Discretion (547, 548, 549, 550, 551,-666)

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• Judgment 4999

  
  139th Session, 2025
  World Health Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decision to close her harassment complaint.

  Considerations 5-7

  Extract:

  [T]he consideration of the complainant’s harassment complaint illustrates that it was considered and assessed by a number of people in a variety of contexts and the initial decision of the Director General […] to close the complaint, was found generally to have been justified […] At the forefront of the complainant’s pleas in these proceedings, is an invitation to the Tribunal to review and assess the evidence and make its own findings and reach its own conclusions about whether harassment had taken place. However, it is well established in the Tribunal’s case law, it is not the Tribunal’s role to re-evaluate the evidence in a case such as the present and in the face of findings by an investigative body (see, for example, Judgment 4884, consideration 5), at least in the absence of demonstrated manifest error. Also, an internal appeals body’s report warrants considerable deference in circumstances, which exists in the present case, where the report involves a balanced and thoughtful analysis of the issues raised in the internal appeal and its conclusions and recommendations were justified and rational (see, for example, Judgment 4848, consideration 10) […] The question which immediately arises is whether the complainant, in her pleas, has established a vitiating error on the part of IOS in its investigations and reports, on the part of the GAC in its deliberations and reports, the GBA in its deliberations and report or on the part of the Director General in the exercise of his discretionary power to close the case. The short answer is that she has not.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4848, 4884
  

  Keywords:

  competence of tribunal; discretion; harassment; judicial review; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4963

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: La requérante – dont le poste a été supprimé – conteste la décision de l’assigner à un nouveau poste, tout en la rétrogradant de deux grades, celle de l’affecter de manière temporaire à un autre poste avec effet rétroactif et celle de rejeter sa candidature dans le cadre d’une procédure de concours.

  Considerations 9 and 13

  Extract:

  Le Tribunal rappelle que, selon sa jurisprudence constante, la décision d’une organisation internationale de procéder à une nomination relève du pouvoir d’appréciation de son chef exécutif. Une telle décision ne peut, en conséquence, faire l’objet que d’un contrôle restreint et ne peut être annulée que si elle émane d’une autorité incompétente, repose sur une erreur de droit ou de fait, omet de tenir compte d’un fait essentiel, tire du dossier des conclusions manifestement erronées, viole une règle de forme ou de procédure ou est entachée de détournement de pouvoir (voir, notamment, les jugements 4552, au considérant 2, 3652, au considérant 7, et 3537, au considérant 10).
  Cependant, toute personne qui s’est portée candidate à un poste qu’une organisation a décidé de pourvoir par voie de concours a le droit de voir sa candidature examinée dans le respect de la bonne foi et des principes fondamentaux assurant une concurrence loyale entre les candidats. Ce droit appartient à tout candidat, indépendamment de ses possibilités réelles d’obtenir le poste à pourvoir (voir, par exemple, les jugements 3652, au considérant 7, 3209, au considérant 11, et 2163, au considérant 1). Il ressort également de la jurisprudence que toute organisation doit se conformer aux règles régissant la sélection des candidats et que, lorsque la procédure se révèle viciée, le Tribunal peut annuler toute nomination qui en a résulté, étant entendu que l’organisation devra tenir le candidat retenu indemne de tout préjudice pouvant résulter de l’annulation d’une nomination qu’il a acceptée de bonne foi (voir les jugements 3652, au considérant 7, et 3130, aux considérants 10 et 11).
  […]
  L’Organisation ayant toutefois manqué à certains de ses devoirs au cours de la procédure de concours et du traitement du recours interne introduit en la matière, la requérante est en droit de se voir octroyer des dommages-intérêts pour le tort moral subi en raison de ces irrégularités.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 2163, 3130, 3209, 3537, 3652, 4552
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; organisation's duties; selection procedure;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4962

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: La requérante conteste l’évaluation de ses performances pour l’année 2019, ainsi que les décisions subséquentes de «geler» son avancement d’échelon et de la soumettre à un plan d’amélioration de ses performances.

  Considerations 7 and 13-14

  Extract:

  [L]e Tribunal rappelle […] sa jurisprudence constante selon laquelle l’évaluation des mérites d’un fonctionnaire au cours d’une période déterminée fait appel à un jugement de valeur, ce qui exige de sa part qu’il respecte le pouvoir d’appréciation des organes chargés de procéder à une telle évaluation. Si le Tribunal doit certes contrôler si les notes attribuées au fonctionnaire ont été à tous égards régulièrement établies, il ne lui appartient cependant pas de substituer sa propre appréciation à celle des personnes et/ou organes chargés de procéder à l’évaluation des membres du personnel d’une organisation internationale. Le Tribunal n’interviendra en conséquence que si un tel rapport émane d’une autorité incompétente, a été établi en violation d’une règle de forme ou de procédure, repose sur une erreur de droit ou de fait, omet de tenir compte d’un fait essentiel, tire du dossier des conclusions manifestement erronées, ou est entaché de détournement de pouvoir (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4564, aux considérants 3 et 8, 4258, au considérant 2, 3692, au considérant 8, 3268, au considérant 9, 3228, au considérant 3, 3062, au considérant 3, et 1688, au considérant 5).
  […]
  [L]e Tribunal relève d’abord que la circonstance que les membres du Comité des rapports ont formulé des considérations parfois divergentes au cours de leurs discussions tend, contrairement à ce qu’affirme la requérante, à conduire à la conclusion que ces membres ont bien rempli leurs fonctions de manière indépendante et impartiale.
  […]
  Le Tribunal en conclut que, si les opinions des membres du Comité des rapports ont pu diverger au cours des discussions, il n’en reste pas moins que leur recommandation finale a été formulée à l’unanimité.
  Enfin, le Tribunal estime que le Directeur général a pu, dans le cadre du large pouvoir d’appréciation dont il dispose en la matière, considérer que l’établissement d’un plan d’amélioration des performances destiné à permettre à la requérante de rectifier sa conduite au sein de l’Organisation était plus indiqué qu’une simple mutation de l’intéressée.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1688, 3062, 3228, 3268, 3692, 4258, 4564
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; performance evaluation; rating;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4960

  
  139th Session, 2025
  European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: La requérante conteste, d’une part, la décision de ne pas la promouvoir lors de l’exercice annuel de promotion de 2018 et, d’autre part, le refus d’examiner un reclassement de son poste. Elle se plaint également d’une discrimination fondée sur le genre.

  Consideration 17

  Extract:

  Le Tribunal tient tout d’abord à rappeler que, à la différence d’une promotion, un reclassement du poste occupé par un membre d’une organisation internationale touche nécessairement à la structure de l’organisation concernée et est, de ce fait, tributaire de l’organisation générale du service (voir en ce sens, notamment, le jugement 1207, au considérant 9). Il est également de jurisprudence constante que tant le classement que le reclassement d’un poste au sein d’une organisation internationale est laissé à l’appréciation du chef exécutif de cette organisation et que le Tribunal ne réexaminera toute décision prise en la matière que pour des motifs limités (voir, notamment, les jugements 4685 (reclassement d’un poste), aux considérants 4 et 5, et 4186 (classement d’un poste), au considérant 6). Dans le jugement 3589, au considérant 4, le Tribunal a ainsi considéré que «les décisions de classement ne peuvent en principe être annulées que si elles ont été prises par une autorité incompétente, si elles sont entachées d’un vice de forme ou de procédure, si elles reposent sur une erreur de fait ou de droit, si des faits essentiels n’ont pas été pris en compte, si elles sont entachées de détournement de pouvoir ou si des conclusions manifestement erronées ont été tirées du dossier (voir, par exemple, les jugements 1647, au considérant 7, et 1067, au considérant 2). En effet, le classement des postes appelle nécessairement un jugement de valeur quant à la nature et à l’étendue des tâches et responsabilités qui y sont afférentes, et il n’appartient pas au Tribunal de procéder à une telle évaluation (voir, par exemple, le jugement 3294, au considérant 8).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1067, 1207, 1647, 3294, 3589, 4186, 4685
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; post classification; reclassification;
  

  Consideration 7

  Extract:

  Le Tribunal rappelle toutefois que, selon sa jurisprudence constante, les fonctionnaires n’ont pas automatiquement droit à une promotion (voir les jugements 4391, au considérant 4, 4290, au considérant 8, 4066, au considérant 3, 3495, au considérant 11, et 1016, au considérant 3), une organisation jouissant en effet d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation en matière de promotion du personnel. Pour cette raison, les décisions qu’elle prend dans ce domaine ne peuvent faire l’objet que d’un contrôle limité du Tribunal, qui n’intervient que si la décision émane d’une autorité incompétente, repose sur une erreur de droit ou de fait, omet de tenir compte d’un fait essentiel, tire du dossier des conclusions manifestement inexactes, viole une règle de forme ou de procédure ou est entachée de détournement de pouvoir (voir les jugements 4480, au considérant 13, 4391, au considérant 4, 4290, au considérant 8, 4281, au considérant 2, 4252, au considérant 4, 4066, au considérant 3, et 2835, au considérant 5). En outre, le Tribunal a précisé que, dès lors que l’appréciation d’une candidature à une promotion fait appel à un jugement de valeur, il n’a pas vocation à interférer dans ce processus décisionnel, sauf si celui-ci présente de graves imperfections (voir les jugements 4895, au considérant 3, 4391, au considérant 4, 4290, au considérant 8, 4066, au considérant 3, et 1827, au considérant 6). La violation d’une règle de procédure n’en reste pas moins un vice susceptible de justifier l’annulation d’une décision de ne pas promouvoir un fonctionnaire (voir les jugements 4391, au considérant 4, 4290, au considérant 8, 4066, au considérant 3, et 1109, au considérant 4).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1016, 1109, 1827, 2835, 3495, 4066, 4252, 4281, 4290, 4391, 4391, 4480, 4895
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; promotion;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4953

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Atomic Energy Agency
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decision not to extend her fixed-term appointment.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  The Tribunal recognizes the wide discretion an international organization enjoys under such provisions, whether contained in an international organization’s regulatory regime or in a staff member’s letter of appointment, in deciding whether or not to renew a fixed-term appointment. The Tribunal respects an organization’s discretion to determine its own requirements and the career prospects of staff. However, the discretion is not unfettered but is subject to only limited review. The Tribunal will normally set aside a decision not to renew or extend an appointment if taken without authority; in breach of a rule of form or of procedure; if the decision rested on an error of fact or of law; if some essential fact was overlooked; if there was abuse of authority, or if clearly mistaken conclusions were drawn from the evidence (see Judgment 4503, consideration 7). The Tribunal’s role in reviewing a decision not to renew a fixed-term contract for budgetary reasons is limited (see, for example, Judgments 4834, consideration 2, and 3367, consideration 11).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3367, 4503, 4834
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; judicial review; non-renewal of contract; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4949

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Criminal Court
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: Le requérant conteste son renvoi sans préavis pour faute grave.

  Considerations 20-24

  Extract:

  S’agissant du deuxième moyen que soulève le requérant, selon lequel la sanction infligée serait disproportionnée, le Tribunal rappelle tout d’abord que, dans le jugement 4749, au considérant 10, il a souligné ce qui suit sur l’importance qu’une mesure disciplinaire ne soit pas disproportionnée et sur les conséquences qui découlent d’un manque de proportionnalité:
  «Dans le jugement 4478, aux considérants 11 et 12, le Tribunal a rappelé que “[l]a jurisprudence confirme que la décision sur le type de mesures disciplinaires à prendre relève du pouvoir d’appréciation de l’autorité disciplinaire, pour autant que la mesure ne soit pas disproportionnée” (voir aussi le jugement 3640, au considérant 29), et que “le Tribunal ne saurait substituer son appréciation à celle d’une autorité disciplinaire, [car] il se borne à évaluer si la décision est dans les limites de l’acceptable” (voir également à ce sujet le jugement 3971, au considérant 17). Dans ce jugement 4478, le Tribunal a en outre relevé que, si le manque de proportionnalité doit être considéré comme une erreur de droit justifiant l’annulation d’une mesure disciplinaire, “[l]orsque l’on cherche à déterminer si une mesure disciplinaire est disproportionnée par rapport à l’infraction commise, il y a lieu de prendre en compte les circonstances, tant objectives que subjectives, et [qu’]en cas de licenciement une étude particulièrement attentive s’impose”. [...]»
  (Voir également, à ce sujet, les jugements 4859, au considérant 28, 4858, au considérant 28, 4745, au considérant 11, 4697, au considérant 24, 4660, aux considérants 16 à 19, et 4504, au considérant 11.)
  Ainsi, selon une jurisprudence bien établie du Tribunal, l’autorité investie du pouvoir disciplinaire au sein d’une organisation internationale dispose d’un pouvoir d’appréciation quant au choix de la sanction infligée à l’un de ses fonctionnaires à raison d’une faute commise par ce dernier, mais sa décision doit cependant, dans tous les cas, respecter le principe de proportionnalité qui s’impose en la matière (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4832, au considérant 47, 4504, au considérant 11, 4457, au considérant 20, 3971, au considérant 17, 3944, au considérant 12, et 3640, au considérant 29).
  À ce sujet, le Tribunal constate que la CPI fait erreur quand elle affirme dans ses écritures que c’est au requérant seul qu’il incomberait de démontrer que la sanction infligée était disproportionnée. En effet, s’agissant du respect du principe de proportionnalité, qui doit guider toute organisation dans la détermination de la sanction à infliger en matière disciplinaire, c’est au Tribunal qu’il appartient de le vérifier avec l’éclairage des arguments des deux parties sur la question, sans que la charge de la preuve incombe plus particulièrement à l’une d’entre elles.
  Dans la présente situation, le Tribunal considère que la sanction de renvoi infligée au requérant – aggravée, qui plus est, par la suppression du préavis et des indemnités de licenciement – était d’une sévérité excessive et a ainsi été prononcée en méconnaissance du principe de proportionnalité. Le Tribunal relève que la sanction infligée à l’intéressé était la mesure disciplinaire la plus sévère prévue par les dispositions statutaires de la CPI et qu’elle dépassait largement les limites de ce qui était acceptable dans les circonstances de l’espèce ainsi que le démontrent les considérations suivantes.
  À cet égard, le Tribunal observe, en premier lieu, qu’en ce qui concerne toutes les allégations reprochées au requérant autres que celles portant sur la violation de l’obligation de confidentialité ou de l’obligation de réserve, la sanction de renvoi sans préavis pour faute grave n’était pas ouverte à l’organisation aux termes de l’alinéa viii) du paragraphe a) de la règle 110.6 sur lequel elle s’est appuyée en l’espèce. […]
  [A]insi que le Tribunal l’a rappelé dans le jugement 4362, au considérant 18, «[l]e manquement au devoir de confidentialité par un fonctionnaire d’un tribunal international constitue une question extrêmement grave [et dans] certains cas, la gravité d’un tel manquement justifiera assurément un renvoi sans préavis. [Toutefois, dans] d’autres cas, cette sanction ne sera pas forcément justifiée.» […]
  En l’espèce, comme il a été dit, le manquement reproché au requérant à cet égard ne relevait pas de l’obligation de confidentialité en l’absence de preuve au-delà de tout doute raisonnable que des informations confidentielles avaient été divulguées. Il relevait plutôt d’un manquement à l’obligation de réserve. Or, ici, le Tribunal estime que ce manquement ne constituait pas une faute d’une intensité qui permette de la qualifier de faute grave, si bien que, dans cette mesure, la sanction de renvoi sans préavis pour faute grave ne trouvait pas application.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3640, 3944, 3971, 4362, 4457, 4478, 4504, 4660, 4697, 4745, 4749, 4832, 4858, 4859
  

  Keywords:

  disciplinary measure; discretion; proportionality; summary dismissal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4948

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Criminal Court
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: Le requérant conteste la décision de le suspendre de ses fonctions avec maintien de son traitement et avec effet immédiat.

  Considerations 9 and 15

  Extract:

  [I]l convient de rappeler qu’il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante du Tribunal que la suspension est une décision de nature discrétionnaire, qui ne peut faire l’objet que d’un contrôle restreint. Ainsi, dans le jugement 4658, au considérant 2, le Tribunal a souligné en particulier ce qui suit à cet égard:
  «2. Comme le Tribunal l’a relevé à diverses reprises, une mesure de suspension, avec ou sans maintien du traitement, décidée dans le cadre d’une procédure disciplinaire, est une mesure provisoire qui ne préjuge en rien de la décision sur le fond relative à une éventuelle sanction disciplinaire prononcée à l’encontre du fonctionnaire concerné.
  [...]
  Une telle décision relève du pouvoir d’appréciation du chef exécutif de l’organisation. Elle ne peut donc faire l’objet de la part du Tribunal que d’un contrôle restreint et ne sera annulée que si elle émane d’une autorité incompétente, viole une règle de forme ou de procédure, repose sur une erreur de droit ou de fait, omet de tenir compte de faits essentiels, est entachée de détournement de pouvoir, ou s’il a été tiré du dossier des conclusions manifestement erronées (voir, notamment, les jugements 4586, au considérant 8, 4519, au considérant 2, 4452, au considérant 7, 3037, au considérant 9, 3035, au considérant 10, 2698, au considérant 9, et 2365, au considérant 4 a)).
  [...]
  Enfin, si l’autorité peut prendre une mesure de suspension lorsqu’elle considère, sur la base d’éléments portés à sa connaissance et selon son appréciation, que l’accusation de faute formulée contre un fonctionnaire est légitime, point n’est cependant besoin, à ce stade, d’apporter la preuve que les accusations sont fondées (voir, notamment, les jugements 3036, au considérant 13, 3035, au considérant 14 a), et 2698, au considérant 11).»
  (Voir également les jugements 4612, au considérant 3, 4586, aux considérants 8 et 11, 4361, aux considérants 7 et 11, 4359, aux considérants 7 et 11, 3496, au considérant 2, et 3035, au considérant 10.)
  Dans ce jugement 4658, au même considérant, le Tribunal a toutefois précisé qu’en tant que mesure contraignante à l’égard du fonctionnaire visé, la suspension doit par ailleurs se fonder sur une base légale, être justifiée par les besoins de l’organisation et être prise dans le respect du principe de proportionnalité (voir également, à ce sujet, le jugement 4612, au considérant 3). Le Tribunal a ainsi rappelé qu’il est nécessaire qu’une faute grave soit reprochée au fonctionnaire pour qu’une mesure de suspension puisse être prononcée (voir, par exemple, les jugements 4519, au considérant 2, 3035, au considérant 10, et 2365, au considérant 4 a)). En outre, le Tribunal a souligné que, pour apprécier la légalité d’une mesure de suspension, il doit déterminer si les conditions requises pour prendre une telle mesure étaient réunies au moment où elle a été ordonnée, les faits postérieurs ne pouvant pas être pris en considération (voir, à ce sujet, les jugements 3036, au considérant 13, 3035, au considérant 12, et 2365, au considérant 4 c)).
  […] Ainsi que l’a déjà rappelé le Tribunal, notamment dans les jugements 4658, au considérant 2, précité, et 2698, au considérant 11, une organisation peut prendre une mesure de suspension lorsqu’elle considère, sur la base d’éléments portés à sa connaissance et selon son appréciation, que l’accusation de faute formulée contre un fonctionnaire est légitime, et ce, sans devoir pour autant apporter à cette étape la preuve que les accusations sont fondées.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 2698, 4612, 4658
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; judicial review; suspension;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4945

  
  139th Session, 2025
  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the FAO’s decision to confirm the allegations of sexual harassment against him, to impose on him a ban from all future employment with the FAO/World Food Programme, to include his name in the United Nations Clear Check screening database for perpetrators of sexual harassment, not to renew his short-term contract following a mandatory break in service, and to place a note in his personnel file confirming this.

  Consideration 9

  Extract:

  The Tribunal’s assessment of the investigation that had been undertaken by OIGI is that it was thorough and balanced. Its report was cogent and persuasive. It is not for the Tribunal to itself determine whether the conduct of the subject of the grievance has been established beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether there was evidence before the decision-maker which would justify such a decision by that decision-maker (see, for example, Judgment 3964, consideration 13). In this case there was. More generally, the Tribunal will accept findings of fact by investigative bodies, particularly when they have heard evidence from witnesses (as happened in this case) in the absence of manifest error (see, for example, Judgment 4237, consideration 12).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3964, 4237
  

  Keywords:

  decision-maker; deference; discretion; internal appeals body; investigative body; role of the tribunal;
  

  Consideration 10

  Extract:

  If it was open to the FAO/WPF to find the complainant guilty of the misconduct alleged, as it was, then what it decided to do in consequence involved the exercise of a discretionary power. It is not evident at all that the discretionary power miscarried when the FAO/WFP decided to ban the complainant from future employment and to place a note in his personnel file to this effect. Similarly, the discretionary power did not miscarry in relation to causing personal information identifying the complainant to be placed on the United Nations Clear Check screening database, which appears to have been created “to prevent the rehire of perpetrators of sexual harassment”. Many international organisations have a policy of zero tolerance for sexual harassment and it is a legitimate mechanism, even if harsh, to meet that objective by creating a database designed to reveal individuals who have clearly been found to have engaged in such conduct.

  Keywords:

  decision-maker; disciplinary measure; discretion; personal data; personal file; sexual harassment;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4944

  
  139th Session, 2025
  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decision rejecting her internal appeal in which she contended, among other things, that the investigations conducted and mandated by the World Food Programme into her complaint of rape were ultra vires and that her complaint should instead have been referred to and investigated by national or international judicial authorities.

  Consideration 7

  Extract:

  
  The complainant further contends that, in the present case, rather than investigating the case, the FAO should have referred it to national or international judicial authorities. This argument is unfounded. As noted above, the applicable legal framework does not compel the FAO to report to the police and national judicial authority facts that allegedly amount to crimes punishable on the basis of the local applicable criminal law. The applicable rules and policies establish that the FAO has the discretionary power to report a breach of national laws to the relevant national authorities on a case-by-case basis. An assessment on a case-by-case basis required, for example, an evaluation, by the Organization, of whether national proceedings might help to ensure a prompt investigation, useful for the purposes of the internal proceedings set up for the protection of the victim and the punishment of the perpetrator. The complainant has not established to the Tribunal’s satisfaction that, in the present case, this discretionary power was exercised unlawfully. She was, in any event, able to report directly to the local police and judicial authority, if she had wanted to.

  Keywords:

  discretion; investigation; sexual harassment;
  

  Consideration 6

  Extract:

  The complainant’s contention that the investigations conducted and mandated by the Organization [into her complaint of rape] were ultra vires and went beyond the scope of an administrative investigation, is misconceived. Firstly, the Tribunal notes that the FAO’s legal framework enshrined a wide definition of sexual harassment, which included rape, and compelled the Organization to promptly and thoroughly investigate reports of sexual assault […] Secondly, the Tribunal notes that pursuant to the relevant provisions of the FAO Staff Rules and Regulations, the fact that deeds of staff members amount to a violation of national laws including crimes as defined by competent national laws, does not impede the FAO from taking action and investigating such deeds as misconduct for the purposes of its internal legal framework. Misconduct may well be relevant and be punishable both by national law and by the legal framework of an international organization. […] [T]he Organization is entitled to carry out an investigation into episodes of sexual harassment, including involving violence or lack of consent, even though such episodes may amount to rape according to the relevant national criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the same deed (here the alleged rape) may be regarded simultaneously as a crime according to the relevant national laws and as misconduct according to the legal framework of an international organization. Accordingly, such a deed may well be the subject matter of a criminal investigation and of internal proceedings (through an investigation into a harassment complaint and potential disciplinary proceedings) in parallel or in sequence, as can be inferred from paragraph 44 of the Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service, quoted in Section 304 of the FAO Staff Rules and Regulations. The fact that a deed may amount to a crime potentially subject to criminal investigation to be carried out by the competent national authority does not impede an international organization from taking action for the purposes of its internal rules, and, in particular, for the purpose of conducting a prompt and thorough investigation upon a report of harassment/misconduct. There are no internal rules or policies that prevent the FAO from investigating misconduct amounting to a crime, for the purposes and the effects of internal investigation and measures. In such a case, the investigation is not of a criminal nature, and it is carried out without prejudice for further – concurrent, earlier or subsequent – action taken by the competent national authority. Thus, the allegation that, in the present case, the investigations mandated and conducted by WFP were ultra vires and beyond the Organization’s mandate, is unfounded.

  Keywords:

  disciplinary procedure; discretion; harassment; investigation; misconduct; sexual harassment;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4937

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Organization for Migration
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the decisions to abolish the post she encumbered and to terminate her contract.

  Considerations 2-3

  Extract:

  Firm precedent has it that in order to achieve greater efficiency, to make budgetary savings or if funding is no longer available, international organisations may undertake restructuring entailing the redefinition of posts and staff reductions. However, each and every individual decision adopted in such restructuring must respect all the pertinent legal rules, and, in particular, the fundamental rights of the staff concerned (see, for example, Judgments 4599, consideration 11, and 3238, consideration 7). The case law also states that decisions concerning restructuring within an international organization, including the abolition of posts, may be taken at the discretion of the executive head of an organization and are consequently subject to only limited review. The Tribunal will ascertain whether such decisions are taken in accordance with the relevant rules on competence, form or procedure, whether they rest upon a mistake of fact or law, or whether they constituted abuse of authority. The Tribunal will not rule on the appropriateness of the restructuring, as it will not substitute the organization’s view with its own (see, for example, Judgments 4844, consideration 3, 4004, consideration 2, and 3582, consideration 6). Nevertheless, any decision to abolish a post must be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgments 4353, consideration 6, and 3582, consideration 6). Moreover, a decision to abolish a post must be communicated to the staff member occupying the post in a manner that safeguards that individual’s rights. These rights are safeguarded by giving proper notice of the decision, reasons for the decision and an opportunity to contest the decision. The Tribunal has further stated that the need to give reasons in support of adverse administrative decisions arises precisely because the affected staff member must be given an opportunity of knowing and evaluating whether or not the decision should be timely contested (see, for example, Judgments 4353, consideration 7, 3928, consideration 15, and 3041, considerations 8 and 9). It is worth recalling that, as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing the administrative arrangements for the Support Unit, the Unit’s management and oversight was the responsibility of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) Chair-in-Office, who decided how the Support Unit was run and advised the Organization accordingly of its role in accommodating and supporting the Unit. Moreover, the Head of the Support Unit, who was offered a contract of services by IOM under terms and conditions approved by the Chair-in-Office, was selected by the latter and was accountable to her or him. The Tribunal considers, in light of the terms of the MOU, that the decision to abolish the Support Unit was the prerogative of the GFMD.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3041, 3238, 3582, 3928, 4004, 4353, 4599, 4844
  

  Keywords:

  abolition of post; discretion;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4935

  
  139th Session, 2025
  International Organization for Migration
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the decisions to abolish his position and terminate his appointment.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  Firm precedent has it that in order to achieve greater efficiency or to make budgetary savings international organisations may undertake restructuring entailing the redefinition of posts and staff reductions. However, each and every individual decision adopted in the context of such restructuring must respect all the pertinent legal rules and in particular the fundamental rights of the staff concerned (see, for example, Judgment 3238, consideration 7). The case law also states that decisions concerning restructuring within an international organisation, including the abolition of posts, may be taken at the discretion of the executive head of the organisation and are consequently subject to only limited review. Accordingly, the Tribunal will ascertain whether such decisions are taken in accordance with the relevant rules on competence, form or procedure, whether they rest upon a mistake of fact or law, or whether they constituted abuse of authority. The Tribunal will not rule on the appropriateness of the restructuring, as it will not substitute the organisation’s view with its own (see, for example, Judgment 4004, consideration 2). Nevertheless, any decision to abolish a post must be based on objective grounds and its purpose may never be to remove a member of staff regarded as unwanted. Disguising such purposes as a restructuring measure would constitute abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 3582, consideration 6).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3238, 3582, 4004
  

  Keywords:

  abolition of post; discretion; duty of care; duty to substantiate decision; executive head; judicial review; limits; reorganisation;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4924

  
  139th Session, 2025
  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: Le requérant conteste son licenciement pour motif disciplinaire.

  Considerations 7-10

  Extract:

  Toutefois, le Tribunal estime qu’il ne peut pour autant être tenu pour établi au-delà de tout doute raisonnable que la plainte ainsi déposée ait constitué une dénonciation calomnieuse. Une plainte ne saurait en effet être ainsi qualifiée que si elle a été introduite de mauvaise foi. Or, en l’espèce, aucun élément de preuve versé au dossier ne permet d’affirmer avec certitude que le requérant avait clairement conscience, lorsqu’il a formé sa plainte pour propos mensongers dirigée contre M. Do., de la fausseté des accusations contenues dans celle-ci.
  […] Le Tribunal relève d’abord, à cet égard, que, dans la décision de licenciement […], cette tentative de fraude est présentée tantôt comme une faute distincte de la dénonciation calomnieuse […] tantôt comme la circonstance aggravante d’une faute unique que constituerait cette dénonciation calomnieuse. La confusion résultant de cette ambiguïté n’est pas admissible dans une décision telle qu’une sanction disciplinaire – et, qui plus est, une révocation –, dont les motifs doivent être définis avec une particulière rigueur.
  Mais cette seconde charge ne pouvait de toute façon être retenue. Il ressort en effet des termes mêmes de la qualification de cette dernière que la tentative de fraude reprochée au requérant était «matérialisée par [la] dénonciation calomnieuse» qui lui était par ailleurs imputée. Dès lors que le Tribunal estime, comme il a été dit au considérant précédent, que cette dénonciation calomnieuse n’est elle-même pas établie, la tentative de fraude en question se trouve privée, par voie de conséquence, de son élément constitutif essentiel.
  Au surplus, la faute tenant au dépôt d’une plainte abusive n’aurait pu légalement justifier, en elle-même, l’infliction d’une sanction disciplinaire aussi lourde qu’un licenciement.
  Il résulte de la jurisprudence du Tribunal que, si l’autorité investie du pouvoir disciplinaire au sein d’une organisation internationale dispose d’un pouvoir d’appréciation quant au choix de la sanction infligée à l’un de ses fonctionnaires à raison d’une faute commise par celui-ci, sa décision doit cependant, dans tous les cas, respecter le principe de proportionnalité qui s’impose en la matière (voir notamment les jugements 4457, au considérant 20, 3944, au considérant 12, 3927, au considérant 13, ou 3640, au considérant 29).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3640, 3927, 3944, 4457
  

  Keywords:

  bad faith; burden of proof; disciplinary measure; discretion; judicial review; proportionality;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4917

  
  139th Session, 2025
  United Nations Industrial Development Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the non-extension of her fixed-term appointment.

  Consideration 12

  Extract:

  It is pertinent to recall the Tribunal’s well-established case law concerning the non-renewal of fixed-term appointments. The case law has often reiterated that a staff member appointed on a fixed-term contract does not have a right to the renewal of the contract, when it expires (see, for example, Judgments 4587, consideration 19, 4462, consideration 18, 3586, consideration 6, and 3448, consideration 7). The non-renewal of a fixed-term contract may be lawfully justified by the abolition of the post in the context of a restructuring process, provided that the abolition of the post be based on objective and valid grounds, as the abolition of a post must not serve as a pretext for removing unwanted staff, which would constitute an abuse of authority (see Judgments 4841, consideration 4, and 3940, consideration 3). Decisions concerning the non-renewal of a fixed-term contract, the abolition of a post, and/or a restructuring process, are discretionary decisions subject to limited review by the Tribunal. A restructuring decision must be justified by real needs (see Judgment 4009, consideration 15). The Tribunal does not rule on the appropriateness of a restructuring process, unless and until it negatively affects a staff member in breach of staff rules and regulations (see Judgment 4841, consideration 4).
  The Tribunal has also stated that it is often the case in a challenge to a decision to abolish a post that the aggrieved staff member, in this case the complainant, will develop arguments, often at length, as to how the restructuring might have been done differently and without the consequence of their post being abolished, but whether it could have been done differently is usually beside the point. It is sufficient for the organisation to point to legitimate reasons for the action actually taken (see Judgment 4036, consideration 15).
  Moreover, the case law also requires that the reason for the non-renewal must be valid (and not an excuse to get rid of a staff member) and be notified within a reasonable time (see Judgments 4503, consideration 7, 3769, consideration 7, 3626, consideration 12, 3586, consideration 10, and 3582, consideration 9). However, the case law does not require that reasons be stated in the text that give notice of the non-extension (see Judgments 3837, consideration 10, and 1750, consideration 6). The reasons may emerge at some later time and even during the course of the appeal proceedings so long as the staff member is fittingly permitted to reply (see Judgments 3837, consideration 10, and 1817, consideration 6). Further, it is sufficient if the reasons emerge orally in a meeting or discussion (see, for example, Judgment 3837, consideration 10).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1750, 1817, 3448, 3582, 3586, 3626, 3769, 3837, 3940, 4009, 4036, 4462, 4503, 4587, 4841
  

  Keywords:

  abolition of post; discretion; judicial review; motivation; non-renewal of contract; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4916

  
  139th Session, 2025
  Energy Charter Conference
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests her Performance Appraisal Report for the period from 1 November 2019 to 31 October 2020 and the decision not to renew her appointment due to unsatisfactory performance and loss of trust.

  Consideration 4

  Extract:

  It must be recalled that the Tribunal has consistently held that a decision not to renew the appointment of a staff member of an international organisation lies within the discretion of its executive head and is therefore subject to only limited review. It may be set aside only if it was taken without authority, or in breach of a rule of form or of procedure, or was based on a mistake of fact or of law, or if some essential fact was overlooked, or if clearly mistaken conclusions were drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgment 4654, consideration 16). However, under the Tribunal’s case law applicable to contractual relationships generally, a decision not to renew a contract must be based on objective, valid reasons, and not on arbitrary or irrational ones (see, for example, Judgments 4495, consideration 15, 3769, consideration 7, 3353, consideration 15, and 1128, consideration 2).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1128, 3353, 3769, 4495, 4654
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; duty to substantiate decision; executive head; judicial review; limits; non-renewal of contract;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4897

  
  138th Session, 2024
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges her appraisal report for 2018.

  Consideration 16

  Extract:

  [T]he complainant argues that the four-point assessment scale thus applied does not allow staff members to be assessed as accurately as the eight-point rating scale used in the former assessment system.
  [T]he establishment of such assessment scales is a policy choice falling within the Organisation’s discretion with which – apart from in the extreme case of a clear abuse of that power, which does not arise here – it is not for the Tribunal to concern itself.

  Keywords:

  discretion; performance report; rating;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4895

  
  138th Session, 2024
  European Patent Organisation
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the date of his promotion with retroactive effect and seeks promotion from an earlier date.

  Consideration 3

  Extract:

  It should be recalled that the Tribunal has consistently held that international organizations enjoy wide discretion in relation to the promotion of staff and that it therefore exercises only a limited power of review in this area. The Tribunal will not interfere unless the impugned decision was taken without authority; if it was based on an error of law or fact, some material fact was overlooked, or a plainly wrong conclusion was drawn from the facts; if it was taken in breach of a rule of form or of procedure; or if there was an abuse of authority (see, in particular, Judgments 4391, consideration 4, and 4290, consideration 8). Furthermore, the Tribunal has held that, since the assessment of a candidate for promotion involves a value judgement, it is not its role to interfere in this decision-making process unless it is seriously flawed (see, in particular, Judgments 4391, consideration 4, 4290, consideration 8, 4066, consideration 3, and 1827, consideration 6).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1827, 4066, 4290, 4391
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; judicial review; promotion; work appraisal;
  

  Judgment keywords

  Keywords:

  applicable law; competence of tribunal; complaint dismissed; discretion; internal appeal; internal appeals body; judicial review; oral proceedings; order; promotion; retroactivity; right to be heard; work appraisal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4881

  
  138th Session, 2024
  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges his change of immediate supervisor.

  Considerations 3-5

  Extract:

  Article II of the Statute of the Tribunal provides, in paragraphs 1 and 5, that the Tribunal shall be competent to hear complaints alleging non-observance, in substance or in form, of the terms of an official’s appointment and of the provisions of the staff regulations of the organisation that employs her or him. As the Tribunal has repeatedly stated in its case law, it may be inferred from these provisions that, for a complaint to be receivable, among other requirements, the staff member must have a cause of action (see, for example, Judgments 4337, consideration 6, 4296, consideration 6, 4145, consideration 5, or 3426, consideration 16).
  A cause of action may be recognised only if the decision challenged by that official adversely affects her or him (see, in particular, Judgments 4322, considerations 8 and 9, 3198, consideration 13, 2952, consideration 3, and 1852, considerations 2 and 3).
  However, the Tribunal finds that the complainant has no such cause of action in the present case.
  It is well established in the case law that an international organisation has broad discretion over the organisation of its services and the Tribunal cannot judge the wisdom of measures that it deems necessary to adopt in this regard (see, for example, Judgments 3362, consideration 13, 2856, consideration 9, 2510, consideration 10, or 1131, consideration 5). As the Organization correctly points out, a decision which – like the decision challenged in the present case –determines the reporting line of staff members belonging to a given category or service is a measure of this type and therefore falls within the scope of that case law.
  It is also a general rule that an organisation’s staff members are, in the performance of their duties, placed in a position of hierarchical subordination to its executive head and the various supervisors to whom they report.[...]
  [S]taff members cannot ordinarily be allowed the opportunity to challenge measures determining their reporting lines or the choice of persons designated to exercise supervisory functions in their respect. It is the organisation’s prerogative to take such decisions and they cannot therefore be considered to adversely affect those staff members.
  Admittedly, under the Tribunal’s case law, as an exception to what has just been said, there are two particular situations in which a staff member may be considered to have a cause of action in challenging decisions of this type. The first is where the contested decision has a direct adverse impact on the rights conferred by that staff member’s terms of appointment (see in particular, for the use of this criterion in the similar context of criticism of a measure falling within an organisation’s management policy, Judgment 3376, consideration 3). The second is where the decision in question involves a manifest perversity that renders her or his challenge lawful (according to the criterion established by the Tribunal in Judgment 4322, consideration 9, in a situation that may be transposed to this area).
  However, neither of these situations arises in the present case.

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1131, 1852, 2510, 2856, 2952, 3198, 3362, 3376, 3426, 4145, 4296, 4322, 4337
  

  Keywords:

  cause of action; discretion; judicial review;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4877

  
  138th Session, 2024
  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant challenges the non-renewal of his temporary appointment.

  Consideration 2

  Extract:

  It must be recalled that the Tribunal has consistently held that the decision not to renew the appointment of a staff member of an international organisation lies within the discretion of its executive head and is therefore subject to only limited review. It may be set aside only if it was taken without authority, or in breach of a rule of form or of procedure, or was based on a mistake of fact or of law, or if some essential fact was overlooked, or if clearly mistaken conclusions were drawn from the facts, or if there was abuse of authority (see, for example, Judgments 4654, consideration 16, 4172, consideration 5, 2148, consideration 23, or 1052, consideration 4). That is, a fortiori, the situation in a case such as this where the dispute concerns the non-renewal of a temporary appointment which expressly stated that the appointee was not guaranteed any renewal or conversion of his contract into any other type of contract with UNESCO.
  Nonetheless, under the Tribunal’s case law applicable to contractual relationships in general, a non-renewal decision must also be based on objective, valid reasons, and not on arbitrary or irrational ones (see, in particular, Judgments 4809, consideration 10, 4654, consideration 16, 4495, consideration 15, 3769, consideration 7, 3353, consideration 15, 2708, consideration 12, 1154, consideration 4, and 1128, consideration 2). Those reasons must also be communicated to the staff member concerned (see, in particular, Judgments 4809, consideration 10, 3914, consideration 14, and 3444, consideration 8), although they need not necessarily appear in the decision itself (see, to that effect, Judgments 4368, consideration 15, 3914, consideration 15, and 1750, consideration 6).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 1052, 1128, 1154, 2148, 2708, 3353, 3444, 3769, 3914, 4172, 4368, 4495, 4654, 4809
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; non-renewal of contract; role of the tribunal;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4867

  
  138th Session, 2024
  World Health Organization
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant contests the determination of her leave status during her absence from work as well as the decision, taken as a result of her internal appeal, not to award her moral damages and to grant her up to 2,500 Swiss francs in legal costs.

  Consideration 7

  Extract:

  Decisions regarding special leave are discretionary and, thus, they are subject to only limited review and can be set aside only if they have been taken without authority or in breach of the rules of form or procedure, if they are based on an error of fact or law or have overlooked essential facts, if clearly mistaken conclusions have been drawn from the facts or if there is an abuse of authority (see Judgments 4750, consideration 9, and 4101, consideration 8).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 4101, 4750
  

  Keywords:

  discretion; judicial review; special leave;
  

  
  
  

• Judgment 4856

  
  138th Session, 2024
  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
  Extracts: EN, FR
  Full Judgment Text: EN, FR
  Summary: The complainant impugns the decision to dismiss him for misconduct.

  Consideration 19

  Extract:

  In his internal appeal, the complainant submitted that the measure of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate, primarily because in imposing it, WFP did not take into consideration his “long and distinguished service” with it. He also submitted that the measure had been imposed on an improper evidentiary basis, which he repeats before the Tribunal. The Appeals Committee concluded that the measure of dismissal was proportionate to the nature of the misconduct the complainant committed, with which conclusion the Director-General concurred in the impugned decision, noting that in imposing that measure, he had taken into account the complainant’s service but had decided that the imposition of a less severe measure was not warranted having regard to the totality of the circumstances, including the public nature of the complainant’s actions and his position. The Tribunal is satisfied that this determination was open to the Director-General in the circumstances of the case and discerns no manifest error in that determination. It therefore rejects the complainant’s claim that the disciplinary measure of dismissal was not proportionate.

  Keywords:

  aggravating circumstances; disciplinary measure; discretion; misconduct; mitigating circumstances; proportionality;
  

  Consideration 18

  Extract:

  Regarding the disciplinary measure imposed on the complainant, the general principle in the Tribunal’s case law is that the severity of the sanction that is imposed on a staff member of an international organization whose misconduct has been established is in the discretion of the decision-making authority, who must however exercise it in observance of the rule of law, particularly the principle of proportionality (see, for example, Judgments 3953, consideration 14, and 3640, consideration 29).

  Reference(s)

  ILOAT Judgment(s): 3640, 3953
  

  Keywords:

  disciplinary measure; discretion; misconduct; proportionality;
  

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