) “It is alleged that [the complainant] was [the business development advisor of an EU Grant Scheme project for a Bangladeshi agro-processors’ association] and a member of three other committees of [said association], and that he received a very high fee for developing a project proposal to obtain [for the association] an EU grant.
(b) [the complainant] is also alleged to have submitted two project proposals to [said association] whereby he would be paid for acting as a master trainer.
(c) It is further alleged that [the complainant] was involved in forging the signature of the Director of CO-Dhaka [...].”
The IAO investigation found that the first two allegations (as listed above) were substantiated by the evidence compiled as well as by the complainant’s free admission of guilt. The third allegation was not substantiated and was not raised again in any further proceedings. The Tribunal finds no flaw in the evaluation of the evidence by the Director-General in reaching the conclusion that the burden of proof was met. The complainant’s assertion that the exact amount of money paid was unverified does not negate the fact that he did receive payments for outside activities without authorization from the ILO. The complainant claims the assessment of his unauthorized outside activities being contrary to the ILO’s strategy was false and based solely on a statement made by the Chief Technical Adviser who “was new and had limited knowledge of the TVET project”. The Tribunal notes that the Director-General agreed with the Chief Technical Adviser’s assessment noting that the proposals prepared by the complainant and submitted to the EU on behalf of the agro-processors’ association contradicted ILO policy in the particular field. The Tribunal also notes the Director-General’s conclusion that the complainant’s unauthorized outside activities were in a direct conflict of interest with his position as an ILO National Programme Officer, and that he is the proper authority for deciding what could potentially be considered harmful to the ILO’s interests and/or reputation.
Keywords:
burden of proof; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 4047
126th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to impose on her with immediate effect the disciplinary measure of dismissal for serious misconduct.
Considerations 6, 9 and 13
Extract:
Overall, the case law of the Tribunal is clear and consistent. It was recently referred to in Judgment 3863, consideration 8 (see, also, Judgment 3882, consideration 14, as another recent example), in which the Tribunal said:
“[A]ccording to the well-settled case law of the Tribunal, the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgment 3649, consideration 14). It is equally well settled that the ‘Tribunal will not engage in a determination as to whether the burden of proof has been met, instead, the Tribunal will review the evidence to determine whether a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could properly have been made by the primary trier of fact’ (see Judgment 2699, consideration 9).”
It is legally irrelevant, for the purposes of the Tribunal’s judicial determination of the complaint, that, as the EPO points out in the reply, the same formulation is used in the English common law to establish the standard of proof in criminal proceedings.
[...]
The test [in question] is to be applied by the decision-maker who has to decide whether there has been misconduct and the appropriate sanction. Usually that is the executive head of an organisation or her or his delegate. However it is also a test to be applied by bodies such as a disciplinary committee, though whether it does in any given case will ultimately depend on the role such a body has under the organisation’s rules. Under Article 102 of the Service Regulations for permanent employees of the Office, the Disciplinary Committee is obliged to deliver a reasoned opinion on thedisciplinary measure appropriate to the facts complained of and transmit the opinion to, in this case, the President. This could only be done if the Disciplinary Committee concluded that the staff member had, on the facts, engaged in misconduct warranting a disciplinary measure. Plainly enough, the Disciplinary Committee must be satisfied that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the misconduct occurred. There would be no utility in the Disciplinary Committee applying some other standard before reporting to the President.[...]
In some circumstances, it may be that if one of a number of sets of charges was assessed applying the appropriate standard of proof and a conclusion of guilt reached, the imposition of a particular disciplinary sanction might be justified by reference to the proof of that set of charges beyond a reasonable doubt notwithstanding the failure to apply the appropriate standard in relation to the other sets of charges. [...]
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2699, 3649, 3863, 3882
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary procedure; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 3969
125th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the EPO’s decision to impose upon her the disciplinary measure of downgrading.
Consideration 10
Extract:
The overarching legal principles in a case such as the present have recently been discussed by the Tribunal in Judgment 3862, consideration 20. The Tribunal observed:
“[A]ccording to the well-settled case law of the Tribunal, the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgment 3649, consideration 14). It is equally well settled that the ’Tribunal will not engage in a determination as to whether the burden of proof has been met, instead, the Tribunal will review the evidence to determine whether a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could properly have been made by the primary trier of fact’ (see Judgment 2699, consideration 9).”
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2699, 3649, 3862
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary procedure; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 3964
125th Session, 2018
European Patent Organisation
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant contests the decision to impose on him the disciplinary measure of dismissal for serious misconduct.
Consideration 9
Extract:
The overarching legal principles in a case such as the present have recently been discussed by the Tribunal in Judgment 3862, consideration 20. The Tribunal observed: “the executive head of an international organisation is not bound to follow the recommendation of any internal appeal body nor bound to adopt the reasoning of that body. However an executive head who departs from a recommendation of such a body must state the reasons for disregarding it and must motivate the decision actually reached. In addition, according to the well-settled case law of the Tribunal, the burden of proof rests on an organisation to prove allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see, for example, Judgment 3649, consideration 14).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 3649, 3862
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary measure; duty to substantiate decision; final decision; misconduct; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
Judgment 3649
122nd Session, 2016
International Atomic Energy Agency
Extracts: EN,
FR
Full Judgment Text: EN,
FR
Summary: The complainant impugns the decision of the Director General of the IAEA to summarily dismiss him for serious misconduct.
Consideration 14
Extract:
[I]t is useful to reiterate the well settled case law that the burden of proof rests on an organization to prove the allegations of misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction is imposed. It is equally well settled that the “Tribunal will not engage in a determination as to whether the burden of proof has been met, instead, the Tribunal will review the evidence to determine whether a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could properly have been made” (see Judgment 2699, consideration 9).
Reference(s)
ILOAT Judgment(s): 2699
Keywords:
burden of proof; disciplinary measure; evidence; misconduct; standard of proof; standard of proof in disciplinary procedure;
|
|
|
|
|
