Judicial review (538, 540, 542, 544, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 553, 555, 557, 558, 862, 559, 561, 563, 565, 569, 571, 572, 927, 841,-666)

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• Judgment 5001

  
  139th Session, 2025
  World Health Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the decision to reassign her in the context of the 2019 Mobility Exercise.

  Consideration 2

  Extract:

  As the complainant challenges a reassignment decision, the Tribunal recalls its case law which recognizes the wide discretion of an executive head of an international organization to reassign staff in the interest of the organization. So far as concerns UNAIDS, the discretion is enshrined in Article 1.2 of the Staff Regulations, which states that all staff members are subject to the authority of the executive head of the organization and to assignment by her or him to any of the activities or offices of the organization. The Tribunal has therefore stated that it may interfere with a decision to reassign a staff member only on the limited grounds that the decision was taken ultra vires or shows a formal or procedural flaw or mistake of fact or law, if some material fact was overlooked, if there was misuse of authority or an obviously wrong inference was drawn from the evidence. The Tribunal has however emphasised that the organization must show due regard, in both form and substance, for the dignity of the official concerned, particularly by providing her or him with work of the same level of responsibilities as she or he performed in the previous post and matching her or his qualifications (see Judgment 4599, consideration 19). The Tribunal has also stated, in consideration 2 of Judgment 4595, for example, that an international organization must carefully take into account the interests and dignity of staff members when effecting a transfer to which the staff member concerned is opposed. It is incumbent upon an international organization to prove that a procedure which it has put in place has been duly followed, particularly if the implementation thereof is disputed. The Tribunal has also stated that every international organization is bound by a duty of care to treat its staff members with dignity and avoid causing them undue and unnecessary injury. While the head of an international organization must take into account the organization’s interests as well as the staff member’s abilities and interests in the exercise of the discretion to transfer a staff member, in cases where the two are at odds, greater weight may be accorded by the decision-maker to the interests of the organization.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4595, 4599
  

  Keywords:

  competence of tribunal; judicial review; reassignment; role of the tribunal; transfer;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4999

  
  139th Session, 2025
  World Health Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decision to close her harassment complaint.

  Considerations 5-7

  Extract:

  [T]he consideration of the complainant’s harassment complaint illustrates that it was considered and assessed by a number of people in a variety of contexts and the initial decision of the Director General […] to close the complaint, was found generally to have been justified […] At the forefront of the complainant’s pleas in these proceedings, is an invitation to the Tribunal to review and assess the evidence and make its own findings and reach its own conclusions about whether harassment had taken place. However, it is well established in the Tribunal’s case law, it is not the Tribunal’s role to re-evaluate the evidence in a case such as the present and in the face of findings by an investigative body (see, for example, Judgment 4884, consideration 5), at least in the absence of demonstrated manifest error. Also, an internal appeals body’s report warrants considerable deference in circumstances, which exists in the present case, where the report involves a balanced and thoughtful analysis of the issues raised in the internal appeal and its conclusions and recommendations were justified and rational (see, for example, Judgment 4848, consideration 10) […] The question which immediately arises is whether the complainant, in her pleas, has established a vitiating error on the part of IOS in its investigations and reports, on the part of the GAC in its deliberations and reports, the GBA in its deliberations and report or on the part of the Director General in the exercise of his discretionary power to close the case. The short answer is that she has not.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4848, 4884
  

  Keywords:

  competence of tribunal; discretion; harassment; judicial review; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4986

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his appraisal report for 2017.

  Considerations 3 and 6

  Extract:

  [T]hese requests involve an impermissible determination by the Tribunal of what the appraisal should be. The Tribunal recalls its case law, stated, for example, in consideration 13 of Judgment 4637, referring to Judgment 4257, that its power to review appraisal reports is limited to considering, among other things, whether there was illegality in drawing up the contested report. It is not within the Tribunal’s power to change the overall assessment rating or to upgrade the evaluation of the functional and core competencies in an appraisal report (see, for example, Judgments 4788, consideration 4, 4720, consideration 4, 4719, consideration 7, and 4718, consideration 7). The Tribunal may, if necessary, set aside the contested appraisal report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  The Tribunal recalls the following statement which it made in Judgment 4564, considerations 2 and 3, concerning the limited power of review that it exercises in the matter of staff appraisals:
  “2. [...] It is not for the Tribunal, whose role is not to supplant the administrative authorities of an international organisation, to conduct an assessment of an employee’s merits instead of the competent reporting officer or the various supervisors and appeals bodies which may be called upon to revise that assessment. [...]
  3. [...] [A]ssessment of an employee’s merit during a specified period involves a value judgement; for this reason, the Tribunal must recognise the discretionary authority of the bodies responsible for conducting such an assessment. Of course, it must ascertain whether the ratings given to the employee have been determined in full conformity with the rules, but it cannot substitute its own opinion for the assessment made by these bodies of the qualities, performance and conduct of the person concerned. The Tribunal will therefore intervene only if the staff report was drawn up without authority or in breach of a rule of form or procedure, if it was based on an error of law or fact, if a material fact was overlooked, if a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority.”
  (See also Judgment 4786, consideration 4.)

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4257, 4564, 4637, 4718, 4719, 4720, 4786, 4788
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4985

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his appraisal report for 2017.

  Considerations 1 and 4

  Extract:

  The complainant’s request to order that the EPO issues a new appraisal report for 2017 in which his inability to perform his duties (due to his medical condition) be taken into account and the productivity results be assessed on that basis is rejected as the Tribunal does not issue orders of this kind. The Tribunal however observes that it may, if appropriate, set aside the contested appraisal report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  There is no authority that permits the complainant’s 2017 appraisal report to take into consideration his previous reports. The Tribunal observes that an appraisal report, the purpose of which is to assess an employee’s merits over a given period and which is drawn up according to the rules governing the evaluation exercise for the period in question, is an entirely separate document from previous appraisal reports (see, for example, Judgments 4564, consideration 6, and 1688, consideration 6).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1688, 4564
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4983

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his appraisal report for 2017.

  Considerations 3, 6 and 10

  Extract:

  The Tribunal recalls its case law, stated, for example, in consideration 13 of Judgment 4637, referring to Judgments 4564 and 4257, that its power to review appraisal reports is limited to considering, among other things, whether there was illegality in drawing up the contested report. It is not within its power to change the overall assessment rating or to upgrade the evaluation of the competencies in an appraisal report (see, for example, Judgments 4788, consideration 4, 4720, consideration 4, 4719, consideration 7, and 4718, consideration 7). The Tribunal may, if necessary, set aside the contested appraisal report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  The Tribunal recalls the following statement which it made in Judgment 4564, considerations 2 and 3, concerning the limited power of review that it exercises in the matter of staff appraisals:
  “2. [...] It is not for the Tribunal, whose role is not to supplant the administrative authorities of an international organisation, to conduct an assessment of an employee’s merits instead of the competent reporting officer or the various supervisors and appeals bodies which may be called upon to revise that assessment. [...]
  3. [...] [A]ssessment of an employee’s merit during a specified period involves a value judgement; for this reason, the Tribunal must recognise the discretionary authority of the bodies responsible for conducting such an assessment. Of course, it must ascertain whether the ratings given to the employee have been determined in full conformity with the rules, but it cannot substitute its own opinion for the assessment made by these bodies of the qualities, performance and conduct of the person concerned. The Tribunal will therefore intervene only if the staff report was drawn up without authority or in breach of a rule of form or procedure, if it was based on an error of law or fact, if a material fact was overlooked, if a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority.”
  (See also Judgment 4786, consideration 4.)
  […]
  The complainant’s assumption that his past performance should be considered is unmeritorious. There is no authority that permits the complainant’s 2017 appraisal report to take into consideration his previous reports. The Tribunal observes that an appraisal report, the purpose of which is to assess an employee’s merits over a given period and which is drawn up according to the rules governing the evaluation exercise for the period in question, is an entirely separate document from previous appraisal reports (see, for example, Judgments 4564, consideration 6, and 1688, consideration 6).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1688, 4257, 4564, 4637, 4718, 4719, 4720, 4786
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4982

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his appraisal report for 2017.

  Considerations 3 and 7

  Extract:

  The complainant’s request […] to order that his 2017 appraisal report be amended so that he receives an overall performance rating of “above the level required for the function” instead of “corresponding to the level required for the function” must be rejected as the Tribunal is not competent to issue orders of this kind. In the main, this request involves an impermissible determination by the Tribunal of what the appraisal should be. The Tribunal recalls its case law, stated, for example, in consideration 13 of Judgment 4637, referring to Judgments 4564 and 4257, that its power to review appraisal reports is limited to considering, among other things, whether there was illegality in drawing up the contested report. It is not within its power to change the overall assessment rating or to upgrade the evaluation of the competencies in an appraisal report (see, for example, Judgments 4788, consideration 4, 4720, consideration 4, 4719, consideration 7, and 4718, consideration 7). The Tribunal may, if necessary, set aside the contested appraisal report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  As the complainant challenges the impugned decision on procedural and substantive grounds, the Tribunal recalls the following statement which it made in Judgment 4564, considerations 2 and 3, concerning the limited power of review that it exercises in the matter of staff appraisals:
  
  “2. [...] It is not for the Tribunal, whose role is not to supplant the administrative authorities of an international organisation, to conduct an assessment of an employee’s merits instead of the competent reporting officer or the various supervisors and appeals bodies which may be called upon to revise that assessment. [...]
  3. [...] [A]ssessment of an employee’s merit during a specified period involves a value judgement; for this reason, the Tribunal must recognise the discretionary authority of the bodies responsible for conducting such an assessment. Of course, it must ascertain whether the ratings given to the employee have been determined in full conformity with the rules, but it cannot substitute its own opinion for the assessment made by these bodies of the qualities, performance and conduct of the person concerned. The Tribunal will therefore intervene only if the staff report was drawn up without authority or in breach of a rule of form or procedure, if it was based on an error of law or fact, if a material fact was overlooked, if a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority.”
  (See also Judgment 4786, consideration 4.)

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4257, 4564, 4637, 4718, 4719, 4720, 4786, 4788
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4981

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges her appraisal report for 2017.

  Consideration 7

  Extract:

  As the complainant challenges the impugned decision and her 2017 appraisal report, the Tribunal recalls its consistent case law according to which the power of review that it exercises in the matter of staff appraisals is a limited one. It is not for the Tribunal, whose role is not to supplant the administrative authorities of an international organisation, to conduct an assessment of an employee’s merits instead of the competent reporting officer or the various supervisors and appeals bodies which may be called upon to revise that assessment. The assessment of an employee’s merit during a specified period involves a value judgement. For this reason, the Tribunal must recognise the discretionary authority of the bodies responsible for conducting such an assessment. The Tribunal must ascertain whether the ratings given to the employee have been determined in full conformity with the rules, but it cannot substitute its own opinion for the assessment made by these bodies of the qualities, performance and conduct of the person concerned. The Tribunal will therefore intervene only if the staff report was drawn up without authority or in breach of a rule of form or procedure, if it was based on an error of law or fact, if a material fact was overlooked, if a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 4564, consideration 3). The Tribunal has also stated that this limitation on its power of review in such cases naturally applies to both the rating given in a staff report and the comments accompanying the rating (see, for example, Judgments 4720, consideration 11, 4564, consideration 3, 3945, consideration 7, and 3228, consideration 3). The Tribunal has stated as well, in consideration 6 of Judgment 1136, that, within the scope of the reporting officer’s wide discretion, it is to be presumed that the assessment of a staff member’s performance is made in good faith and in the interest of both the staff and the organisation.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1136, 3228, 3945, 4564, 4720
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4980

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his staff report for 2012-2013.

  Considerations 3, 6 and 9

  Extract:

  In light of the Tribunal’s limited scope of review, it is not within its power of review to order the amendment of the contested staff report so that the complainant receives a marking of “very good” under productivity, attitude to work and dealings with others and for his overall performance. The Tribunal may however, if appropriate, set aside the contested staff report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  In its analysis of the submissions the complainant proffered to challenge the merits of the assessment and his request for the amendment of the markings he received for productivity and attitude to work and dealings with others, as well as for the overall performance to “very good”, the Appeals Committee correctly appreciated that, pursuant to the case law, its scope of review of a performance evaluation was wider than that of the Tribunal. It cited the statements in consideration 5 of Judgment 3318 and consideration 6 of Judgment 3161, that its power of review in effect extends to the overall re-examination of all matters submitted to it, except to the extent that the internal rules which governs the Committee provide otherwise, its role being to determine whether the decision appealed is correct on the facts or whether some other decision should be made. The Committee also noted the Tribunal’s statement in consideration 6 of Judgment 1136, that, within the scope of the reporting officer’s wide discretion, it is to be presumed that the assessment of a staff member’s performance is made in good faith and in the interest of both the staff and the organisation.
  […]
  The Appeals Committee had also noted and correctly rejected the complainant’s argument which suggested, in effect, that the reporting officer erred by not considering the markings and overall performance ratings he had been awarded in previous performance evaluations. The Committee stated, correctly, that such reference was irrelevant to the subject assessment because, as a matter of principle, to be fair, every staff report has to be consistent in itself and cannot be compared with previous staff reports and must be based solely upon a staff member’s performance in each reporting period. The Committee also correctly rejected the other arguments the complainant proffered to support his request for the amendment of the subject markings and overall performance rating, which are based on his subjective opinions. Those arguments did not engage the scope of the Committee’s power of review and of the Tribunal’s power of review recalled in Judgment 4977, consideration 2. They are therefore unfounded, as is the complainant’s claim for moral damages for the “wrongful report” consequentially.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1136, 3161, 3318, 4977
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4979

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his staff report for 2012-2013.

  Considerations 4 and 6-7

  Extract:

  In light of the limited scope of the review the Tribunal exercises over staff reports the Tribunal may, if appropriate, set aside the contested staff report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  In its opinion, the Appeals Committee correctly appreciated that its scope of review of a staff appraisal was wider than that of the Tribunal. This was by reference to the case law stated in consideration 5 of Judgment 3318, considerations 5 to 8 of Judgment 3161 and consideration 6 of Judgment 3703 to the effect that it would commit an error of law if it restricts its review by reference to the scope of the Tribunal’s power of review. The Committee noted, in particular, that the case law required it to scrutinize the performance evaluation much more closely to determine whether the reporting officer had exercised her or his discretion lawfully and that its power of review extended to the overall re-examination of all matters submitted to it concerning the contested staff report. This was except to the extent that the internal rules which governs it (the Committee) provides otherwise, its role being to determine whether the decision appealed is correct on the facts or whether some other decision should be made.
  The Tribunal is satisfied that the Appeals Committee properly exercised its power of review.

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4978

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges her staff report for 2012.

  Considerations 6 and 13

  Extract:

  The complainant’s requests that the Tribunal decides the case and not refer it back to the EPO invites the Tribunal to determine the markings she should be awarded under each head of evaluation and the overall performance rating. The request is rejected by reference to the general principles recalled in Judgment 4977, consideration 2. The evaluation of a staff member’s performance falls within the discretion of the officers charged with conducting it. Since the Tribunal will not substitute its own assessment for that made by the persons or bodies responsible for assessing an employee’s merits, the request would involve an impermissible determination by the Tribunal of what the appraisal should be (see, recently, Judgments 4893, consideration 5, and 4786, consideration 1). The Tribunal however observes that it may, if appropriate, set aside the contested staff report at the same time as the impugned decision and remit the matter to the EPO for review.
  […]
  The complainant’s challenge to the merits of the contested staff report is also unfounded. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Appeals Committee undertook a detailed, balanced, coherent and persuasive analysis of the evaluation made in the staff report and the methodology adopted. The Committee addressed in some detail the markings the complainant’s reporting and countersigning officers awarded in the contested staff report and reasonably concluded that their evaluation was flawed to the extent that the comments made in the category attitude to work and dealings with others were unbalanced and thereupon recommended the staff report be set aside in that respect. The Tribunal determines that the Committee, which in its opinion noted the discretion which a reporting officer enjoys in conducting an assessment, properly acted within its review powers when it so concluded.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4786, 4893, 4977
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4977

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges her staff report for 2012-2013.

  Consideration 2

  Extract:

  As the complainant challenges the impugned decision on procedural and substantive grounds, the Tribunal recalls its consistent case law according to which the power of review that it exercises in the matter of staff appraisals is a limited one. It is not for the Tribunal, whose role is not to supplant the administrative authorities of an international organisation, to conduct an assessment of an employee’s merits instead of the competent reporting officer or the various supervisors and appeals bodies which may be called upon to revise that assessment. The assessment of an employee’s merit during a specified period involves a value judgement. For this reason, the Tribunal must recognise the discretionary authority of the bodies responsible for conducting such an assessment. The Tribunal must ascertain whether the ratings given to the employee have been determined in full conformity with the rules, but it cannot substitute its own opinion for the assessment made by these bodies of the qualities, performance and conduct of the person concerned. The Tribunal will therefore intervene only if the staff report was drawn up without authority or in breach of a rule of form or procedure, if it was based on an error of law or fact, if a material fact was overlooked, if a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 4564, consideration 3). The Tribunal has also stated that this limitation on its power of review in such cases naturally applies to both the rating given in a staff report and the comments accompanying the rating (see, for example, Judgments 4720, consideration 11, 4564, consideration 3, 3945, consideration 7, and 3228, consideration 3). The Tribunal has stated as well, in consideration 6 of Judgment 1136, that, within the scope of the reporting officer’s wide discretion, it is to be presumed that the assessment of a staff member’s performance is made in good faith and in the interest of both the staff and the organisation.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1136, 3228, 3945, 4564, 4720
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; performance evaluation; performance report; rating; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4971

  
  139th Session, 2025
  World Intellectual Property Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests his dismissal from service for misconduct.

  Consideration 5

  Extract:

  In his further arguments, the complainant tries to establish that the impugned decision and the disciplinary decision are substantially flawed. He specifically contests all the counts he was charged with.
  Before addressing the complainant’s arguments concerning each charge, it is appropriate to recall the scope of the Tribunal’s review in disciplinary matters and the standard of evidence required for disciplinary convictions.
  Firstly, the Tribunal shall not interfere with the findings of an investigative body in disciplinary proceedings unless there was a manifest error (see Judgments 4770, consideration 12, 4745, consideration 5, 4579, consideration 4, 4460, consideration 8, and the additional cases quoted therein).
  In disciplinary matters, the Tribunal has consistently found that the burden of proof rests on an organization, which has to prove allegations of misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before a disciplinary sanction can be imposed (see Judgment 4749, consideration 5). The role of the Tribunal is not to assess the evidence itself and determine whether the charge of misconduct has been established beyond reasonable doubt but rather to assess whether there was evidence available to the relevant decision-maker to reach that conclusion (see Judgment 4362, consideration 7). Part of the Tribunal’s role is to assess whether the decision-maker properly applied the standard when evaluating the evidence (see Judgment 3863, consideration 8).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3863, 4362, 4460, 4579, 4745, 4749, 4770
  

  Keywords:

  beyond reasonable doubt; burden of proof; disciplinary measure; judicial review;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4964

  
  139th Session, 2025
  World Intellectual Property Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the decision, taken following an investigation, to dismiss her complaint of harassment and sexual harassment against Mr E.

  Consideration 11

  Extract:

  [I]t is appropriate to note the approach of the Tribunal to findings of fact made by investigative bodies particularly where individuals have been interviewed by the investigator. The Tribunal gives deference to the body and its findings of fact and will only interfere with its findings in the case of manifest error (see, for example, Judgment 4674, consideration 5). That is not to suggest that conclusions reached from the facts as found, particularly if they involve a legal element, are to be afforded the same status.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4674
  

  Keywords:

  competence of tribunal; investigation; judicial review; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4953

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Atomic Energy Agency
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to extend her fixed-term appointment.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  The Tribunal recognizes the wide discretion an international organization enjoys under such provisions, whether contained in an international organization’s regulatory regime or in a staff member’s letter of appointment, in deciding whether or not to renew a fixed-term appointment. The Tribunal respects an organization’s discretion to determine its own requirements and the career prospects of staff. However, the discretion is not unfettered but is subject to only limited review. The Tribunal will normally set aside a decision not to renew or extend an appointment if taken without authority; in breach of a rule of form or of procedure; if the decision rested on an error of fact or of law; if some essential fact was overlooked; if there was abuse of authority, or if clearly mistaken conclusions were drawn from the evidence (see Judgment 4503, consideration 7). The Tribunal’s role in reviewing a decision not to renew a fixed-term contract for budgetary reasons is limited (see, for example, Judgments 4834, consideration 2, and 3367, consideration 11).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3367, 4503, 4834
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; judicial review; non-renewal of contract; role of the tribunal;
  

  Consideration 23

  Extract:

  The Tribunal further recalls its case law, stated, for example in consideration 5 of Judgment 4674, that it is not its role to reweigh the evidence before an internal appeal body which, as the primary trier of fact has had the benefit of actually seeing and hearing many of the persons involved, and of assessing the reliability of what they have said and for that reason the body is entitled to considerable deference. So that where such a body has heard evidence and made findings of fact based on its appreciation thereof, the Tribunal will only interfere in the case of manifest error.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4674
  

  Keywords:

  internal appeals body; judicial review; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4948

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Criminal Court
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: Le requérant conteste la décision de le suspendre de ses fonctions avec maintien de son traitement et avec effet immédiat.

  Considerations 9 and 15

  Extract:

  [I]l convient de rappeler qu’il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante du Tribunal que la suspension est une décision de nature discrétionnaire, qui ne peut faire l’objet que d’un contrôle restreint. Ainsi, dans le jugement 4658, au considérant 2, le Tribunal a souligné en particulier ce qui suit à cet égard:
  «2. Comme le Tribunal l’a relevé à diverses reprises, une mesure de suspension, avec ou sans maintien du traitement, décidée dans le cadre d’une procédure disciplinaire, est une mesure provisoire qui ne préjuge en rien de la décision sur le fond relative à une éventuelle sanction disciplinaire prononcée à l’encontre du fonctionnaire concerné.
  [...]
  Une telle décision relève du pouvoir d’appréciation du chef exécutif de l’organisation. Elle ne peut donc faire l’objet de la part du Tribunal que d’un contrôle restreint et ne sera annulée que si elle émane d’une autorité incompétente, viole une règle de forme ou de procédure, repose sur une erreur de droit ou de fait, omet de tenir compte de faits essentiels, est entachée de détournement de pouvoir, ou s’il a été tiré du dossier des conclusions manifestement erronées (voir, notamment, les jugements 4586, au considérant 8, 4519, au considérant 2, 4452, au considérant 7, 3037, au considérant 9, 3035, au considérant 10, 2698, au considérant 9, et 2365, au considérant 4 a)).
  [...]
  Enfin, si l’autorité peut prendre une mesure de suspension lorsqu’elle considère, sur la base d’éléments portés à sa connaissance et selon son appréciation, que l’accusation de faute formulée contre un fonctionnaire est légitime, point n’est cependant besoin, à ce stade, d’apporter la preuve que les accusations sont fondées (voir, notamment, les jugements 3036, au considérant 13, 3035, au considérant 14 a), et 2698, au considérant 11).»
  (Voir également les jugements 4612, au considérant 3, 4586, aux considérants 8 et 11, 4361, aux considérants 7 et 11, 4359, aux considérants 7 et 11, 3496, au considérant 2, et 3035, au considérant 10.)
  Dans ce jugement 4658, au même considérant, le Tribunal a toutefois précisé qu’en tant que mesure contraignante à l’égard du fonctionnaire visé, la suspension doit par ailleurs se fonder sur une base légale, être justifiée par les besoins de l’organisation et être prise dans le respect du principe de proportionnalité (voir également, à ce sujet, le jugement 4612, au considérant 3). Le Tribunal a ainsi rappelé qu’il est nécessaire qu’une faute grave soit reprochée au fonctionnaire pour qu’une mesure de suspension puisse être prononcée (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4519, au considérant 2, 3035, au considérant 10, et 2365, au considérant 4 a)). En outre, le Tribunal a souligné que, pour apprécier la légalité d’une mesure de suspension, il doit déterminer si les conditions requises pour prendre une telle mesure étaient réunies au moment où elle a été ordonnée, les faits postérieurs ne pouvant pas être pris en considération (voir, à ce sujet, les jugements 3036, au considérant 13, 3035, au considérant 12, et 2365, au considérant 4 c)).
  […] Ainsi que l’a déjà rappelé le Tribunal, notamment dans les jugements 4658, au considérant 2, précité, et 2698, au considérant 11, une organisation peut prendre une mesure de suspension lorsqu’elle considère, sur la base d’éléments portés à sa connaissance et selon son appréciation, que l’accusation de faute formulée contre un fonctionnaire est légitime, et ce, sans devoir pour autant apporter à cette étape la preuve que les accusations sont fondées.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 2698, 4612, 4658
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; judicial review; suspension;
  

  Consideration 19

  Extract:

  S’agissant du troisième moyen du requérant, portant sur la violation alléguée des devoirs de sollicitude, de protection et de bonne foi de la CPI, ce dernier invoque diverses circonstances entourant la décision de suspension et sa mise en application afin de soutenir qu’il y aurait eu manquement à ces devoirs de la part de l’organisation dans les faits. Mais le Tribunal considère qu’au regard de toutes ces circonstances, l’intéressé n’établit pas de violation ou d’erreur qui relève du contrôle restreint auquel il est astreint et qui pourraient justifier son intervention quant à l’exercice du pouvoir d’appréciation du chef exécutif de l’organisation pour appliquer une suspension avec maintien du traitement et avec effet immédiat, ainsi que cela a été fait en l’espèce.
  D’abord, le Tribunal a déjà expliqué en quoi la mesure de suspension était justifiée. La mauvaise application alléguée du principe de proportionnalité ne saurait donc constituer un manquement de la CPI à son devoir de sollicitude.
  Ensuite, le requérant n’a pas établi un manquement de l’organisation à ses obligations en raison de la durée déraisonnable de la suspension, de sa publicité ou de sa soudaineté. Ainsi qu’il ressort du rapport de la Commission de recours et de la décision attaquée, à la date où cette dernière a été rendue, soit le 4 mai 2022, la durée de la suspension s’expliquait par la procédure de recours interne qui avait requis un premier examen par le Mécanisme et ensuite un processus devant la Commission de recours. Le délai d’environ sept mois qui s’est écoulé entre la date de l’application de la mesure et celle de la décision attaquée n’apparaît pas en soi déraisonnable et, au-delà de sa seule affirmation, l’intéressé n’établit pas en quoi cela pourrait être le cas. Le Tribunal ajoute que, dans le cadre de la présente requête, il n’est saisi que de la décision portant sur l’application de la mesure de suspension initiale d’une durée de trois mois, et non des deux décisions subséquentes de prolongation de cette suspension pour des durées respectives additionnelles de trois mois chacune. Dans le jugement 4658, au considérant 2, le Tribunal a relevé que, lorsqu’une mesure de suspension a été prolongée, c’est son rôle de déterminer si les conditions de chaque décision de prolongation sont remplies au moment où cette décision est prise (voir également à ce sujet le jugement 4586, au considérant 11). Il s’ensuit qu’il s’agit là de décisions définitives qui sont distinctes et qui, le cas échéant, doivent faire l’objet de requêtes distinctes.
  Par ailleurs, il n’y a pas lieu non plus de conclure que l’organisation aurait diffusé la décision de suspendre l’intéressé aux collègues de ce dernier ou à l’extérieur de la CPI de manière à porter atteinte à son intégrité professionnelle. Le Tribunal a déjà reconnu que le fait d’informer les fonctionnaires d’un département d’une mesure imposée peut parfois être nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l’organisation (voir, par exemple, le jugement 4237, au considérant 9). Le Tribunal considère que la manière dont l’annonce de la décision de suspendre le requérant a été faite demeurait adéquate dans les circonstances de l’espèce, ainsi que l’a d’ailleurs relevé la Commission de recours dans son rapport.
  En ce qui concerne la circonstance que le requérant a été escorté hors des locaux de la Cour immédiatement après la décision de le suspendre, aucun élément de preuve versé au dossier ne vient appuyer l’assertion selon laquelle la mesure aurait été mise à exécution de manière déraisonnable. Là encore, dans le jugement 4831, au considérant 10, s’appuyant sur un jugement antérieur (voir le jugement 3649, au considérant 13), le Tribunal a rappelé que, si le fait d’être escorté hors des locaux de l’organisation peut être ressenti comme une expérience humiliante, procéder ainsi est parfois justifié et, en l’absence de conduite des représentants de l’organisation qui exacerberait cette humiliation (par exemple, en faisant escorter le fonctionnaire hors des bureaux par le personnel de sécurité), cela relève simplement de bonnes pratiques de gestion au même titre que le sont la désactivation immédiate du compte de messagerie ou l’interdiction d’accès aux installations de l’organisation.
  Quant à la notification de la décision de suspension en remettant au requérant une notification écrite de celle-ci à son domicile, l’organisation a raison de souligner que ce document lui a été remis en main propre à son domicile afin de s’assurer qu’il le reçoive en temps utile et compte tenu du contexte où il ne se trouvait dorénavant plus dans les locaux de l’organisation. Ni les écritures ni les pièces dossier n’appuient l’affirmation du requérant selon laquelle la notification aurait été d’une extrême violence pour lui et sa famille du fait qu’elle aurait eu lieu au moment où sa fille était de retour de l’école.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3649, 4237, 4586, 4658
  

  Keywords:

  duty of care; judicial review; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4935

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Organization for Migration
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decisions to abolish his position and terminate his appointment.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  Firm precedent has it that in order to achieve greater efficiency or to make budgetary savings international organisations may undertake restructuring entailing the redefinition of posts and staff reductions. However, each and every individual decision adopted in the context of such restructuring must respect all the pertinent legal rules and in particular the fundamental rights of the staff concerned (see, for example, Judgment 3238, consideration 7). The case law also states that decisions concerning restructuring within an international organisation, including the abolition of posts, may be taken at the discretion of the executive head of the organisation and are consequently subject to only limited review. Accordingly, the Tribunal will ascertain whether such decisions are taken in accordance with the relevant rules on competence, form or procedure, whether they rest upon a mistake of fact or law, or whether they constituted abuse of authority. The Tribunal will not rule on the appropriateness of the restructuring, as it will not substitute the organisation’s view with its own (see, for example, Judgment 4004, consideration 2). Nevertheless, any decision to abolish a post must be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 3582, consideration 6).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3238, 3582, 4004
  

  Keywords:

  abolition of post; discretion; duty of care; duty to substantiate decision; executive head; judicial review; limits; reorganisation;
  

  Considerations 17-19

  Extract:

  [T]he complainant submits that, contrary to the case law, the internal appeal process was flawed and the Administration violated its duty to provide him with an effective internal appeal remedy because the JARB failed to examine the substance of his arguments. […]
  [He] argues that the JARB “explicitly refused” to rule on whether the Administration violated its duty to reassign him, with the result that the impugned decision which accepted the JARB’s report was incomplete and flawed. […]
  […] In the present case, the JARB considered the pleas the complainant proffered in his internal appeal and rejected his submission that the obligation to find a possible reassignment for him had not been met by IOM. Notwithstanding that the JARB’s analysis of the complainant’s pleas was brief and concise, it was sufficiently clear, understandable and adequate to permit the complainant to pursue his complaint before the Tribunal.

  Keywords:

  appointment without competition; duty of care; judicial review; reassignment; report of the internal appeals body; right of appeal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4924

  
  139th Session, 2025
  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: Le requérant conteste son licenciement pour motif disciplinaire.

  Considerations 7-10

  Extract:

  Toutefois, le Tribunal estime qu’il ne peut pour autant être tenu pour établi au-delà de tout doute raisonnable que la plainte ainsi déposée ait constitué une dénonciation calomnieuse. Une plainte ne saurait en effet être ainsi qualifiée que si elle a été introduite de mauvaise foi. Or, en l’espèce, aucun élément de preuve versé au dossier ne permet d’affirmer avec certitude que le requérant avait clairement conscience, lorsqu’il a formé sa plainte pour propos mensongers dirigée contre M. Do., de la fausseté des accusations contenues dans celle-ci.
  […] Le Tribunal relève d’abord, à cet égard, que, dans la décision de licenciement […], cette tentative de fraude est présentée tantôt comme une faute distincte de la dénonciation calomnieuse […] tantôt comme la circonstance aggravante d’une faute unique que constituerait cette dénonciation calomnieuse. La confusion résultant de cette ambiguïté n’est pas admissible dans une décision telle qu’une sanction disciplinaire – et, qui plus est, une révocation –, dont les motifs doivent être définis avec une particulière rigueur.
  Mais cette seconde charge ne pouvait de toute façon être retenue. Il ressort en effet des termes mêmes de la qualification de cette dernière que la tentative de fraude reprochée au requérant était «matérialisée par [la] dénonciation calomnieuse» qui lui était par ailleurs imputée. Dès lors que le Tribunal estime, comme il a été dit au considérant précédent, que cette dénonciation calomnieuse n’est elle-même pas établie, la tentative de fraude en question se trouve privée, par voie de conséquence, de son élément constitutif essentiel.
  Au surplus, la faute tenant au dépôt d’une plainte abusive n’aurait pu légalement justifier, en elle-même, l’infliction d’une sanction disciplinaire aussi lourde qu’un licenciement.
  Il résulte de la jurisprudence du Tribunal que, si l’autorité investie du pouvoir disciplinaire au sein d’une organisation internationale dispose d’un pouvoir d’appréciation quant au choix de la sanction infligée à l’un de ses fonctionnaires à raison d’une faute commise par celui-ci, sa décision doit cependant, dans tous les cas, respecter le principe de proportionnalité qui s’impose en la matière (voir notamment les jugements 4457, au considérant 20, 3944, au considérant 12, 3927, au considérant 13, ou 3640, au considérant 29).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3640, 3927, 3944, 4457
  

  Keywords:

  bad faith; burden of proof; disciplinary measure; discretion; judicial review; proportionality;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4917

  
  139th Session, 2025
  United Nations Industrial Development Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the non-extension of her fixed-term appointment.

  Consideration 12

  Extract:

  It is pertinent to recall the Tribunal’s well-established case law concerning the non-renewal of fixed-term appointments. The case law has often reiterated that a staff member appointed on a fixed-term contract does not have a right to the renewal of the contract, when it expires (see, for example, Judgments 4587, consideration 19, 4462, consideration 18, 3586, consideration 6, and 3448, consideration 7). The non-renewal of a fixed-term contract may be lawfully justified by the abolition of the post in the context of a restructuring process, provided that the abolition of the post be based on objective and valid grounds, as the abolition of a post must not serve as a pretext for removing unwanted staff, which would constitute an abuse of authority (see Judgments 4841, consideration 4, and 3940, consideration 3). Decisions concerning the non-renewal of a fixed-term contract, the abolition of a post, and/or a restructuring process, are discretionary decisions subject to limited review by the Tribunal. A restructuring decision must be justified by real needs (see Judgment 4009, consideration 15). The Tribunal does not rule on the appropriateness of a restructuring process, unless and until it negatively affects a staff member in breach of staff rules and regulations (see Judgment 4841, consideration 4).
  The Tribunal has also stated that it is often the case in a challenge to a decision to abolish a post that the aggrieved staff member, in this case the complainant, will develop arguments, often at length, as to how the restructuring might have been done differently and without the consequence of their post being abolished, but whether it could have been done differently is usually beside the point. It is sufficient for the organisation to point to legitimate reasons for the action actually taken (see Judgment 4036, consideration 15).
  Moreover, the case law also requires that the reason for the non-renewal must be valid (and not an excuse to get rid of a staff member) and be notified within a reasonable time (see Judgments 4503, consideration 7, 3769, consideration 7, 3626, consideration 12, 3586, consideration 10, and 3582, consideration 9). However, the case law does not require that reasons be stated in the text that give notice of the non-extension (see Judgments 3837, consideration 10, and 1750, consideration 6). The reasons may emerge at some later time and even during the course of the appeal proceedings so long as the staff member is fittingly permitted to reply (see Judgments 3837, consideration 10, and 1817, consideration 6). Further, it is sufficient if the reasons emerge orally in a meeting or discussion (see, for example, Judgment 3837, consideration 10).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1750, 1817, 3448, 3582, 3586, 3626, 3769, 3837, 3940, 4009, 4036, 4462, 4503, 4587, 4841
  

  Keywords:

  abolition of post; discretion; judicial review; motivation; non-renewal of contract; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4916

  
  139th Session, 2025
  Energy Charter Conference
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests her Performance Appraisal Report for the period from 1 November 2019 to 31 October 2020 and the decision not to renew her appointment due to unsatisfactory performance and loss of trust.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  It must be recalled that the Tribunal has consistently held that a decision not to renew the appointment of a staff member of an international organisation lies within the discretion of its executive head and is therefore subject to only limited review. It may be set aside only if it was taken without authority, or in breach of a rule of form or of procedure, or was based on a mistake of fact or of law, or if some essential fact was overlooked, or if clearly mistaken conclusions were drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 4654, consideration 16). However, under the Tribunal’s case law applicable to contractual relationships generally, a decision not to renew a contract must be based on objective, valid reasons, and not on arbitrary or irrational ones (see, for example, Judgments 4495, consideration 15, 3769, consideration 7, 3353, consideration 15, and 1128, consideration 2).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1128, 3353, 3769, 4495, 4654
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; duty to substantiate decision; executive head; judicial review; limits; non-renewal of contract;
  

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  The Tribunal also recalls its well-established case law regarding its limited power of review of decisions relating to performance evaluations. As stated in Judgment 4267, consideration 4, “assessment of merit is an exercise that involves a value judgement, signifying that persons may quite reasonably hold different views on the matter in issue. Moreover, because of the nature of a value judgement, the grounds on which a decision involving a judgement of that kind may be reviewed are limited to those applicable to discretionary decisions. Thus, the Tribunal will only interfere if the decision was taken without authority, if it was based on an error of law or fact, a material fact was overlooked, or a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts, if it was taken in breach of a rule of form or procedure, or if there was an abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgments 3006, consideration 7, and 3062, consideration 3) [...]”.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3006, 3062, 4267
  

  Keywords:

  judicial review; limits; performance; performance evaluation; performance report;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4904

  
  138th Session, 2024
  European Organization for Nuclear Research
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the decision not to recognise that he was suffering from disability.

  Consideration 2

  Extract:

  [A]ccording to [the Tribunal's] case law, while it may not replace the medical findings of a body such as an invalidity board with its own assessment, it does have full competence to say whether there was due process and to examine whether the board’s opinion shows any material mistake or inconsistency, overlooks some essential fact or plainly misreads the evidence (see, in particular, Judgments 4709, consideration 4, 4585, consideration 10, 4473, consideration 13, 4237, consideration 5, 3994, consideration 5, 2996, consideration 11, 2361, consideration 9, and 1284, consideration 4).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1284, 2361, 2996, 3994, 4237, 4473, 4585, 4709
  

  Keywords:

  invalidity; judicial review; medical board; role of the tribunal;
  

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